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INTRODUCTION

Joe Smith was sixty-two years old and still married to his high
school sweetheart, Kim. Ever since graduating high school, he had
worked as a crane operator for a small construction company, where
he had made just enough to support his family and maintain their
modest household. The couple's two sons were on scholarship at the
state university. Joe hoped college would separate his boys from the
sorts of local rabble which had gotten him into trouble decades ago.
Fortunately, no one seemed to care anymore about Joe's 1964 conviction for felony drug possession. Or so he thought.
He opened his newspaper one Sunday morning and learned a
group of four men armed with baseball bats had broken into the home
of a local retiree over the weekend, destroying thousands of dollars
worth of property before savagely beating the man's golden retriever to
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death. This was the third incident of this kind in less than a month,
and had happened less than three miles down the road from Joe's
home. The suspects appeared to be victimizing older residents who
lived in more isolated or rural parts of the county. Joe read this
angrily, knowing he and his wife might also be targets. They would be
helpless against four armed men.
After work the next day, Joe drove into town and visited Steve's
Hunting Supply. After browsing the firearms display for a few hours,
he decided on a pump action shotgun. "Perfect for home defense,"
Steve remarked. But once Joe had filled out all the paperwork-on
which he noted his prior felony conviction-Steve refused to make the
sale.
As Joe stared at him in confused silence, the uncomfortable store
owner explained that state law had recently been revised to prohibit
anyone with a felony conviction from having or buying a firearm,' and
that federal law prohibited retailers from selling a gun to someone
whose possession was illegal under state law.2 So regrettably, because
of Joe's 1964 drug conviction, it was unlawful for Steve to make the
sale. Joe was bewildered. "That was forty-something years ago!" he
protested. "Plus, I'm not taking this thing anywhere but my own
house."
"I'm sorry," said Steve resolutely, "but that's the law, and if you
don't like it, contact your state representatives." When Joe finally got
home that night, he did just that. After having Kim check over his
letter for spelling errors, Joe sealed it reverently inside an envelope,
affixed two postage stamps just to be safe, and said a prayer.
One night several weeks later, Joe stood on the back porch of his
country home grilling spare ribs for a late dinner. Kim was inside,
folding laundry. Just as he turned off the propane flame, Joe heard a
vehicle approaching his home. Even from the opposite side of the
house, he could hear unbelievably loud music pumping from the car
stereo into the rural night air. "I sure hope that's not our boys!" he
shouted through the back door to Kim, who appeared momentarily,
shaking her head. "I don't think so," she said with concern.
1. This is precisely the state of the law in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 14-415.1 (2007).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) (2006) (making it unlawful for a dealer to sell "any
firearm to any person in any State where the purchase or possession by such person of
such firearm would be in violation of any State law"); id. § 922(d)(1) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to
any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person . .. is
under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ....
).
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Joe's pulse quickened. He strode through the kitchen and living
room to the front of the house and peered through the small windows
in the door. To his horror (but not to his surprise), he saw four shadowy figures get out of a parked car and begin to walk casually across
the wide lawn towards his front steps, each carrying what looked like a
baseball bat.
He tried to calm his breathing as he quickly double-checked the
lock on the front door and handed his cell phone to Kim, who looked
faint. Joe quietly instructed his wife to call for help and lock herself in
the bedroom until police arrived. Without questioning him, she dialed
emergency and hurried toward the rear of the home. Joe was still
scouring the kitchen in search of something he could use to defend
himself when he heard the first sound of shattering glass.
Thirty miles away from the crisis unfolding at Joe's home, a young
dental assistant named Meredith paid her bar tab and finished off her
fourth drink. She lit a cigarette as she stumbled out of the downtown
martini bar, hoping to catch a stronger cell phone signal.
Six years earlier, before graduate school, she had been convicted
of "felony death by vehicle" after drunkenly driving over the city sidewalk (and a pedestrian) on her way home from a cocktail party. While
her prison sentence had been suspended, state law mandated revocation of her driver's license; yet it also allowed her to petition for a conditional license after five years. Just months earlier, her own petition
had been granted, and she purchased a new Land Rover to celebrate
regaining her driving privileges.
Now frustrated with being unable to contact her "no show" date,
the tipsy young woman reoriented herself towards the parking deck.
She climbed the stairs to the second level and peered groggily across
several rows of cars in search of her large, silver-colored sports utility
vehicle. Finding it, she scrambled into the driver's seat. With a sigh of
resignation, she dialed her ex-boyfriend, started the engine, and dug
through the glove box in search of her favorite Whitney Houston
album.
In his office at the state capitol the next morning, Senator Randall
hands a stack of unread constituent letters to his intern. "I'm heading
to a late breakfast," he says. "If they're writing about the school funding bill, send a gracious response-you know what to do with the rest."
An hour later, while the Senator is still shaking hands with union
bosses, all six pages of a handwritten letter from Joe Smith meet their
fate in the teeth of a document shredder.
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Understandingthe Issue: What Britt Did Not Address

The North Carolina Supreme Court very recently dealt with a case
brought by Barney Britt, a citizen who (like Joe Smith in the above
vignette) found his firearms ownership rights revoked by the state leg3
islature some decades after being convicted of a minor felony offense.
An amendment in 2004 to the Felony Firearms Act made it illegal for
Britt to keep a firearm in his own home-even though his rights of
citizenship had been fully restored and his post-conviction conduct
had been without blemish.4 Reversing the court of appeals, the
supreme court held, on state constitutional grounds, that the Act was
an "unreasonable regulation" insofar as it applied to Britt:
Based on the facts of plaintiffs crime, his long post-conviction history of respect for the law, the absence of any evidence of violence by
plaintiff, and the lack of any exception or possible relief from the statute's operation, as applied to plaintiff, the 2004 version of [the Act] is
an unreasonable regulation, not fairly related to the preservation of
public peace and safety. In particular, it is unreasonable to assert that
a nonviolent citizen who has responsibly, safely, and legally owned
and used firearms for seventeen years is in reality so dangerous that
any possession at all of a firearm would pose a significant threat to
public safety.'
Even though the court properly restored Britt's rights,6 its limited,
fact-specific disapproval of the Act was inadequate. Because the court
refused to reach its worthy result by way of Britt's constitutional claims
(which would have risked overturning the Act entirely), other persons
with decades-old convictions for nonviolent and relatively insignificant
crimes remain in the clutches of a statute that deprives them of a fundamental, individual right under the federal Constitution; namely, the
right of self-defense. 7 The silver lining, of course, is that the court's as3. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009). The decision from which Britt
appealed, Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 253-76.

4. See Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 321-22, 323 (discussing briefly the legislative history
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 and highlighting Britt's exemplary behavior as a citizen).
5. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
6. See id. at 322 ("[T]his Court retained plaintiffs notice of appeal based upon a

substantial constitutional question as to the following issue only: 'Whether the application of the 2004 amendment to [the Act] to plaintiff violates his rights under N.C.
Const. art. I, § 30."'); id. at 321 ("We determine that [the Act] is unconstitutional as
applied to plaintiff .... ").
7. The Supreme Court has made clear that "the Due Process Clause specially pro-

tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
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applied holding left the Act vulnerable to further challenge from arguments it did not consider.
As the United States Supreme Court has recently emphasized, "the
inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the Second Amendment
right [to keep and bear arms]." 8 When an individual like Joe is confronted with mounting criminal violence in the neighborhood, no
response is more natural than his impulse to secure means of effective
self-defense. Not only is this response natural, but it is also popular.
Of the North Carolinians polled in a recent survey, over 52% keep a
firearm in their home;9 and of this number, at least 76% report doing
so for the specific purpose of defending themselves against
criminals.' In urban areas with higher instances of violent crime, an
even greater number (85% of gun owners surveyed) reported keeping
their weapon for protection against criminals. 1
Yet North Carolina law-even after the recent Britt decision-continues to prohibit people like our hypothetical Joe Smith from having a
firearm for any purpose, including self-defense in the home. 12 Despite
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed .... " Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In a lengthy examination of the Second Amendment, the Court
recently showed that the right to keep and bear arms is indeed deeply rooted in
America's history and tradition. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 2783-2822 (2008). As North Carolina gun enthusiasts have opined, the right of
self-defense is also "individual" in nature. See Gordon Hutchinson, Heller Opens a
Welcome Can of Worms, N.C. SpoRTsMAN, July 2008, available at http://www.north
carolinasportsman.com/details.php?id=836 (praising Heller as "a rock-solid constitutional determination by the Supreme Court of the United States that you and I have
the individual right to own firearms for personal use and self-defense"); see also
authorities listed infra note 37.
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
9. Press Release, Pub. Policy Polling, Crime Protection Main Reason for NC Gun
Ownership (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Survey], http://www.publicpolicypolling
.com/pdf/pppreleasenc2 11.pdf. This figure appears to have increased significandy
since a 2002 survey in which only 41.6% of respondents in North Carolina indicated
they kept a firearm in or around their home. See N.C. State Ctr. for Health Statistics,
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System: 2002 Survey Results, http://www.schs.
state.nc.us/schs/brfss/2002/nc/all/firearm4.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (indicating the website-format reproduction of the survey results statistics was generated
on July 28, 2003).
10. 2009 Survey, supra note 9.
11. See id. ("[Slignificantly more gun owners in urban areas-85% compared to the
overall 76%-reported owning them for protection against criminals."). As the report
explained, "[pleople living in places with higher crime rates, specifically large cities,
have greater concerns about becoming crime victims." Id.
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2007).
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the fact that he has never done anything remotely violent, Joe's fourdecade old felony conviction calls for his permanent disarmament
under the Act.13 In other words, this statute robs Joe of the only tool
realistically capable of protecting him against today's violent criminals:
his firearm. By disarming Joe, the Act effectively deprives him of his
fundamental right of self-defense-a right to which other North
Carolinians remain entitled even if they are convicted of other heinous
wrongs, so long as those wrongs are not labeled "felonies. '"14
Even though there is no fundamental right to drive a car, North
Carolina's treatment of drunk drivers like Meredith is far more careful
than its treatment of nonviolent felons like Joe. It is true that Meredith's felony death-by-vehicle conviction triggered the mandatory, "permanent" revocation of her driver's license by the Division of Motor
Vehicles (DMV). 1 5 But notwithstanding her conviction and the fact
that her crime was actually the unlawful killing of a person with her
car, current North Carolina law allows Meredith to own and possess a
motor vehicle. 16 Moreover, upon her petition after a five-year revocation period the DMV can reinstate her driver's license, with certain
17
restrictions, if it is pleased with her conduct during the five years.
Joe, meanwhile, has no way to recover his right to keep arms, short of
receiving an unconditional pardon for his 1964 felony by the Governor, which will not happen. 8 The current Felony Firearms Act simply
does not provide for relief from the disentitlement it imposes.' 9
The Due Process Clause "forbids the government to
infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."2 ° In contrast to the anemic "as applied"
reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Britt, 2 1 this Com13. See id.
14. As explained infra Part IV.A.1, even if a person has committed a shocking or
violent misdemeanor, she does not become disentitled under the Act. See, e.g., infra
text accompanying note 335 ("Even the habitual, wanton blowing up of dynamite or
exploding of bombs is not enough to earn disentitlement under the Act."). Why?
Because her crime is subject to neither "felony" punishment nor imprisonment in
excess of a year. See infra note 158; infra text accompanying notes 302-16.
15. See infra notes 452-71 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See infra discussion accompanying notes 443-46.
19. Rather than attack North Carolina's licensing or impaired driving laws, this
Comment will suggest that these statutes might serve as a model for improving the
Felony Firearms Act. See infra discussion accompanying notes 450-77.
20. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
21. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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ment argues that the Felony Firearms Act is not narrowly tailored to
any compelling state interest and thus unconstitutionally infringes the
fundamental right of self-defense. 22
B.

Considering the Heller Decision

On June 26, 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the United
States Supreme Court struck down the District's longstanding ban on
handgun possession.2 3 Justice Scalia's majority opinion declared that
the District's cocktail of laws, which effectively outlawed home possession of all operable firearms by combining a proscription against registration of handguns with a ban on possession of unregistered firearms,
violated guarantees contained in the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 24 The Court emphatically denounced the District's absolute handgun ban in the home, "where the need for defense
of self, family, and property is most acute."2 The Court explained:
The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for
combating [the problem of handgun violence], including some measures regulating handguns ....

But the enshrinement of constitutional

rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These
include the absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for selfdefense in the home.26
While anxious to safeguard the "inherent right of self-defense"
and the use of implements "overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose, '' 27 the Court cautiously attempted to avoid
establishing any illimitable right to firearm possession. "Like most
rights," explained Justice Scalia, "the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited. '2' The Court attempted to reassure
opponents of felon gun possession-such as Congress-that its holding should not serve to "cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on

22. If we could read Joe's letter, we might find him making some of the same observations which are made in this Comment.
23. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008) ("In sum, we
hold that the District's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second

Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.").
24. See id. at 2817.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 2822.
27. Id. at 2817.

28. Id. at 2816.
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the possession of firearms by felons"2 9 or other "presumptively lawful
regulatory measures." 30 But these words of comfort seem little more
than dicta, 31 being unnecessary to the case's holding and instead
merely incidental to the Court's admission that it had not undertaken
to analyze the "full scope" of the Second Amendment.3 2
Yet even if Justice Scalia's platitudes in this regard are interpreted
by lower courts as binding authority, 33 limitations on the fundamental
right of self-defense are still only "presumptively" lawful. Presump29. Id. at 2816-17 (listing as additional examples "laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms").
30. Id.at 2817 n.26.
31. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence
15 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1324757 (describing Justice Scalia's assurances regarding these regulatory measures as an "astounding series of dubious obiter dicta pronouncing on the
constitutionality of a wide range of gun control regulations that were not before the
Court"). Even Justice Breyer admitted that he was "puzzled by the majority's list.., of
provisions that in its view would survive Second Amendment scrutiny." See Heller,
128 S.Ct. at 2870 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He continued:
These ["presumptively lawful regulatory measures"] consist of (1) prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons; (2) prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons; (3) prohibitions on the possession of firearms by ...the
mentally ill; (4) laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings; and (5) government conditions
and qualifications attached to the commercial sale of arms .... Why these?
Is it that similar restrictions existed in the late 18th century? The majority
fails to cite any colonial analogues.
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The last three
sentences of this quoted passage seem designed to cast doubt sarcastically on Justice
Scalia's qualifications as an originalist. Professor Lund, who disagrees with Justice
Breyer's position in Heller, would nevertheless seem to agree with his criticism of
Scalia's approach. See Lund, supra, at 15 ("The most obviously originalist approach
would ask what kind of gun regulations were accepted, or acceptable, in the late eighteenth century.").
32. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
33. Professor Lund suggests that, unfortunately, Scalia's dicta might be treated as
law by lower courts. See Lund, supra note 31, at 15. He elaborates on this topic at
length, employing a critical tone:
Justice Scalia seems to promise an "exhaustive historical analysis" of [the lawfulness of such regulatory limitations] in future cases. If that turns out to be
anything like the historical analysis he used in ruling on the handgun ban, it
won't be exhaustive and it won't be historical. In any event, don't hold your
breath waiting for these cases-lower courts routinely treat Supreme Court
dicta as though they were holdings, and the Court routinely declines to
review such decisions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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tions are rebuttable. If absolute prohibitions against possessing the
means of exercising that right are unconstitutional, every lawmaking
body in America ought to reexamine any of their statutes which have
the effect of outlawing gun possession in absolute and indiscriminate
terms. This is particularly true for North Carolina, since its highest
Act may, in some cases, concourt has indicated the Felony Firearms
34
regulation.
unreasonable
stitute an
The question for North Carolina, which Britt v. State failed to
answer, 3 5 is whether the Felony Firearms Act in its current formwhich outlaws all gun possession by persons having any felony conviction-represents a constitutional response to gun violence, or
whether the state's decision to dispossess all felons of all firearms in
all places is instead a policy choice which the Constitution, through
Heller's recognition of a fundamental right of self-defense, has taken
off the table.3 6 A proper understanding of the constitutional right at
issue, in conjunction with an analysis of the Act's relationship to that
right, will answer the question. It is to the fundamental right itself
which we now turn.
C.

Assuming a Fundamental Right

Put quite simply, this Comment assumes the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects an individual, fundamental right
of self-defense.3 7 It further assumes that application of strict scrutiny
34. See Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009).
35. See Plaintiff Appellant's Supplemental Brief Per Order of 24 March 2009 at 4
n.1, Britt, 681 S.E.2d 320 (No. 488A07), 2009 WL 1347773 (emphasizing that Britt
was not "abandon[ing] the prior position taken in this case . . . that [Second Amendment of the United States Constitution] is also violated by the application of [the Act]
to [him]"); Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322 ("Because we agree with plaintiff that the application of [the Act] to him violates Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution, it is unnecessary for us to address any of plaintiffs remaining arguments, and we
express no opinion on their merit.").
36. Cf. supra text accompanying note 26.
37. See Heller 128 S. Ct. at 2797 (stating that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation" and
that "this meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second
Amendment[;] ... it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment
...codified a pre-existing right" which does not depend on the Constitution for its
exercise); cf. Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate et al. in Support of Respondent at 1, 5, 9, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), available at http://
www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/07-290bsacmembersussenate.pdf
(stating Congress has repeatedly declared the Second Amendment to protect an individual, fundamental right); Brief for the National Rifle Ass'n & the NRA Civil Rights
Defense Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol32/iss2/6

10

Cochran: A Fighting Chance for Outlaws: Strict Scrutiny of North Carolinas

2010]

SCRUTINIZING THE FELONY FIREARMS ACT

to any law infringing this fundamental right is appropriate, in keeping
with the Supreme Court's multitudinous Fourteenth Amendment "substantive due process" holdings.3 8 With these assumptions in place, I
(No. 07-290), available at http://www.nraila.org/media/PDFs/nra amicus heller.pdf
("As the Framers made clear in the very text of the Second Amendment, they considered the right to keep and bear arms necessary to the security of a free State[;] ... this
explicit connection between the right to keep and bear arms and the preservation of
democratic self-government compels a conclusion that the Amendment guarantees a
fundamental right." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); SENATE
JUDICIARY COMM., 97TH CONG., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION 12 (1982) (concluding that "the history, concept, and
wording of the [Second Amendment], as well as its interpretation by every major commentator and court in the first half-century after its ratification, indicates that what is
protected is an individual right of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a
peaceful manner"). Note that while Justice Scalia emphasized that a person's need for
self-defense may be "most acute" in the home, Heler 128 S. Ct. at 2817, there is no
reason to define the fundamental right of which we now speak with such specificity
that it becomes merely a right of home-defense. Cf. Posting of Randy Barnett to Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1231623391.shtml (Jan. 10, 2009, 16:36 EST)
(describing the right at issue in Heller as simply an unenumerated "natural right of
self-defense" but providing no qualification as to whether that right may only be protected in a person's home).
38. The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to laws affecting fundamental
rights. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). Professor Fallon writes that
the Supreme Court adopted the strict scrutiny formula as its generic test for

the protection of fundamental rights ....

One stringent version [of strict

judicial scrutiny] allows infringements of constitutional rights only to avert
catastrophic or nearly catastrophic harms. Another, which views legislation
as appropriately suspect when likely to reflect constitutionally forbidden purposes, aims at "smoking out" illicit governmental motives.
Richard H. Fallon, Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1271 (2007). Fallon
also observes that "individual Justices tend to vary their applications of strict scrutiny
based on their personal assessments of the importance of the right in question." Id.
One might even say that the Justices sometimes refuse to acknowledge they are even
applying such a standard. The Heller dissenters, for example, characterized the majority's analysis in that case as, "in theory," an application of strict scrutiny, 128 S. Ct.
1783, 2851-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting), notwithstanding the Court's assertion that it
had "declin[ed] to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment
restrictions." Id. at 2821 (majority opinion). For a discussion of the confusion surrounding the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to infringements of Second Amendment and other fundamental rights, see Adam Winkler,
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MIcH. L. REv. 683 (2007). Writing prior to
Heller, Professor Winkler states that "[u]nder current Second Amendment doctrine,
the right protected by the Second Amendment is not deemed 'fundamental."' Id. at
697 (emphasis added). "Yet," he continues, "one would imagine that holding would be
reconsidered should the Supreme Court reinterpret the amendment to protect an individual right." Id. (emphasis added). According to some, the Heller decision provided
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argue that the Felony Firearms Act is such a law and that it fails such
scrutiny.
It is crucial to understand that questions concerning whether this
right is truly fundamental, whether the Second Amendment applies to
the states, B9 or whether such a fundamental right may be defined with
this level of generality, are irrelevant to the analytical substance of this
discussion. For purposes of this Comment, the answer to all three of

just the sort of reinterpretation Professor Winkler predicted. E.g., Lund, supra note 31
(interpreting Justice Scalia's opinion in Heller as recognizing that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear firearms for purposes of personal and collective self-defense).
The Court has also addressed limitations of certain individual rights through a
determination of whether the right has been unduly burdened. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (explaining, in its evaluation
of a "constitutional right of privacy" as exercised by women seeking abortions, that
"not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right," and that "a finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus"). Even if
Felony Firearms Act does not have the purpose of placing a "substantial obstacle" in
the path of someone trying to defend their own life from an attacker, it certainly has
such an effect. The burden analysis, however, has no application with respect to the
fundamental right of self-defense, which-unlike abortion-depends on its being
instantly exercisable if it is to be of any value to its possessor. The ability to exercise
and benefit from the right of self-defense is simply either available or unavailable in a
given instance; it cannot be "duly" burdened as Casey and other cases might suggest.
But see United States v. Bledsoe, No. SA-08-CR-13(2), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60522
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008) (upholding a federal gun regulation under intermediate scrutiny despite the case being decided in the wake of Heller); but cf. Sayoko Blodgett-Ford,
The Changing Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 6 CONST. L.J. 101, 172-73 (1995)
(arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to state gun laws, but that intermediate
scrutiny is proper in reviewing federal gun restrictions). Nor do I find applicable Professor Volokh's suggestion that "a restriction [on gun possession rights] might only
slightly interfere with rightholders' ability to get the benefits that the right secures, and
thus might be a burden that doesn't rise to the level of unconstitutionally 'infringing'
the right." Posting of Eugene Volokh to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/
1238001528.shtml (Mar. 25, 2009, 13:18 EST) (alterations omitted) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, this Comment rejects the burden analysis and its applicability to
North Carolina's Felony Firearms Act.
39. There still appears to be some disagreement regarding whether the Second
Amendment has been "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment so as to apply to
the states. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/heller-sequels-move-along (Feb. 16, 2009, 17:48 EST) (discussing post-Heller
Seventh Circuit cases debating the issue of "whether state and local governments must
obey the [Second] Amendment").
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these questions is "yes."' 40 An individual, fundamental right is at
stake, and the Felony Firearms Act ought therefore to be examined
under the most scrutinizing level of constitutional review. 4 '

40. Prior to Heller, the answer would seem to have been "no." For an argument
that "the North Carolina Constitution provides for an individual right to bear arms,"
see Carl W. Thurman, Note, State v. Fennell: The North Carolina Tradition of Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1078, 1078 (1990). The Note
reviews, among other cases, State v. Fennell, 382 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), in
which the court of appeals upheld appellant's conviction for possessing a weapon of
mass destruction-here, a sawed-off shotgun-against his federal and state constitutional arguments. See Thurman, supra at 1079-80 (describing the violation of N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-288.8 (1988)). The court held that the federal Constitution "does not
guarantee an individual the right to bear arms except in connection with a well-regulated militia." Id. at 1080 (describing Fennell, 382 S.E.2d at 232). This conclusion, of
course, was one expressly rejected in Heller roughly seventeen years later. See 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2790-91 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms.").
Interestingly, the Fennell court "acknowledged .. .that North Carolina courts have
held that there exists an individual as well as a collective right to bear arms under the
North Carolina Constitution," though that right is subject to reasonable regulation.
Thurman, supra at 1080 (citing Fennell, 382 S.E.2d at 233) (emphasis added).
41. It is worth mentioning here that while Heller was not overtly a substantive due
process case, and while the Court did not purport to apply any particular level of
scrutiny in its analysis, the opinion emphasized that "under any of the standards of
scrutiny [the Court has] applied to enumerated constitutional rights," the District's
handgun ban "would fail constitutional muster." 128 S.Ct. 2783 at 2818 (2008)
(emphasis added). The Court also pointed out that the "presumption of constitutionality" for legislation "appear[ing] on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
[Bill of Rights]" was more narrow than in rational review cases, where the affected
right bore only a strained relationship to an enumerated right. Id. at 2818 n.27 (citing
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Indeed, "if all
that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the
Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions
on irrational laws, and would have no effect." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Court specifically rejected the approach of Justice Breyer and the dissenters, who
favored balancing the individual's interest in self defense against the government's
interest in public safety (and would have upheld the District's ban). See id. at 2851-52
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[Any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety
concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter."). The dissenters
thus characterized the majority's analysis as an application of strict scrutiny "in theory." See id. In response, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Second Amendment is
itself "the very product of an interest-balancing by the people-which Justice Breyer
would now conduct for them anew." Id. at 2821 (majority opinion).
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STRICT SCRUTINY: PUTTING THE ACT TO THE TEST

During the 1971 legislative session, the Felony Firearms Act
became law, making it unlawful for "any person who [had] been convicted . . . of a crime, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding two years, to purchase, own, possess or have in his custody, care or
control, any hand gun or pistol."4 2 In the decades subsequent to its
enactment, the Act has seen numerous permutations, some of which
significantly limited its restrictive scope.4 3 But today, the Act prohibits
possession of virtually any firearm by any person convicted of any

felony.44
The United States Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment requires heightened, strict
scrutiny of any law prohibiting a person from exercising or possessing
the means to exercise an individual fundamental right. 45 Strict scru-

tiny has traditionally ensured that laws limiting or affecting the exercise of a fundamental right are narrowly tailored so as to impose the
least restriction possible. 46 In other words, a law may only limit a person's fundamental rights to the extent its constraints are truly "neces47
sary" to further a "carefully defined" and compelling state interest.
If a criminal statute, for example, has greater restrictive reach than
is logically necessary to achieve the state's policy goal (overinclusive)
or leaves loopholes which make it possible to circumvent that policy or
42. Act of July 19, 1971, ch. 954, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1538.
43. For a more detailed examination of the Act's history, see Part IILA, infra.
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2007).
45. See sources cited supra note 38.
46. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 1272 ("Especially in cases in which challenged
governmental regulations would serve to reduce risks of harm rather than eliminate
them . .. , courts almost inescapably ask an all-things-considered question: Is a particular infringement of constitutional rights, measured by its nature and scope, justifiable in light of the benefits likely to be achieved and the available alternatives?"). One
might distinguish the "least restrictive means" analysis from the "overinclusiveness"
analysis, however, since "the prohibition against overinclusiveness suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of narrow tailoring even if no less restrictive alternative existed." Id. at 1328.
47. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995). Moreover, it appears that "despite the Supreme Court's efforts to
separate the questions whether the government has asserted a compelling governmental interest and whether legislation satisfies a narrow tailoring requirement, the application of strict scrutiny frequently involves a joint, simultaneous assessment of ends
and means." Fallon, supra note 38, at 1272. In other words, a government interest
may be regarded as less compelling where the means it employs are not a tight logical
fit to that interest.
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which confound it altogether (underinclusive), that statute cannot be
described as narrowly tailored.48 Overinclusiveness is often evidence
48. Although it addresses state interference with an established, enumerated fundamental right (rather than an unprecedented, penumbral one, as the right of selfdefense may be), the Supreme Court's discussion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), is nonetheless instructive. In that case, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to a Massachusetts "closure" statute that "require[d] trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the
press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that victim." Id.
at 598 (describing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981)). In an earlier
decision, the Court had "firmly established" that "the press and general public have a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials" under the First Amendment as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 603 (referencing Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980) (plurality opinion)). The
Globe sought injunctive relief against the Superior Court of Norfolk County for denying the newspaper access to a rape trial pursuant to Massachusetts's closure statute.
Id. at 598-602. The Commonwealth defended its law by asserting its interests in (1)
"[protecting] minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment"
and (2) "[encouraging] such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and
credible manner." Id. at 607.
While acknowledging that the first of these interests-"safeguarding the physical
and psychological well-being of a minor"-was compelling, the Court found it insufficient to uphold the statute. Id. at 608-09. Concerned that "the circumstances of the
particular case may affect the significance of the interest," the Court explained that a
case-by-case rule, requiring a determination of whether closure might be necessary to
protect the child's welfare, would be just as effective as the statute's mandatory closure
rule. Id. In light of this less-restrictive alternative, the law was unnecessarily restrictive and therefore not narrowly tailored to this asserted interest. Id.
The Court was dismissive of the second interest. If the closure statute was really
intended to encourage child victims to testify truthfully by limiting the audience to
which victims would broadcast their humiliating sufferings, it was grossly underinclusive for its failure to deny the press "access to the transcript, court personnel, or any
other possible source that could provide an account of the minor victim's testimony."
Id. at 609-10. The dissenting opinion, however, stressed that the Commonwealth's
closure rule was "intended not to preserve confidentiality, but to prevent the risk of
severe psychological damage caused by having to relate the details of the crime in front
of a crowd which inevitably will include voyeuristic strangers." Id. at 617-18 (Berger,
CJ., dissenting). But the majority was not persuaded, and went on to emphasize that,
in addition, the Commonwealth had "offered no empirical support for the claim that
the rule of automatic closure ...[would] lead to an increase in the number of minor
sex victims coming forward and cooperating with state authorities." Id. at 609-10
(majority opinion) (emphasis added). Without saying so explicitly, the Court
appeared to treat the absence of empirical data as well as the underinclusiveness of the
statute as evidence that this second interest was not as "compelling" as the Commonwealth described it. See id.
Globe Newspaper is thus one of the cases that suggests that there is a rather circular relationship between the criticality of an asserted interest and the narrowness with
which the challenged statute is deemed tailored to furthering that interest. See supra
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of policymaking zeal and the disregard for individual rights that
accompanies an indignant legislature or its intentionally demonstrative response to popular public concerns. Underinclusiveness, on the
other hand, is evidence that the interest purportedly furthered by the
law is not really as "compelling" as the state pretended; in other words,
if the state had been serious about its policy objective, it would have
been more meticulous in drafting the statute.
Together, over- and underinclusiveness suggest that the force
behind the law is not reason, but something more arbitrary, such as
legislators' desire to gain or retain popularity with voters by appearing
responsive to their complaints. 49 Arbitrariness alone is not a denial of
the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of due process, but an arbitrary
law which infringes upon an individual, fundamental right does so
unconstitutionally.

50

Against this substantive due process backdrop, I posit that all persons have an unenumerated, individual, fundamental right of self
defense. 5 ' Because defending oneself from an armed home invader
explanation in note 47. That is, the less tight the fit between the means and the ends,
the less highly the Court will regard the ends. Likewise, the less compelling the ends,
the more narrowly the Court will require the statute to be tailored to them. Because of
the Court's willingness to engage in this reciprocal reasoning, it is not hard to see how
an application of strict scrutiny all but ensures the unconstitutionality of the challenged law.
49. But see Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 453 (1977) (describing a
compelling interest in inspiring public confidence in government). Professor Gottlieb
contends that such an interest, on its face, "is much too broad, for it would include an
interest in public confidence in government independent of a factual evaluation of the
performance of that government." Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV.
917, 962 (1988) (emphasis added) (pointing out, in addition, that this interest was
"derived ... from an implicit [government] need to operate efficiently"). Such a purpose is made illegitimate, he suggests, by the First Amendment's countervailing guarantees of freedom of speech and the right to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. See id.
50. As Justice Scalia has observed, "[iut would be absurd to think that all 'arbitrary
and capricious' government action violates substantive due process-even, for example, the arbitrary and capricious cancellation of a public employee's parking privileges." City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003)
(Scalia, J. concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)). Nevertheless, "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government
to infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty interests at all ... unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721
(quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
51. Some rights not mentioned in the Bill of Rights have come to be recognized as
fundamental despite the fact that they are "unenumerated." Under the Supreme
Court's famously inventive "penumbral" doctrine, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
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may require the use of a firearm, a statute which prohibits such an
attacker's intended victim from owning or possessing a gun-limiting
her available defensive tools to kitchen knives or blunt instrumentsaffects her fundamental right of self-defense in a lethal way. That law
would fail under strict scrutiny. Indeed, Heller struck down such a law
as unconstitutional.5 2 It is precisely this sort of limitation on the fundamental right of self-defense that exists on the books in North Carolina today, and which needs to be reexamined.
Subjecting the Act's current provisions to strict scrutiny should all
but guarantee their prospective unconstitutionality, as most statutes
considered under this level of review are presumed to be unconstitutional.5 3 Thorough analysis shows the Act to represent critically
flawed, unreasonable public policy laying beneath a shroud of public
inattention and barely stirring the curiosity of the courts, whose opinions (with the exception of the recent Britt v. State decision) address
the Act with cursory, half-hearted review under minimal constitutional
scrutiny. To date, no court in North Carolina or the Fourth Circuit has
directly addressed the federal question of whether the Felony Firearms
Act is an unconstitutional infringement of a fundamental right; the
courts have not dealt with a substantive due process argument or
responded decisively to a "narrow tailoring" critique of the Act. Even
in Britt, the North Carolina Supreme Court specifically refused to
answer such questions. 54 This is unsettling in light of the Heller opinion's vigorous articulation of the right of self-defense, regardless of the
level of specificity with which Justice Scalia's opinion may have implicitly defined the right.5 5
We will now explore the Felony Firearms Act's legislative history,
consider the legislature's purpose in creating and enforcing it, analyze
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."),
the enumerated rights "necessarily suggest other peripheral, but nevertheless fundamental, rights that must also be protected, such as the right of privacy, the right to
travel, and freedom of association." 16A Am. JUR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 400 (2008).
Applying this concept to the issue at hand, it is not difficult to reason that the Second
Amendment, with its specific guarantee of a right to keep and bear arms, U.S. CONST.
amend II, might be said to "emanate" a "penumbra" containing within its periphery
the fundamental right of self-defense.
52. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
53. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) ("Indeed, the failure of
legislative action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder whether [such]
review ... has been strict in theory, but fatal in fact.").
54. The Britt decision is discussed in Part I.A, supra.
55. Cf. Barnett, supra note 37 (defining the right at issue in Heller in broad terms).
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its current text, and evaluate its effectiveness in order to determine
whether the limitations it places on individuals' exercise of the fundamental right of self-defense are narrowly tailored toward achieving a
compelling state interest.
III.

IDENTIFYING THE STATE'S "COMPELLING" INTEREST

Proper constitutional analysis of any statute requires first identifying a compelling state interest and then conducting an analysis of the
statutory language, applying strict scrutiny to determine whether the
law is narrowly tailored to further the interest. Because the fundamental right of self-defense has not been litigated in North Carolina in the
substantive due process context, the state has never been required to
produce for the courts an actual, compelling interest in support of its
Felony Firearms Act. And the courts seem to have been uninterested
in describing the legislature's precise purpose in passing the Act, notwithstanding their insistence that a criminal statute must be construed
"with regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress. "56
Practically speaking, of course, it is rather impossible to anticipate in advance all interests that the state might advance in defending
the Act. Lack of precedent, as well as adversarial creativity, makes
unrealistically presumptuous any analytic approach which would
amount to guessing at the precise contours of the state's arguments or
the interests it might describe. 57 Even in the recent Britt v. State
appeal, the only interest the State managed to identify was "preserving
the peace and security of the public," announcing that this was an
"important governmental objective" to which the Act was "substan-

56. State v. Wood, 647 S.E.2d 679, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added)
(quoting State v. Priddy, 445 S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
57. Attempting to overcome the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny of laws which
affect fundamental rights, government litigants have demonstrated pronounced determination and creativity in asserting their interests. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (1984). The respondent, California's Secretary of State, offered no
fewer than seven different in justification of the state's limitation-in the form of mandating "blanket" open partisan primary elections-on political parties' fundamental
right to associational freedom under the First Amendment. See id. at 570, 582-86.
Rejected by the Court as insufficiently compelling were the state's interests in "producing elected officials who better represent the electorate," id. at 582, "expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns," id., "[supporting] nonparty
members' keen desire to participate in selection of the party's nominee," id. at 583
(emphasis added), "promoting fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing
voter participation," id. at 584, and protecting the "confidentiality of [voters'] party
affiliation." Id. at 585.
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tially related." 8 In light of the hollowness of such assertions, we
should pursue more thoughtful conclusions as to both the identity and
weight of the state's objectives and interests by first carefully tracking
the policies underlying the Act's development and then examining
cases describing the policy goals North Carolina courts perceive as justifying the Act.
Accordingly, this part of the discussion begins with a chronological and policy-conscious examination of the Act's history, with an eye
towards tracking legislative purpose. It then investigates the state's
challenging burden of identifying an interest which might be asserted
as compelling, focusing first on the interests described by a pair of
North Carolina cases, then considering several plausible alternative
interests.
A.

Legislative History: Four Decades of Political Plinking

Reviewing the history of the Felony Firearms Act is vital to learning what interests the legislature has actually intended the Act to further. Bypassing this preliminary step may render impossible the task
of determining whether the interests the Act was intended to advance
are truly "compelling." Equally important is that a detailed examination of the legislative history allows us to contrast legislative strategies
from one year to the next in a "comparative reasonableness" analysis
when conducting strict scrutiny later in this discussion. 9
So far, North Carolina courts have merely summarized changes to
the Act's language in a sterile, chronological fashion.6 ° But there is
more to the Act's history than our courts have spelled out. This Com58. Defendant/Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 8, Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320
(N.C. 2009) (No. 488A07), 2009 WL 1615170.
59. As an example of such an analysis outside the confines of this Comment, sup-

pose a federal judge reviewing the current Act under strict scrutiny silently acknowledges a 1975 policymaking maneuver as particularly careful or scrupulous in placing

limitations on the right of self-defense. Having seen this, she might be subliminally
inspired to denounce a less fastidious infringement created in 2004 as unconstitutionally overbroad in contrast-even though the later policy may represent an honest
attempt to correct flaws not realized nearly three decades earlier. Practically speaking,
these contrasts might prove influential or even determinative.
60. In State v. Johnson, for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals provided
a summary of the changes made to the Felony Firearms Act, without any discussion of
policy concerns which brought about those amendments:
In 1971, the General Assembly enacted the Felony Firearms Act, which
made unlawful the possession of a firearm by any person previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than two years. [One
section of the Act] set forth an exemption for felons whose civil rights had
been restored.
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ment distinguishes carefully between a mere chronological record of
the Felony Firearms Act's textual changes and a more thorough discussion that includes reference to the political concerns that actually
influenced the development of the statute-and takes the approach last
mentioned. While the first and simpler approach is certainly easy to
digest, the latter is far more nutritious. Even given the relative ease
with which the Heller majority apparently dismissed any historical and
statistical concerns underlying the District of Columbia's handgun
ban, 6 1 the vigor with which the dissenters 6 2 and amici curiae on both
sides 6 3 debated those concerns advises that the following discussion
In 1975, the General Assembly repealed [the exemption for restored
felons] and amended [the remainder of the Act] to ban the possession of
firearms by persons convicted of certain crimes for five years after the date of
"such conviction, or unconditional discharge from a correctional institution,
or termination of a suspended sentence, probation, or parole upon such convictions, whichever is later." .
In 1995, the General Assembly amended [the Act] to prohibit possession
of certain firearms by all persons convicted of any felony. [In 2004, the Act
was amended to provide that] "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person who has
been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody,
care, or control any firearm ... "
610 S.E.2d 739, 741 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). And two years later,
praising the above synopsis as its own "thorough[] review[]" of the Act, the court of
appeals explained modifications to the law since Johnson: "[e]ffective 23 August 2006,
the legislature modified [the Act] to exempt 'antique firearms' from the proscription of
felons possessing firearms [and] modified the definition of 'antique firearms' . . . to
exclude conventional cartridge firearms." Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 404, 405
(N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). The North Carolina Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals was hardly an improvement, as Justice Brady's opinion
rehashed the intermediate court's version of the Act's legislative history in fewer than
seven sentences. See Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009).
61. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). Justice Scalia
assured the District that the Court was "aware of the problem of handgun violence in
this country," and that it "[took] seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who
believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution." Id. See, e.g., Brief for
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. Supporting Petitioner at 1, 50, Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157193. "[B]ut what is not debatable," Scalia
concluded, "is that it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment
extinct." Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822.
62. E.g., id. at 2854-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
63. E.g., Brief of Criminologists, Social Scientists, Other Distinguished Scholars
and the Claremont Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5, Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 383535 ("Correctly analyzed, the District's
crime statistics confirm that there is no real evidence that the handgun ban helped,
and reason to believe that it may have hurt the District's residents."). But see Brief for
Brady Center, supra note 61, at 44-45 (ignoring the question of the effectiveness of the
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err on the side of robustness. 64 Brace yourself for a detailed examination of nearly forty years of legislative history.
1.

From Introduction to Enactment

Edward Knox was elected in 1970 to serve as a senator in North
Carolina's General Assembly. 65 During the time leading up to his election, Knox was aware of mounting public criticism of the state's meager gun control laws in light of what was perceived as an unchecked
increase in violent crime. 66 Accordingly, Knox emphasized throughout his Senate campaign that he would take affirmative steps to
address the crime situation.67
So not long after taking office, Senator Knox introduced a bill
which would culminate in the Felony Firearms Act.68 He intended the
Act to reflect the contours of federal gun laws. 69 But the Knox bill
would not be ratified before a series of textual changes had occurred,
each of which provide a significant insight on the concerns of North
Carolina's legislature as it contemplated this new public safety
measure.

District's ban, and focusing instead on the effectiveness of broad federal regulations on
firearm); Brief of Amici Curiae Major American Cities, the United States Conference of
Mayors, and Legal Community Against Violence in Support of Petitioners at 5, Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157195 (complaining that large cities are
disproportionately impacted by gun violence).
64. As a discussion of legislative history is necessarily narrative in nature and not
analytic, most discussion of the legal ramifications of the Act's provisions has been
saved for the portion of this Comment applying strict scrutiny to the current statute.
65. Telephone Interview with H. Edward Knox, Managing Partner, Knox, Brotherton, Knox & Godfrey (Oct. 25, 2008). After serving two terms in the Senate (1971
through 1974), Mr. Knox was elected Mayor of Charlotte. In 1984, he ran for Governor of North Carolina, but lost to then-Attorney General Rufus Edmisten in a hotlycontested Democratic gubernatorial primary. Mr. Knox reports that he is a firm supporter of gun rights. Id.
66. Id. (explaining that although convicted criminals were on the streets with weapons, "we had to wait on violations of federal law [to prosecute them]; but the feds
weren't doing much about it, and we didn't have anything [similar to the federal felonin-possession law] in the state").
67. Id.
68. See S.B. 43, 1st Ed., 1971 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1971) (indicating bill
was introduced in January of 1971).
69. Telephone Interview, supra note 65.
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a. Only Certain Firearms Prohibited
Initial disagreement appeared to exist in the Senate regarding
what sorts of weapons felons would be prohibited from possessing
under the proposed Felony.Firearms Act. The Knox bill provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any
court in this State, in any other State of the United States or in any
federal court of the United States of a crime, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding two years, to purchase, own, possess, or
have in his custody, care or control, any of the following: (1)
firearms ....70
The range of guns prohibited to felons by this language was quite
broad, since the term "firearms" inevitably included all firearms, irrespective of concealability or other factors which might bear on the likelihood of their being used violently by criminals. Rejecting this rather
all-inclusive language, the Senate's Judiciary II Committee replaced the
term "firearm," along with the rest of the original list of prohibited
items, 71 with the following terms:
(1) pistol, (2) revolver, (3) sawed-off shotgun, a sawed-off shotgun
is herein defined as any weapon made from a shotgun, whether by
alteration, modification, or otherwise, with a barrel or barrels of less
than 18 inches in length, or a modified weapon having an overall
length of less than 26 inches; or (4) explosives, as defined
[elsewhere].72

This list of prohibited items was ultimately done away with,7 3 but
its brief appearance sheds some light on what may have been going on
in the minds of those on the committee. The decision to enumerate
certain types of weapons appears to represent an attempt to narrow
the statute's prohibitions to apply more directly to the type of harm
sought to be avoided without creating irrelevant or unreasonable
70. S.B. 43, 1st Ed., 1971 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1971) (emphasis added).
The Act as introduced also would have outlawed possession of explosives, burglary
tools, "a deadly weapon used ... in the commission of a crime," and "marijuana, any

depressant or stimulant drug or narcotic drug unless the same has been duly prescribed by a licensed physician." Id. Punishment for violation of the Act was a maximum ten years imprisonment, a fine of up to $5000, or both. Id.
71. See id. The additional items the originally-introduced Act would have prohibited felons from possessing, which are described supra note 70, seem to have nothing
to do with firearms or a fundamental right of self defense.
72. See S.B. 43, 2d Ed., 1971 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1971) (reflecting Sen-

ate's adoption of a committee substitute to the Knox bill on May 6, 1971).
73. See infra discussion accompanying notes 76-80.
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restrictions.7 4 While no related committee minutes from 1971 remain
in North Carolina's legislative libraries which might provide additional
clarity as to the impetus of these proposed changes, a plain reading of
them-and a bit of common sense-suggests that they were careful, reasoned policymaking ideas.
For example, the decision to list (and thus prohibit) "pistol[s]"
and "revolver[s]" as part of disentitlement suggests that it was the convicted criminal's ability to conceal a weapon-his having the chance to
bring a gun into close proximity with his intended victims without it
being detected-that the committee deemed most dangerous to the
public. In contrast, because the public is visually alerted when an evildoer parades himself about while carrying a long gun in open view,
the danger he poses may be avoided by those alert to what he is carrying around.
Similarly, the "sawed-off shotgun" also appears to have been listed
due to concerns about its concealability, though its inclusion in the
committee's short-lived list may have been the product of additional
considerations. One of these may have been the weapon's enhanced
ability to inflict close-range carnage despite a villain's bad aim by sending dozens of lethal projectiles flying in a spread pattern instead of just
one bullet in a straight line. But if shotgun spray was the danger, why
did the proposed amendment not list all shotguns? One reason may
have been the committee's concern that a significant number of North
Carolinians were likely to own normal shotguns for legitimate sporting
or home defense purposes. This would mean the politically safe alternative to dispossessing all convicted felons of their shotguns was to
apply disentitlement only to those shotguns that had been rendered
75
unusable for lawful purposes by being sawed short.

74. Recall the discussion supra note 41. Perhaps the members of the Senate's Judiciary II Committee in 1971 were aware of rational basis scrutiny and the requirement
that a law be at least rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. In any event, the
changes made to the Knox bill prior to its ratification seem either to have been motivated by concern for constitutional scrutiny, or by elected officials' hesitancy to alienate those persons convicted of felonies whose voting and other civil rights had been
restored, and who kept rifles and shotguns for lawful purposes such as hunting or
home defense. The likelihood that only a relatively small fraction of North Carolinians would suffer disentitlement under the original Knox bill makes the committee's
initial reluctance to impose disentitlement all the more remarkable. This suggests that
the right of self-defense (along with the means to exercise it) was greatly valued by
both the public and legislature in 1971.
75. With the short barrel of a sawed-off shotgun, the spread pattern of the pellets
fired becomes so aberrant and uncontrollable that the weapon is rendered largely incapable of striking live game, or even stationary targets-and oddly enough, this large
blast pattern is what makes a sawed-off shotgun such a frightening tool in the hands of
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Following what appears to have been another round of changes
made by the Judiciary II Committee, the Felony Firearms Act finally
became law. 7 6 But instead of the Knox bill's "firearms" 77 and the list
of weapons enumerated in the first committee substitute, 78 the Act
simply read, "any hand gun or pistol. ' 79 It is uncertain what distinc-

tion may have appeared to the minds of the legislators between a class
of weapons (handguns) and a member of that class (pistol) which
would have advised prohibiting both that class and a member of it.
The fact that certain non-concealable long guns actually operated on a
revolving cylinder design8 ° may suggest why the legislature was leery
of including the term "revolver" in its list.
Also of relevance may have been the North Carolina State Constitution, which specifically declares that the General Assembly holds all
power to control and restrict possession of concealed weapons."' On a
theory of negative implication, one might argue that the legislature has
no constitutional authority to prohibit the possession of arms that do
not create the sorts of dangers that might be avoided through restrictions against concealed weapons. Perhaps the General Assembly in
1971 was mindful of such an argument, and was thus leery of lumping
"long guns" into the Act.
b.

Delimiting the Cause of Disentitlement

Recall that disentitlement under the Act would only befall a person "who ha[d] been convicted [in any state or federal court] . . . of a
crime, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding two
an assailant at close range. To the extent a sawed-off shotgun may have nevertheless
fired a "slug" instead of numerous pellets, the likeness of that weapon to handguns
would likely have triggered the "pistol or revolver" enumeration if an individual were
to be charged with a Felony Firearms Act violation.
76. See generally Act ofJuly 19, 1971, ch. 954, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538 (effective
Oct. 1, 1971).
77. Relevant language from the Knox bill is reproduced supra in the text accompanying note 70.
78. This list is described supra in the text accompanying notes 71-75.
79. Compare S.B. 43, 3d Ed., 1971 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1971), with Act of
July 19, 1971, ch. 954, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1538.
80. See 3 EDWARD HENRY KNIGHT, KNIGHT'S AMERICAN MECHANICAL DICTIONARY
1928-29 (Hurd & Houghton 1877) (picturing, with accompanying description, several "revolvers" which are also long guns).
81. While providing that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed," the North Carolina constitution also makes clear that it should not be read
to "justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the General Assembly
from enacting penal statutes against that practice." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30 (emphasis
added).
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The statute made clear that "the term 'conviction'

[meant] a final judgment in any case of any offense having a maximum
permissible penalty of more than two years without regard to the plea
entered or the sentence imposed."8 3 By requiring a final judgmentrather than merely an indictment, for example-the Act would postpone a defendant's disentitlement until he was proven more certainly
to be a felon.
Also uncontroversial was the Act's use of a seemingly broad definition of the event which would trigger disentitlement: receipt of a conviction in any state or federal court in the nation for any crime
punishable by imprisonment exceeding two years.8 4 Absent from this
description was the term "felony." Yet the fact that this law's short title
was (and continues to be) "The Felony Firearms Act" 85 suggests at a
minimum that the General Assembly imagined "felons" to be those
who could be sentenced under any law in the United States, or of any
state therein, to more than two years' imprisonment for their actions.
This means the General Assembly also might have assumed only violent or dangerous criminals would receive sentences of that length
across the nation.
The question of "triggering events" is addressed more thoroughly
when I apply strict scrutiny to the Act's current provisions. In the
meantime, the Act's two-year sentencing qualification suggests that the
1971 General Assembly was careful to disentitle only felons of a dangerous, violent variety. As will become clear, more recent versions of
the Act have not operated as narrowly in this regard.8 6
c.

The Restoration Exemption

Perhaps the most puzzling and most substantial change made to
Senator Knox's bill prior to enactment was the insertion of the following sentence: "Any person whose citizenship is restored under the provisions of Chapter 13 of the General Statutes, [or] any comparable
State or federal statute, shall thereafter be exempted from the provisions of this act."'8 7 I refer to this proviso as the "restoration exemp-

tion." Absent this language, a felon's disentitlement under the Act
82. Act ofJuly 19, 1971, ch. 954, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1538 (emphasis added).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. See id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Part IV.A. 1-2, infra, discusses the language of the modern Act and its tenuous
connection to potential state objectives.
87. Act of July 19, 1971, ch. 954, sec. 2, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1539.
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would have been perpetual. Up until a few days before the Act was
first ratified, Chapter 13 had provided that two years after a convicted
felon was discharged from incarceration or probation, he could petition to have his "rights of citizenship" restored by way of a hearing, in
which he needed only satisfy the judge of his character for truth and
honesty. 88 The exemption placed the right of firearm ownership
among those rights of citizenship recoverable under Chapter 13 or its
analogues.
The restoration exemption would seem to run against the very
assumption underlying the Act, which is that persons convicted of certain crimes present a danger even after their sentence has been served.
Yet the legislature's thinking appears to have been that any felon who
met the state's requirements for restoration of civil rights was not a
person whose possession of weapons endangered the public, and thus
his disentitlement ought not persist. Moreover, the creation of this
exemption implicitly announced that, in North Carolina's judgment,
the right of an individual to possess a firearm was equal in importance
to other civil rights restorable to a felon on his or her release, such as
the right to vote.
But the exemption, and its limiting effect on the Act, was rendered
even more forceful by way of changes in the law governing restoration
of civil rights. Indeed, just three days prior to passing the Felony Firearms Act, the General Assembly had repealed the existing Chapter 13,
replacing it with rights restoration hurdles that were even easier for excons to negotiate. 89 In short, it was only after further loosening the
slack on the restoration scheme, and then adding the restoration
exemption, that the General Assembly passed the Felony Firearms
Act.90
88. See Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 902, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1421; cf. State v. Currie, 202 S.E.2d 153, 154-55 (N.C. 1974) (discussing the legislative history-as it stood
in 1974-of changes to the procedures and requirements for restoring civil rights to
convicts and applying revised Chapter 13 to the benefit of the defendant, who had
been charged with a violation of the Felony Firearms Act, notwithstanding the fact that
the Chapter 13 revision occurred after his trial but while his appeal was pending).
89. The laws replacing Chapter 13 provided for "automatic restoration of citizenship to any person who ha[d] forfeited such citizenship due to committing a crime and
ha[d] either been pardoned or completed his sentence," upon satisfaction of any of
these three conditions: "(a) the Department of Correction at the time of release recommend[ed] restoration of citizenship; (b) two years ha[d] elapsed since
release . . . during which time the individual ha[d] not been convicted of a criminal
offense . . . ; (c) or upon receiving an unconditional pardon." Act of July 16, 1971,
ch. 902, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1421, 1421.
90. Compare the ratification dates of the Chapter 13 amendments and the original
Felony Firearms Act.
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These observations should not be taken as an argument that the
legislature diluted the rights restoration process with an eye towards
weakening the Felony Firearms Act's disentitling effect. None of the
legislative history suggests that the repeal and replacement of Chapter
13 and inclusion of the restoration exemption in the Act prior to its
passage were anything more than coincidental bits of lawmaking. Still,
it is not difficult to imagine that legislators soliciting member support
for the Act might have forecasted a relaxation of the rights restoration
requirements in an effort to comfort those who may have feared public
backlash over firearms disentitlement.
In any event, it is reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly in 1971 was anything but cavalier in creating this disentitlement,
appearing instead to move sensitively and cautiously as it narrowed the
Act's provisions. But regardless of whether the Felony Firearms Act's
pre-enactment development should be attributed to political, constitutional, or prudential concerns, what is certain is that between the time
Senator Knox introduced it until the day it was ratified, the Act had
diminished profoundly in its scope.
2.

Subtle But Significant Early Adjustments

In 1974, six members of the House of Representatives introduced
an amendment to the Act that would replace the term "pistol" with
"other firearms with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall
length of less than 26 inches."'" As introduced, the bill would have
also repealed the restoration exemption, making permanent any disentitlement imposed by the Act. 9 2 While the first of these proposed
changes survived, the second appears to have been rejected before the
bill was ratified. 93
The replacement of "pistol" with a specific, measurement-based
term certainly broadened the Act's scope. For example, possession of
a twenty-five inch long "rifle" previously not implicated by the Act
would now fall within its proscriptive ambit. Yet this explicit focus on
the physical size of the weapon to be prohibited was nothing new, having been first proposed in 1971 in substantially the same form. 94 This
91. See H.B. 1757, 1st Ed., 1973 Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (N.C. 1974).
92. See id. The restoration exemption is described supra in the text accompanying

notes 87-90.
93. See Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1196, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 320, 320

(reflecting changes to definition of prohibited firearms but retaining the restoration
exemption).
94. Compare supra text accompanying note 91, with supra text accompanying

note 72.
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reintroduction of measurement-specific language suggests that
the 1974 General Assembly was principally concerned with keeping
concealable weapons out of the hands of violent criminals. So while
the Act's terminology was broadened in a logical sense, the substance
of the revision was far from sweeping. The harm to be remedied by the
Act remained quite narrowly defined.
Interestingly, the Senate Judiciary I Committee-the same committee with which the above terminological change was clearly popularrefused to repeal the restoration exemption. 5 Whatever the reason,
North Carolina's elected senatorial representatives were not sufficiently convinced that felons should forever be dispossessed of arms.
3.

Tightening the Reins: The NarrowingAmendments

By the summer of 1975, the legislative spotlight had fallen once
again on the Felony Firearms Act, and with it a flurry of substantive
modifications. On May 19 of that year, Senator Allsbrook 96 introduced
a bill designed to repeal the restoration exemption, replacing it with
what was to be, in essence, a ten-year sunset on disentitlement. 97 But
by the time the Allsbrook bill was ratified on June 26, other members
of the General Assembly had succeeded in amending it so heavily that
98
it barely resembled the original at all.
The Allsbrook bill, as amended, had a "narrowing" effect on the
Act in that it wrought significant limitations on the Act's restrictive
scope. Yet the impromptu nature9 9 and radical substantive import of
some of the amendments to the Allsbrook bill suggest, paradoxically,
that its narrowing effect came about through what appear to have been
less-than-careful legislative methods. For this reason, perhaps the bill
as amended should be considered only mostly narrowing. In any
95. See H.B. 1757, 2d Ed., 1973 Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (N.C. 1974) (indicating a
committee substitute had been adopted on March 12, 1974).
96. Throughout this discussion, the names of the General Assembly members
sponsoring a given bill or an amendment have been provided to clarify the sequence of
events involved in bringing about the 1975 changes to the Felony Firearms Act.
97. See S.B. 829, 1st Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
98. Compare id. (showing the language originally proposed by Senator Allsbrook),
with Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273 (reflecting the final,
ratified text of the Allsbrook bill).
99. Several of the changes to the Allsbrook bill (each discussed in the text below)
came about by way of "floor amendments," which are generally handwritten changes
offered by the legislator at a time just prior to voting on the given bill. These are
introduced, discussed, and then adopted (or rejected) without the benefit of committee
review or any other meaningful opportunity to conduct relevant research or poll
constituents.
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event, it is undisputable that the original Felony Firearms Act was ren-

dered nearly unrecognizable as a result of these amendments. And
despite their drastic effect on the Act, these changes were to stand
untouched for roughly the next twenty years.
a. Restoration Exemption Replaced by Five-year
Disentitlement Cap
The Allsbrook bill cut the restoration exemption from the Felony
Firearms Act.1 ° ° Yet as an apparent substitute for that exemption, the
bill also would have provided that possession of certain firearms' 01 by
a convicted felon would only be unlawful "within 10 years from the
date of [the underlying] conviction, or unconditional discharge from a
correctional institution, or termination of suspended sentence, or
parole upon such conviction, whichever is later."' 0 2 In effect, this bill
would have mitigated the harsh impact of repealing the original restoration exemption by creating a ten-year maximum duration for con0 3

victs' disentitlement.1

100. See S.B. 829, 1st Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
101. The Allsbrook bill did not revise the then-existing description of prohibited
weapons, which-as of the changes made to the Act in 1974-was "any hand gun or
other firearm with a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less
than 26 inches." Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1196, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 320, 320.
102. S.B. 829, 1st Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975) (emphasis added).
103. Alas, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to appreciate that the Allsbrook
bill's specific time limit on disentitlement was actually more lenient in its treatment of
felons than the former arrangement, which had provided only the possibility of relief
from disentitlement under the restoration exemption, failing which perpetual disentitlement was guaranteed:
When the Firearms Act became law in 1971, felons were not automatically
restored to full citizenship immediately on their release from prison; however,
those felons whose citizenship rights had been restored were exempt from the
Act.... Then in 1973, North Carolina amended the [citizenship-restoration
provisions of the] General Statutes to restore felons to full citizenship immediately upon their unconditional discharge ....

When it became apparent

that this would make virtually all felons exempt from the Firearms Act, ...
the General Assembly repealed the exemption for felons whose citizenship
rights had been restored .... Clearly, North Carolinaintends to restore to exconvicts their general citizenship rights but limit their firearms privileges.
United States. v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit thus described the result with undue emphasis on the legislature's
"inten[t]" to "limit" convicted felons' firearms rights and without properly observing
the mitigating effect of the provisions replacing the restoration exemption. See id. This
unscrupulous inference of legislative intent based on a shallow review of the Act's
legislative history has managed to go unnoticed by commentators, who only discuss
the case with an eye toward ex post facto analysis. See, e.g., Note, Retrospective Applica-
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The ten-year cap, however, was not to be. On June 12, in the
course of reviewing the Allsbrook bill as a member of the Judiciary I
Committee, Senator Gudger 10 4 moved to amend it by reducing the proposed maximum duration of disentitlement under the Act from a
period of ten years to five years. 10 5 His motion carried,' °6 the committee gave its substitute a favorable report, 10 7 and the Senate adopted
it. 10 8 The ratified version of the bill would ultimately reflect Senator

tion of State FirearmProhibitions Triggering Enhanced Sentencing Under FederalLaw: A
Violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause? The Circuits Split, 27 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 307, 316-17 (2001) (echoing the McLean court's conclusion that
"intended result" of the restoration exemption's repeal was an unmitigated restriction
of felons' firearm rights). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit cited no authority whatsoever
in support of its assertion that it suddenly "became apparent" to the legislature that its
1973 changes to North Carolina's rights-restoration statutes would result in more freedom for felons. McLean, 904 F.2d 218-19. Indeed, as explained supra in the discussion accompanying notes 89-90, it seems unlikely that the General Assembly was at
all "surprised" to learn of this consequence. If this possibility-rehabilitated convicted
felons regaining their gun rights-had truly been a surprise rather than a debated policy concern, the Allsbrook bill arguably would have repealed the restoration exemption
without replacing it with what would ultimately become the disentitlement cap. See
infra paragraph accompanying note 104.
104. A decorated Army Air Corps veteran, lawyer, and Buncombe County democrat,
Lamar Gudger served the North Carolina legislature as a senator from 1971 until
1976, when he was elected to serve the first of two congressional terms in the United
States House of Representatives. See Obituary, GREENSBORO NEws & REC. (N.C.),
Aug. 4, 2004, at B6, available at 2004 WLNR 17567388.
105. See S. Amend. 1, S.B. 829, 1st Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
Note that Senator Gudger's changes also cut in half the existing ten-year maximum
imprisonment term for violation of the Act. Compare id., with Act of July 19, 1971,
ch. 954, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1538.
106. See MINUTES FOR S. JUDICIARY I COMM., June 12, 1975, 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess., at 4. The committee minutes from this almost two-hour long meeting indicate
that Senator Allsbrook, who was Chairman of the committee, "excused himself briefly
and asked Senator Gudger to temporarily preside." See id. at 2. Interestingly, Senator
Gudger proceeded to call for discussion of a number of other bills, postponing debate
of the Felony Firearms Act bill-and his own amendment thereto-until Allsbrook had
"resumed the Chair." Id. at 3-4. As only five members of this committee were present
at any point during the meeting, see id. at 1, it is possible that Senator Gudger's delay
was designed to ensure that a potentially tie-breaking vote had returned to the room
before reaching the bill.
107. See id.; INST. OF GOV'T, LEGIS. SERV., BILL HISTORY AS OF JUNE 26, 1975, S. 829,
microformed on N.C. Legislative Library (Off. State Mgmt. Sys.) [hereinafter BILL HisTORY] (indicating the Senate adopted its Judiciary I Committee's substitute bill on
June 16, 1975, the Committee having given it a favorable report).
108. Id.
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Gudger's changes, replacing the restoration exemption with a five-year
disentitlement cap. 1°9
There was, of course, an important difference between the restoration exemption and the disentitlement cap. The former allowed for a
case-by-case determination of whether a convict's rights of citizenship
(including firearms rights) ought to be restored, while the latter proviso set disentitlement to expire automatically. The petitioning process for restoration involved addressing specific features of the
criminal, crime, and case involved-features whose evaluation requires
human judgments irreducible to statutory formulae. Automatic
renewal of entitlement, on the other hand, is just arbitrary. For example, it is not necessarily true that a convicted shotgun murderer will
become any less violent on the fifth (or even tenth) anniversary of his
completion of a thirty-year sentence. But by the same token, a woman
convicted of operating a half-dozen video poker machines in her home
basement1 10 is not necessarily any more violent or dangerous on the
first day of her release than she will be five years later. While representing a willingness to err on the side of recognizing the fundamental
importance of North Carolinians' right of self-defense, such a one-sizefits-all solution is not a particularly careful method of restoring firearm entitlements. Thus, the creation of the disentitlement cap is one
change that rendered the Allsbrook bill, as ultimately ratified, only
"mostly" narrowing.
b.

Only Specific Crimes Trigger Disentitlement

On June 23, Senator Vickery introduced an amendment to the Allsbrook bill on the floor of the Senate identifying in specific terms the
109. See Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 3, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273, 1273.

110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-306.1A(a) (2007) makes it unlawful for anyone not in
certain recognized Indian tribes or their lands "to operate, allow to be operated, place
into operation, or keep in that person's possession for the purpose of operation any
video gaming machine ......

A video gaming machine is "a video machine which

requires deposit of any coin or token, or use of any credit card, debit card, or any other
method that requires payment to activate play ....
Id. § 14-306.1A(b). Any person
who operates five or more of these gambling machines "is guilty of a Class G felony."
Id. § 14-309(b). While this particular illustration of nonviolent felony activity comes

from today's law instead of contemporary criminal statutes, nonviolent crimes of the
"white collar" variety were punishable by two or more years imprisonment at the time
the disentitlement cap was created. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 153 S.E.2d 477, 477-79
(N.C. 1967) (stating that defendant was sentenced to two years in prison for

"cheat[ing] and defraud[ing] the ... Welfare Department out of the sum of $40.00 per

month" for a year); State v. Young, 204 S.E.2d 185, 185 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (stating

that a man convicted of felony embezzlement had been sentenced to seven years in
prison).
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criminal activity that would call for the revocation of a given convict's
Specifically, the Vickery amendment
firearm possession rights.'
provided that a conviction for "violating any provision of Article 3, 4,
6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 30, 33, 36, 36A, 52A, or 53 of Chapter 14 of
the General Statutes" would render a person disentitled under the Act,
and deleted the requirement that the crime be punishable by over two
years in prison." 2 In other words, convictions which would trigger
the Act's disentitlement under the proposed Vickery amendment
would be those obtained based on a violation of certain Articles of
North Carolina's Chapter 14, regardless of sentence length-instead of
convictions for crimes under any law in the nation which were punish13
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding two years."
The first problem with the Vickery amendment (as first proposed)
was that if someone was convicted of violating the laws of a jurisdiction other than North Carolina, that conviction would not bring about
firearms disentitlement under the Act, notwithstanding the nature of
the crime and the potential length of its accompanying imprisonment
term." 4 However, no one in the Senate seemed concerned with this
discrepancy. 115
The second difficulty was that by erasing the two-year prison sentence criterion, the Vickery amendment risked grouping serious
crimes together with even extremely minor ones that might happen to
reside in the same specified Article of the General Statutes. Unlike the
first, this problem did raise eyebrows. At least one member of the Senate appeared uncomfortable with the idea of designating entire Articles
of Chapter 14 as containing disentitlement-triggering offenses without
being given opportunity to review the contents of those Articles thoroughly." 6 Indeed, before the Vickery amendment was put to a final
vote, Senator Gudger moved to change the text of that amendment by
111. See S. Amend. 2, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
112. Id. Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes contains the majority of
the state's criminal law provisions.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273, 1273
(reflecting, with respect to the discrepancy described in the text, the language of the
Vickery Amendment, S. Amend. 2, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 1975), as first proposed).
116. The nature of the Vickery amendment as a floor amendment meant that rather
than having its subject matter researched by legal staff and debated in committee prior
to any vote, it would require members of the Senate to pass upon it without any more
scrutiny than could be conducted in the Senate Chamber.
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inserting the word "feloniously" before the word "violating."1 1

This

modification meant only convictions received for "feloniously violating" any of the specified Chapter 14 Articles would trigger
disentitlement." 8
It seems clear that Senator Gudger's insertion was aimed at mitigating the hazards of deleting the two-year criterion.1 1 9 What is even
clearer is that it was hotly disputed; for when the votes were tallied, the
Gudger modification passed by a narrow three-vote margin.120 Among
those opposing the modification was Senator Vickery himself. 1 2 1 But
in the end, the Senate appears to have agreed that the amendment's list
of disentitlement-triggering Chapter 14 Articles-each of which might
have contained relatively minor offenses not contemplated by Senator
Vickery-amounted to painting with too broad a brush.' 22 After being
thus revised by the Gudger modification, the Vickery amendment
12 3
passed with only five senators voting against it.
Insofar as the Vickery amendment limited disentitlement-triggering acts to violations of laws which were actually under the control of

the General Assembly-as opposed to those of other states and the federal government, which have the potential to vary from their North
117. See S. Amend. 3, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
118. Compare Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273,
1273 (reflecting Senate's adoption of the word "feloniously" as a qualifier for those
violations of state law triggering disentitlement), with S. Amend. 2, S.B. 829, 2d Ed.,
1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
119. Senator Gudger was likely concerned that the selection of Articles provided by
Senator Vickery in his amendment contained statutes the violation of which normally
would not be considered as rising to the level of "felonious" criminal conduct, and
which rightly, therefore, were not punishable by a prison term exceeding two years.
His modification thus attacked the overinclusiveness of the Vickery amendment.
Unfortunately, an adverb like "feloniously" is definable only in a circular sense; that
is, the term assumes individuals may be said to have violated the law in such a manner
as to render their conduct truly "felonious," yet does not anticipate that the state might
also choose to define even minor offenses as "felonies." Though his decision to inject
such an unwieldy adverb into the Felony Firearms Act appears to fall somewhat short
of his goal, it seems obvious that Senator Gudger was attempting to ensure that only
serious crimes would serve as a basis for disentitlement.
120. N.C. S. Roll Call, S. Amend. 3, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 1975) (indicating the Gudger modification received twenty-one votes of "aye,"
and eighteen "no" votes).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See N.C. S. Roll Call, S. Amend. 2, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 1975) (indicating the Vickery amendment received thirty-five votes of
"aye," and only five "no" votes).
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Carolina analogues-it was "narrowing." 124 But because the amendment discarded the old requirement that a disentitling offense be "punishable by imprisonment exceeding two years," it was necessary to
require that the Vickery amendment's listed statutes be "feloniously"
violated before a consequent conviction would trigger disentitlement,
lest the Act limit the firearm rights of unwary committers of minor and
5
innocuous offenses.

12

Yet it seems the General Assembly preferred to err on the side of
underinclusiveness, because the amendment would mean that "out of
state" crimes, however heinous, would no longer trigger disentitlement
in North Carolina. Additionally, while the Vickery amendment ultimately gave the Act greater specificity, it was evaluated on the floor of
the Senate Chamber without the benefit of a more careful methodology. For these reasons, the Vickery amendment represents another
"mostly" narrowing change.
c.

The Home and Business Exceptions

By the time the sun sank below the Raleigh skyline on June 23,
1975, the Allsbrook bill provided that the Act would not "prohibit the
right of any person to have possession of a firearm within his own
home or on his lawful place of business." 126 But neither the exception
for home possession nor the exception for business possession was
1 27
original to Senator Allsbrook's bill.
Senator Strickland created the home exception by way of a handwritten amendment to the bill which he offered on the floor of the
Senate in the same manner-and on the same day-as Senator Vickery
had offered his amendment.' 2 8 The former moved to amend the bill by
inserting a declaration that "[n]othing in [the] Act would prohibit the
right of any person to have possession of a firearm within his own
home.' 1

29

Rather amazingly, in light of its being discussed in the divi-

124. Compare supra text accompanying notes 111-12, with Act of July 19, 1971,
ch. 954, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538 (containing relevant provisions of the original
law), and discussion supra accompanying notes 84-85.
125. See supra note 120.
126. Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 2, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273, 1273 (emphasis added).
127. This bill is first discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 96-98.
128. The Vickery amendment is introduced supra in the text accompanying
note 111.
129. S. Amend. 4, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975)
(emphasis added).
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sive wake of the controversial Gudger modification 130 debated perhaps
only minutes before, Senator Strickland's home exception received
13 1
unanimous Senate approval.
After the Senate adopted the home exception, the Allsbrook billnow in its third edition-was sent to the House. 1 32 There, Representative Erwin succeeded in adding, by way of a floor amendment, the
words "or lawful place of business" to the excepting language created
by Senator Strickland. 1 33 The Senate subsequently concurred as to the
addition of Erwin's business exception, again without a single "no"
vote.

1 34

The apparent popularity of both the home exception and business
exception is remarkable given the colossal import of their combined
substantive sweep: for while the disentitlement cap and the Vickery
amendment limited the duration and specified the causes of disentitlement under the Felony Firearms Act, respectively, the home and business exceptions went even further. Assuming the Act was designed to
prevent violence against the public by keeping dangerous and concealable firearms out of the hands of persons deemed unsafe with such
weapons, what justification could have possibly supported allowing
convicted felons to keep guns in their homes or lawful places of
business?
The answer is self-defense. Other hypotheses as to the home and
business exceptions' justification are reasonable, 35 but they really
130. Senator Gudger's modification of the Vickery amendment is described supra in
the text accompanying notes 116-25.
131. See N.C. S. Roll Call, S. Amend. 4, S.B. 829, 2d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 1975) (indicating the Strickland amendment received thirty-seven votes of
"aye," and zero "no" votes).
132. See BILL HISTORY, supra note 107. By this time, of course, the Senate had
adopted the committee substitute reflecting Senator Gudger's reduction of the disentitlement cap to five years (from the original ten), and had approved the Vickery amendment as revised by the Gudger modification. Id.
133. See H. Amend., S.B. 829, 3d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1975).
134. See N.C. S. Roll Call, H. Amend., S.B. 829, 3d Ed., 1975 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 1975). This vote tally was hand-marked by the Principal Clerk as being "for
concurrence." Id.
135. Such alternative speculations might suppose, for example, that the legislature
rallied around pre-Heller Second Amendment arguments in adopting the home and
business exceptions. But there is nothing in the legislative history-or in the case law
of that time-to corroborate such notions. Up until the time the Allsbrook bill was
ratified, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms" guaranteed by both the federal
and state constitutions had not hindered the General Assembly in its quest to restrict
possession of firearms by felons. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30
(stating that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed," and
stressing that "[n]othing herein shall ... prevent the General Assembly from enacting
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cannot be explained without acknowledging what must have been the
legislature's recognition of the importance of self-defense. Particularly
during a time in North Carolina where vigorous criminal activity was a
great public concern, 1 36 the legislature must have been keenly aware of
the possibility that ex-felons might also become victims of violence in
their own homes or businesses. The home and business exceptions
may thus be viewed collectively as tantamount to a self-defense exception. However radical they might appear, when weighed in contemplation of a fundamental right of self-defense, the home and business
exceptions represented the most narrowing of all the changes ever
13 7
made to the Act.
4.

Two Decades of Relative Quiet

In contrast to the boisterous tone of North Carolina's 1975 legislative session in its breakneck treatment of the Felony Firearms Act, the
twenty years that followed seemed quite tame, notwithstanding several
comparatively minor changes.
Most of the noteworthy substantive revisions made during this
period involved tweaks to the language put in place by the Vickery
amendment. 138

In 1977, a House bill1 39 was introduced which,

according to its own title, amended the Act "to include drug violators,
[to] add weapons of mass death and destruction to the ones felons are
prohibited to possess, [and to] make the Act again applicable to out-ofstate felony-level offenses." 140 The title was accurate. The 1977
amendment expanded the list of firearms prohibited under disentitlement to include weapons of mass death and destruction.14 ' But more
significantly, it extended disentitlement to persons having prior conpenal statutes against [the practice of carrying concealed weapons]" (emphasis

added)).
136. For a contemporary response to the state's growing violent crime rate, see Sidney S. Eagles, Jr., Crime Preventionfor the 1970's, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31 (1971).
137. The court of appeals later interpreted the home exception as being limited to
"the convicted felon's own premises over which he has dominion and control to the
exclusion of the public." State v. Cloninger, 350 S.E.2d 895, 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
Apparently, this area may include the felon's hotel room, but not the other premises of
the hotel. See id.
138. The Vickery amendment is introduced supra in the text accompanying

note 111.
139.
140.
title of
141.

See H.B. 1404, 1st Ed., 1977 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1977).
See Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 1105, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1396 (stating
amendment).
For North Carolina's current statutory definition of such weapons, see infra
note 394 (summarizing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.8(c) (2007)).
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victions for "felonious" violations of "criminal laws of other states or of
the United States substantially similar to the crimes covered in [certain
of the General Statutes] which are punishable where committed by
imprisonment for a term exceeding two years.' 1 4 2 The "crimes covered" by the newly listed Article 5 of Chapter 90 were all drug violations. 14 3 The language of the 1977 amendment preserved the General
Assembly's control over the text defining criminal conduct that would
trigger disentitlement, while filling the gap left by the Vickery amendment that shielded even a serial murderer from disentitlement so long
as his crimes were "out of state."
The remainder of changes made during this twenty-year period
were concerned principally with bringing the Act into conformity with
14 4
North Carolina's freshly devised "structured sentencing" system,
and with adjusting (in an upward direction) the applicable punishment. 145 Other than evoking general criticisms incident to the
enhancement of any law's punishing power, these changes appear to
have caused no hubbub. Until the summer of 1995, the Felony Firearms Act's operative provisions remained largely undisturbed.

5. The General Assembly Grows Gun-shy
On July 26, 1995, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 865,
which purported in its title "to conform [state laws regarding the
purchase of a handgun] to the requirements of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act.' 1 46 This bill's effect on the Felony Firearms
142. See Act of July 1, 1977, ch. 1105, sec. 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1396. To
the list of "triggering" Articles specified originally by the Vickery amendment, the
1977 bill added Article 5 of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes. Compare id., with
supra text accompanying note 112.
143. Article 5 of Chapter 90 contains the "North Carolina Controlled Substances
Act." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-86.
144. E.g., Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 760, sec. 5, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850, 869
(repealing the punishment specified within the text of the Act-that is, a maximum five
years imprisonment or a fine of up to $5,000, or both-to provide simply that any
violator of the Act would be "punished as a Class I felon").
145. E.g., Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 539, sec. 1245, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2730, 2800
(raising violation of the Act to "Class H felony" status for punishment purposes).
146. See Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417-18
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921-922 (2006)) was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on November 30,
1993, and became effective on February 28, 1994. This law created procedures governing the purchase of handguns from federally licensed dealers, which included a
five-day waiting period during which the local sheriff would check the potential
buyer's background. To the extent the Brady Act "forces States and local law enforce-
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Act, however, was more robust than its title revealed, as it both repealed
the disentitlement cap and eradicated the enumeration of specific Gen14 7
eral Statutes which if violated would "trigger" disentitlement.
Adding injury to insult, the legislature passed another bill just two
days later which elevated the punishment for a violation the Act.' 4 8
a. Reviving Permanent Disentitlement
The original edition of Senate Bill 865 bill did not meddle with the
disentitlement cap at all, but instead merely set out changes in protocol relating to the issuance of handgun purchase permits. 149 Yet by the
time it was ratified, the bill rendered the five-year sunset on disentitle50
ment completely stricken from the Act's text.1
But effectuating perpetual disentitlement apparently took some
doing. The Senate passed the bill and sent it to the House, which
promptly used the occasion to conduct a near-overhaul of the Felony
Firearms Act-to the apparent dismay of the Senate, which subsequently refused to concur. i 51 In addition to making changes broadening the Act's scope,' 5 2 the House had repealed the disentitlement
ment officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and to
accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers," it has been held an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935-36 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 936 ("[T]he Brady Act violates the Tenth
Amendment in that it compels state law enforcement officers to administer or enforce
a federal regulatory program." (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
147. See Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417-18.
148. See Act of July 28, 1995, ch. 507, sec. 19.5(k), 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525,
1633-34.
149. See S.B. 865, 1st Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995). Initially unrelated to the Felony Firearms Act, this original edition of the bill had provided, inter
alia, that a sheriff would be required to issue a handgun purchase permit once he or
she had "[v]erified by a criminal history background investigation that it is not a violation of State or federal law for the applicant to purchase, transfer, receive, or possess a
handgun," "[flully satisfied himself or herself by affidavits, oral evidence, or otherwise, as to the good moral character of the applicant," and "[f]ully satisfied himself or
herself that the applicant desires the possession of the weapon mentioned for (i) the
protection of the home, business, person, family or property, (ii) target shooting, (iii)
collecting, or (iv) hunting." Id.
150. See Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417-18.
151. See 1995 Bill Tracking N.C. S.B. 865 (LexisNexis) (stating that the House
adopted its Judiciary I Committee's substitute bill, as well as an amendment made on
the House floor).
152. S.B. 865, 3d Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995). The most important of those broadening changes are discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 157-64.
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cap. 1 5 3 This would mean that once a person was convicted of a disentitling offense, he would be forever barred from possessing firearms.
Yet paradoxically, in what seems to have been an attempt to resurrect the long-repealed restoration exemption,15 4 the House had also
adopted an additional subsection for inclusion in the Act:
After a period of five years from the date of conviction, or the unconditional discharge from a correctional institution, or termination of a
suspended sentence, probation, or parole upon conviction, whichever
is later, a person subject to [disentitlement under the Act] may petition
the superior court in the jurisdiction in which the person resides for a
permit to purchase, own, possess, or control a firearm, other than a
handgun or a weapon of mass death and destruction, the person's residence [sic]. The court
may, for good cause shown, grant the petition
55
permit.1
a
issue
and

In essence, this language would have converted the former sunset
provision-which lifted disentitlement automatically upon the expiry
of five years-into a timeline by which convicted felons might request a
determination as to their gun-worthiness. But by the time the House
and Senate managed to concur on the bill,1 5 6 nothing was left of this
provision, and the disentitlement cap remained repealed. Nonetheless,
the eagerness to retain some sort of rights-restoration exemption to the
Act suggests that at least some legislators were sensitive to even convicted felons' need for effective self-defense implements.
b.

Giving the Act a Hair Trigger

The House's changes to Senate Bill 865 also included deleting the
list-drafted by Senator Vickery two decades earlier-of specific Articles of North Carolina General Statutes which if violated would trigger
disentitlement under the Act. 1 5 7 In place of this list, the bill provided
that disentitlement would now apply to anyone with any North Caro-

153. 1995 Bill Tracking N.C. S.B. 865 (LexisNexis).

154. Recall the discussion supra accompanying notes 87-90.
155. S.B. 865, 3d Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995). It is possible that
the next to last sentence of the quoted language was intended to end with such words
as, "foruse only in the person's residence." See id. Otherwise, this block of text makes

little sense, as the home and business exceptions to the Act were still in effect at the
time of this short-lived proposal. See id.
156. The Senate's failure to concur sent the bill into Conference Committee on
July 10, from which it did not emerge until two weeks later. See 1995 Bill Tracking
N.C. S.B. 865 (LexisNexis).
157. See discussion supra in the text accompanying notes 111-25.
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lina felony conviction 15 8 as well as to persons who violate "criminal
laws of other states or of the United States ...

that are substantially

similar [to the aforementioned North Carolina felonies and] which are
punishable where committed by imprisonment for a term exceeding
' 159

one year."

The General Assembly thus chopped in half the existing requisite
imprisonment period for a disentitling offense. 160 At the same time, it
created a new and unbounded categorical trigger for disentitlement:
the nominal felony. Interestingly, from its inception, North Carolina's
structured sentencing rubric has included "felonies" that are punishable by as little as three months in prison. 161 Thanks to Senate Bill 865,
disentitlement would be triggered by any North Carolina felonyregardless of its corresponding imprisonment term-as well as any
"year and a day" offense in another jurisdiction. 1 62
The inevitable effect of this change was that even more crimes,
wherever committed, would make the offender subject to the Act's
prohibitions. And because nonviolent crimes were (and continue to
be) punishable by "felony punishment"1 63 or imprisonment in excess

158. Prior to this amendment, the Act had been revised to redefine the term "conviction" as "a final judgment in any case in which felony punishment, or imprisonment for
a term exceeding two years, as the case may be, is permissible." Act of July 1, 1977, ch.
1105, sec. 2, § 14-415.1(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1396 (emphases added). The
July 26 bill kept this definition in place, but changed the relevant language to read "a
term exceeding one year." Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, § 14-415.1(b), 1995
N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417. When we consider that North Carolina's definition of
"felony" includes any crime which "[i]s or may be punishable imprisonment in the
State's prison" or which "[i]s denominated as a felony by statute," N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-1 (2007), it becomes clear that the Act disentitles persons convicted of crimes
which are felonies by name only as well as crimes which are not nominal felonies but
which call for imprisonment in excess of one year.
159. Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417 (emphasis added). But see discussion infra note 303 (addressing an ambiguity in the statutory
text).
160. See id. In other words, disentitlement formerly limited to those convicted of
committing a two-year crime was extended by this bill to include persons convicted of
committing a one-year crime.
161. See Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2298, 2309
(introducing the state's structured sentencing grid and prescribing a "mitigated" sentence of between three and four months imprisonment for Class I felony offenses).
162. See Act of July 26, 1995, ch. 487, sec. 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417.
163. Supra note 158.
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of one year, smaller fish than ever before would face being caught in
1 64
the net of disentitlement.
c.

Raising the Stakes

Two days after expanding the Act's reach through Senate Bill 865,
the General Assembly passed another bill that increased the punishment for those convicted of violating the Act.165 Instead of remaining
punishable as a Class H felony, violation of the Act became a Class G
felony. 16 6 This change nearly doubled the applicable imprisonment
terms. 1 6 7 Given the marked disagreement between legislative chambers with respect to Senate Bill 865, this change might seem to have
been the proverbial "nail in the coffin," signifying that squabbling had
come to an end and that the General Assembly's treatment of the Act
was deliberate and evenhanded.
But it appears North Carolina's decision to double the possible jail
time for those violating Act was anything but pointed and deliberate.
Rather, the change was inserted discreetly into a dense 227-page
appropriations bill bearing the heading, "An Act to Appropriate Funds
to Provide Expansion Expenditures and Capital Improvements for
State Departments, Institutions, and Agencies, and for Other
Purposes." 168
164. The relative pettiness of some North Carolina crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year-and the effect of this on the Act's constitutionality-is
explored infra in the discussion accompanying notes 307-16.
165. See Act of July 28, 1995, ch. 507, sec. 19.5(k), 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525,
1633-34.
166. See id.
167. While North Carolina's rather complex structured sentencing system is worth
studying, for present purposes, it suffices to note that in 1995, a man convicted of a
Class I felony only would have faced six months in jail, or up to eight months if the
offense was "aggravated." See Act of July 28, 1995, ch. 507, sec. 19.5(l), § 15A1340.17(c), 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525, 1634-36. But if convicted of a Class G felony
instead, the same man might serve up to thirteen months presumptively, or up to
sixteen months with aggravating factors. See id. The July 28 amendment thus approximately doubled the sentences to be imposed upon persons violating the Felony Firearms Act.
168. See H.B. 230, Ratified Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995) ("This act
shall be known and cited as 'The Expansion and Capital Improvements Appropriations
Act of 1995."'). The edition of this bill which was finally ratified on July 28 was 227
pages in length, having grown seventy-five pages since being approved by the House
Appropriations Committee nearly a month earlier. See 1995 Bill Tracking N.C. H.B.
230 (LexisNexis); H.B. 230, 2d Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995) (having
a length of 152 pages).
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In theory, conscientious legislators considering a bill will have
read and evaluated all of its provisions prior to voting to adopt it.'6 9
This presumption is strained, however, when the bill is hundreds of
pages long, shuffles changes to substantive law among an innumerable
miscellany of technical amendments, and is defined by extended
debate over its budgetary provisions. Indeed, the presumption
becomes irresponsible when changes affecting the personal liberty of a
human being are "slipped in" as part of such an expansive piece of
legislation. Even given the benefit of the doubt, lawmakers cannot be
expected to conduct an individualized evaluation of inconspicuous
appear little more than an afterthought.
and benign changes 170 which
17 1
But more on this later.
6. Shooting Blind: The Broadening Amendments
The most momentous changes to the Felony Firearms Act since
the 1970s occurred in the summer of 2004.172 With one small exception, the version of the statute fashioned by the sprawling "Act to
Strengthen the Laws Against Domestic Violence" is still the law
today. 173 This subsection describes the domestic violence bill's
amending language with respect to the Act, and the circumstances of
its origin and passage.

169. Cf. Russell v. Ayers, 27 S.E. 133, 134 (N.C. 1897) ("It must be presumed that[,
in passing a bill, the legislators] knew what they were doing and that they meant to do
what they did.").
170. In this instance, the entire change took place in two characters of text: it was
achieved by striking through the letter "H" in subparagraph (a) of the Act and inserting
the letter "G" in its place. See H.B. 230, Ratified Ed., 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 1995) (showing changes on page 112).
171. This line of criticism applies with equal force to more recent and still current
changes to the Act, which were brought about by way of a multi-part, many-paged bill
persuasively labeled as strengthening laws against domestic violence-an invitation for
rubber-stamping if ever there was one. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
172. See Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, sec. 14.1, § 14-415.1(a), 2004 N.C. Sess.
Laws 716, 737-38.
173. See Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716 (bearing the heading, "An Act to Strengthen the Laws Against Domestic Violence, to Provide Additional
Assistance to Domestic Violence Victims, and to Make Other Changes as Recommended by the House Select Committee on Domestic Violence"). Compare N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-415.1 (2007) (showing no changes to the Act since 2004 other than the
addition of an "antique firearms" exception).
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Expanding the Range of Prohibited Firearmsand Removing the
Home and Business Exceptions

Upending the General Assembly's former categorical 1 74 and measurement-based 175 methodologies for determining the types of firearms which would be barred to disentitled convicted felons, the
domestic violence bill amended the Act to state that
[a] firearm is (i) any weapon, including a starter gun, which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the
action of an explosive, or76its frame or receiver, or (ii) any firearm muf1
fler or firearm silencer.

Gone is the specification of a threshold barrel length or overall
gun length-and with it, the legislature's thirty-year emphasis on
prohibiting firearms to felons based on the concealability of the
weapon. 1 7 7 Indeed, North Carolina's longstanding distrust of convicts
carrying pocket-size deadly weapons appears to have been supplemented by a less explainable concern over felons toting even mere com17

ponents of firearms.'

More dramatic, however, was that this domestic violence bill completely discarded the home and business exceptions.' 7 9 With a couple
of lines in the twenty-seven-page bill,' 0 the exception language so
painstakingly added to the Act through committee substitutes and
floor amendments in 1975 was unceremoniously deleted in its entirety
174. See supra text accompanying note 79.
175. See supra text accompanying note 91.
176. Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, sec. 14.1, § 14-415.1(a), 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws
716, 737-38. This bill was passed by the General Assembly onJuly 15, 2004, but did
not become effective until its approval by Governor Easley on Aug. 12, 2004. See 2003
Bill Tracking N.C. H.B. 1354 (LexisNexis).
177. These specifications are discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 70-80.
178. One might argue that extending disentitlement to cover gun components is necessary in the event that the illegal possessor attempts to disassemble an intact firearm
prior to being apprehended by law enforcement. But this explanation just points out
the inability of the Act to prevent firearm violence (as opposed to its power to punish
its offenders) and thus highlights its punitive nature. Contra State v. Johnson, 610
S.E.2d 739, 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (overcoming appellant's ex post facto challenge
by concluding that "the Act is not so punitive in effect that it should be considered
punitive rather than regulatory").
179. Since 1975, the Act had provided, "Nothing in this [Act] would prohibit the
right of any person to have possession of a firearm within his own home or on his
lawful place of business." See Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 2, 1975 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1273, 1273.
180. See H.B. 1354, Ratified Ed., 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) (showing
change on page 20).
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by the General Assembly.'"' This change in the law forbids a person
with a disentitling conviction to keep a gun in their own home or business, even for the lawful purpose of self-defense.
b.

Inside the Committee on Domestic Violence

It is at this juncture in our discussion of the Act's development
that examining its influences and the motivations of the legislature
becomes most important, since the changes brought about by the
domestic violence bill continue to define the Act today. Several questions here demand attention. Whose idea was it to scrap the home
exception? What convinced the General Assembly to approve such a
momentous revision? The disappointing answers lie along the cusp of
obscurity, shuffled among the minute books of the House Select Committee on Domestic Violence and its Subcommittee on Criminal Law
Issues. These show that the 2004 changes to the Act can be traced to
the unsubstantiated recommendations of two individuals: Sergeant
John Guard, of the Pitt County Sheriffs Department, and Beth
Froehling, of the North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
Not long after the select committee was formed,' 8 2 Sergeant Guard
appeared before it and gave a report on domestic violence (in the form
of a computerized slide show), which was based on his experiences
with the Pitt County Domestic Violence Prevention Unit.' 8 3 Most of
his presentation dealt with the need for a warrantless, mandatory
arrest rule for domestic violence police calls, as well as the need for
offender treatment programs.1 8 4 But as a printout of Guard's slides
discloses, he also attempted to highlight a relationship between firearms and domestic violence.'

8 5

181. Compare id., with Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, sec. 14.1, § 14-415.1(a), 2004

N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 737-38 (reflecting the deletion).
182. H. SELECT COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, REPORT TO THE 2004 SESSION OF THE
2003 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REPORT] (stating, on an unnumbered page entitled "Preface," that the select
committee was formed on August 12, 2003).
183. See MINUTES FOR H. SELECT COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE., Sept. 25, 2003,
2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) [hereinafter SELECT COMM. MINUTES FOR
SEPT. 25, 2003].
184. See id.
185. See id. (designating the included copy of Guard's slide show presentation as
"Attachment 1"). Notably, these slides claimed that 56% of all female homicide victims were killed with a firearm, and also that between 1976 and 1996, 65% of "intimate partner homicides" were committed with a gun. Id. (citing Lawrence A.
Greenfeld et al., Violence by Intimates: An Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or
FormerSpouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS FACTBOOK
10 (1998)).
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The only arguably relevant statistic provided in these materials
was that Guard's sparsely-staffed "Domestic Violence Prevention Unit"
had been responsible for seizing about 72% of the total number of
guns seized by the Sheriff's Department in Pitt County for a one-year
period ending in November of 2002.186 Yet there was no mention of
whether these seizures were the result of anything more than "protective sweeps" or other lawful police techniques similarly unrelated to
the nature of the act for which the searched person is being
arrested.' 8 7 Further, the materials failed to specify whether the Unit
even seized these weapons from convicted felons. Certainly a singlecounty, single year statistic that, at best, only hints vaguely at a relationship between domestic violence and firearm seizure-lacking a
profile the dispossessed persons-is irrelevant to the question of
whether disarming convicted felons in their homes will serve to protect potential victims of domestic violence.
Following Guard's presentation, the members of the select committee asked him a battery of questions. 18 8 Conspicuously absent,

186. See id. Some of these questions included: whether domestic violence increased
during difficult economic times; whether offender treatment programs were successful; whether enrollment in such programs ought to be mandatory; whether incarcerated offenders had access to such programs; how to protect the victim once their
offender is released from prison; and (most remarkably) whether "publicizing the
abuser's name and picture after conviction would shame them into not abusing again."
Id. (emphasis added). This last question, raised by Representative Paul Stam-co-chair
of the Criminal Law Issues Subcommittee, no less-prompted Representative Wilma
Sherrill, co-chair of the select committee, to argue that "the family and children needed
to be considered before publicizing the abuser's name." Id. Interestingly, none who
were present thought it worthwhile to spring to the defense of the offender. The committee's unabashed zeal for punishing politically unpopular criminals is particularly
revealing. Indeed, this same group of legislators would soon irreverently trash the
home and business exceptions to the Felony Firearms Act. The inherent need of the
"abuser" to be able to defend himself in his own home after serving his sentence was
clearly the last thing on this committee's mind.
187. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 587 S.E.2d 445, 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). In that
case, while performing "a protective sweep of the residence in which they detained
[an] individual," the police found "a shotgun at the foot of a bed... [and] a revolver by
a couch," and seized these weapons after a search warrant arrived. Id. at 447-48. The
court observed that "protective sweeps of a residence performed by law enforcement
officers in conjunction with an in-home arrest are reasonable if [officers reasonably
believe] that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the
arrest scene." Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
188. See SELECT COMM. MINUTES FOR SEPT. 25, 2003, supra note 183.
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however, were questions about firearms.' 89 Even when given the
opportunity to place emphasis on gun violence, Guard did not do so.
In fact, according to the minutes, "Representative Johnson asked Sergeant Guard if he could choose one thing for this committee to do to
help curb domestic violence, what would it be." 190 His response was
that "the committee needed to tap into the resources of the state
because everything is needed to come together, not just law enforcement, but society as a whole openly saying violence in the home is
wrong."' 9 ' This rather imprecise answer seems to have prioritized
funding objectives-and the heroic goal of cultivating additional stigma
for offenders-over any state interest in preventing gun violence in the
home. 192
In October of 2003, roughly a month after the above-described
meeting of the select committee, its Subcommittee on Criminal Law
Issues convened. 1 93 The focal point of this meeting was a presentation
by Beth Froehling, Public Policy Specialist (now Deputy Director) for
the North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence.' 9 4 Froehling
urged the subcommittee to adopt a variety of legal reforms ostensibly
designed to protect existing and potential victims of domestic
5
violence. 19
In her presentation, Froehling attacked "gun permit loopholes,"
or the fact that pistol purchase permits, once issued, were valid and
189. Perhaps interest in discussing further gun regulation was lessened by the presentation's discussion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.8, which had already made it unlawful "for any person to own, possess, purchase, or receive or attempt to own, possess,
purchase, or receive [any sort of gun or gun permit] if ordered by the court for so long
as [any domestic violence-based protective order] is in effect." See
UTES FOR SEPT.

190.
191.
cation
192.

SELECT COMM. MIN-

25, 2003, supra note 183.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. One committee member then opined puzzlingly that "prevention and eduin the schools is the key to helping eliminate the problem." Id.
See id. The minutes also report that when Representative Gorman asked Ser-

geant Guard a question similar to the one posed by Representative Johnson, Guard
answered that "the General Assembly could help by funding agencies that are trying to
establish domestic violence as a crime that will not be tolerated." Id. (emphasis

added).
193.

H. SELECT COMM. ON DOMESTIC
Oct. 28, 2003, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) [hereinafter CRIM.
L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003].
194. See id.; N.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence: Our Staff, http://www.
nccadv.org/who we are.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
195. See CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003, supra note 193. Some of
these proposed reforms were: creating a harsher penalty for the crime of strangulation;
imposing stiffer pretrial release conditions on offenders; and creation of an exception
to the warrant requirement for the arrest of persons violating protective orders. See id.
MINUTES FOR SUBCOMM. ON CRIM. LAw ISSUES,

VIOLENCE,
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could be used to purchase a handgun up to five years after the date of
issuance. 196 She recommended that all such permits expire after one
year. 1 97 Hearing this, Representative Gorman opined that "any crime
should nullify a [purchase] permit."' 9
This must have provided a very nice segue into Froehling's next
talking point; for now she turned her attention to attacking, essentially, the Felony Firearms Act's home and business exceptions.' 99
Here, reproduced in full, is the impression that Froehling's discussion
of the Act appears to have left on the subcommittee's recorder of minutes: "Felons having guns within their own homes or lawful place of
business is not acceptable especially in a domestic violence situation.
This is unacceptable and is not consistent with federal law."200
Whatever the precise meaning of these criticisms might have been,
they appear to have started the ball rolling on the subcommittee's decision to delete the Act's home and business exceptions.2 ° '
In January of 2004, Sergeant John Guard appeared before the subcommittee and gave a presentation which was similar in many respects
to the one he gave to the select committee itself the previous Septem196. See id.

197. See id.; Letter from N.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence, to Reps. Paul

Stam & Beverly Earle, N.C. Gen. Assem. (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter NCCADV Letter]
(on file with author). Note that the five-year expiration period to which Froehling
objected is still law today. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-403 (2007).
198. See CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003, supra note 193.

199. See supra notes 179-81.
200. CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003, supra note 193 (citation omitted); accord NCCADV Letter, supra note 197 ("We support the proposal to conform
NC law with federal law in terms of prohibitions against felons possessing firearms.").

201. The minutes indicate that another proposed amendment to the Act had been
circulating in the House prior to this subcommittee meeting. See CRIM. L. SUBCOMM.
MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003, supra note 193 (remarking that, as Beth Froehling
presented her objections to the home and business exceptions to the Act, "[t]he subcommittee recalled a House bill that dealt with felons possessing guns"). Indeed, it
appears the amending language ultimately injected into the domestic violence bill by

the select committee came from H.B. 1058, 1st Ed., 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2004) (bearing the short title, "Felons Can't Possess Firearms"), which met its fate in
May of 2003 when it was withdrawn from the House calendar for the second time and

referred to the Rules Committee. See N.C. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1058 Information
& History, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/billlookup/billlookup.pl?session--2003&
billid=h1058 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). So while the 2004 changes to the Felony

Firearms Act were not drafted from whole cloth by the select committee or its Subcommittee on Criminal Law Issues, it seems the features of House Bill 1058 would have
been ignored and forgotten but for their resurrection by Beth Froehling and John

Guard in the domestic violence committees.
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ber. 20 2 This time, however, Guard's slide show featured materials
attacking the home and business exceptions to the Act. 20 3 He appears

to have emphasized the same points as Beth Froehling likely did in the
October meeting; namely, that the exceptions were (supposedly) "very
dangerous in [the] context of domestic violence" and were "not consistent with federal law." 20 4 But it seems Guard only offered support for
the second of these contentions-and this was merely a two-sentence
summary of what he apparently assumed to be the "federal law" governing felony gun possession." Indeed, the subcommittee's recorder
of minutes only thought it necessary to report this contention-and
not the first-in summarizing Guard's recommendations.2 °6 Moreover,
shortly after this presentation, the subcommittee's staff attorney
passed out a draft of an amendment to the domestic violence bill
which the minutes describe as "the State/Federal Firearm Law conformity [draft]." 20 7 Conformity with federal law-not protection of
potential domestic violence victims-thus seems to have been the catch
phrase. Representative Weiss moved to give the select committee a
favorable report regarding this amendment, and the motion carried. 20
Subsequently, the select committee reconvened and adopted the
language upon the subcommittee's favorable report-apparently without discussion.20 9 This gutted the home and business exceptions, and
210
also changed the Act's proscriptions to include all firearms.

So it came to pass that these modifications were introduced
together as part of what was essentially a "report" by the House Select
Committee on Domestic Violence, which was little more than a draft of
the domestic violence bill itself. 211 With respect to the Act, the
changes specified in this draft bill survived unmodified from their gen202. See

MINUTES FOR SUBCOMM. ON CRIM. LAW ISSUES,

H.

SELECT COMM. ON DOMESTIC

Jan. 7, 2004, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) [hereinafter CRIM. L.
SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR JAN. 7, 2004].
203. See id. (warning that the Act "[p]rohibits possession of firearms by felons
EXCEPT... within his own home or on [sic] his lawful place of business").
204. Id.
205. See id. (discussing, out of over a dozen Title 18 sections of the U.S. Code relating to firearms regulation, only 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2000)).
206. See id. (stating that one of Guard's recommendations was to "have state law
conform with federal law that a felon cannot possess a firearm even in his home").
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See MINUTES FOR H. SELECT COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Mar. 15, 2004, 2003
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004).
210. See id. (indicating that a copy of the adopted language appears as "Attachment
7" to the meeting's minutes).
211. See generally DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 182.
VIOLENCE,
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esis in the Subcommittee on Criminal Law Issues until their ratifica-

tion. 2 12 Remarkably, the bill passed as amended without a single "no"
vote from the House and with only one negative vote from the Senate
on the bill's second reading.2 13 It is quite possible that no one even
noticed the changes to the Felony Firearms Act buried deeply amid the
meandering sections of the domestic violence bill.2 1 4
The circumstances of these changes' introduction and passage
indicate that the relevant amending provisions-which so dramatically
broadened the Act's scope-received little to no negative attention.
There is no evidence of there ever having been a single discussion in
either the select committee or its subcommittee regarding whether the
changes would actually have any effect on domestic violence. Further,
neither Sergeant Guard nor Beth Froehling appear to have cited a single
relevant statistic that might have supported the notion that domestic
violence offenses were being committed by ex-cons, in their homes,
with firearms. Likewise, there is no record of any research having been
conducted as to the types of firearms with which these assumed
offenses were being committed, and thus no evidence that bringing all
firearms within the Act's scope had anything to do with domestic violence.21 5 Froehling has admitted that there is no research "readily
available" indicating how many firearms-related domestic violence
offenses are committed by someone with a prior felony on their
record.2 "6 This makes it appear unlikely that such figures existed in
2004 when the Coalition lobbied to extend the Act.
It is likely that the General Assembly, aware of the attendant political risks and benefits, was content to rubber-stamp a significant and
deliberate change in the criminal law without considering its effect on
North Carolina citizens' right to self-defense or the likely ineffective212. Compare CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FORJAN. 7, 2004, supra note 202 (attaching copy of relevant draft language), with Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, sec. 14.1, § 14415.1(a), 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 737-38.
213. See N.C. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1354 Information & History, http://www.
ncleg.net/gascripts/billlookup/billookup.pl?session=2003&billid=h 1354&votesto
view=all (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
214. See H.B. 1354, Ratified Ed., 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2004) (showing
its length to be twenty-seven pages).
215. "But the reason for the changes was conformity with federal law," argues the

reader. As I will explain, the state cannot be said to have a compelling interest in
ensuring that its laws match those authored by Congress.
216. See E-mail from author to Elizabeth Froehling, Deputy Director, N.C. Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (Mar. 19, 2009, 18:45:00 EST) (on file with author); E-mail
from Elizabeth Froehling, Deputy Director, N.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
to author (Apr. 6, 2009, 14:35:00 EST) (on file with author).
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ness of the amended Act itself in preventing gun violence. Legislators
voted in favor the domestic violence bill knowing they would receive
good press for making a heroic gesture in the name of combating
domestic violence-and knowing they would be gambling away their
reelection chances if they voted otherwise.
7.

21 7 The
"Curiouser and Curiouser!"
Antique Firearm Exception

Two years after whacking the home and business exceptions and
expanding disentitlement to include all firearms, the General Assembly carved out a little exception for a particular category of guns. A
portion of the deceptively-labeled 2006 Technical Corrections Act 2 18
announced that the Felony Firearms Act would "not apply to an
antique firearm. '219 This bill amended the definition of "antique firearm" to the following:
[any firearm (including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system) manufactured on or
before 1898[;] ... [a]ny replica of [one of the above] if the replica is not

designed or redesigned for using rimfire or conventional centerfire
fixed ammunition[; or] . . . [a]ny muzzle loading rifle, muzzle loading

shotgun, or muzzle loading pistol, which is designed to use black pow220
der substitute, and which cannot use fixed ammunition.
This was hardly a "technical" correction-unless one considers the .58
caliber musket ball and its ilk only "technically" responsible for hundreds of thousands of slain Civil War soldiers.2 2 1
217. LEwIs CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 14 (Charles A. McMurray ed., MacMillan 1914). The quoted phrase was uttered by the child Alice when, to her amazement,
she began to grow disproportionately tall after consuming a cake marked "Eat Me."
See id. at 12-14. Like poor Alice, the Felony Firearms Act has changed shape dramatically throughout its development, which has been characterized by the sort of comical
unpredictability often featured in children's fantasy literature.
218. S.B. 1523, 3d Ed., 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (providing the
"short title" of the Act).
219. See Act of July 27, 2006, ch. 259, sec. 7(b), § 14-415.1(a), 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws
1232, 1237.
220. See id., sec. 7(a), § 14-409.11, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1236-37. The definition of "antique firearm" continues in the exact same form today, and is codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-409.11 (2007). Note that the definition excludes any weapon
which "[i]ncorporates a firearm frame or receiver," is "converted into a muzzle loading
weapon," or which "is a muzzle loading weapon that can be readily converted to fire
fixed ammunition by replacing the barrel, bolt, breechblock, or any combination
thereof." Id. § 14-409.11(b) (emphasis added).
221. See MARGARET E. WAGNER ET AL., THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CIVIL WAR DESK
REFERENCE 493 (2009) (describing muzzle-loading weapons used by Union and Confederacy troops); E.B. LONG WITH BARBARA LONG, THE CIVIL WAR DAY BY DAY: AN ALMA-
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Quite remarkably, the antique firearms exception permits felons
to own muzzle loading black powder weapons. 222 These differ from
most modern "fixed ammunition" firearms in that they cannot fire
more than one shot without being reloaded by hand. But reloading
requires much more than just thumbing another pre-manufactured
bullet into place.2 3 It would be foolish to rely on an antique firearm
against an armed criminal in a self-defense situation today. Still, while
muzzle loading weapons are time-consuming to load and difficult for
most users to fire with accuracy, they are capable of providing lethal
firepower. Hunters in North Carolina commonly use these rifles to
224
dispatch larger game such as whitetail deer and bear.
Note that the definition of excepted antique weapons also specifically includes "muzzle loading pistols. ' 22 This means the antique firearms exception not only countermands the current general
prohibition against firearm possession by felons, but also rebuffs (less
obviously) the Act's traditional emphasis on preventing their concealmnent of guns.
So why did the North Carolina legislature create this exception?
Was it really just a "conforming" change, as the Session Law's heading
1861-1865, at 711 (1985) (reporting that the war claimed roughly 623,000
fatalities).
222. See id.§ 14-409.11(a). Black powder "substitute" is generally just a synthetic,
smokeless form of gunpowder used in muzzle loading (or "black powder") rifles.
223. To prepare for each shot, the black powder shooter must manually clean the
rifle bore, measure out a quantity of gunpowder, pour that down the barrel, and then
ram wadding-followed by the lead ball or projectile-down the barrel to rest on the
powder charge. Additionally, before pulling the trigger will do any good, a new percussion cap (which ignites the internal powder charge when struck) must be positioned where the gun's hammer will fall. This process requires considerable care and
may take novices upwards of a minute to complete. But see History.com, Musket Loading: How Fast?, http://www.history.com/search.do?searchtextmusket+loading (follow "Musket Loading: How Fast?" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) ("[A] trained
Revolutionary War soldier in General George Washington's army should [have been]
able to load and fire three aimed shots per minute."). Moreover, these guns' notoriously sluggish powder ignition often creates a considerable delay between the moment
of the trigger pull and the firing of the shot. See id.And "flintlocks" (which do not use
a percussion cap) are even more primitive, complicated, and finicky. See JOHN ROBERT
NAC,

WEBER, FORKS, PHONOGRAPHS, AND HOT AIR BALLOONS:

A

FIELD

GUIDE TO INVENTIVE

210-12 (1992) (detailing the various steps involved in loading and firing a
flintlock rifle).
224. See N.C. WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMM'N, NORTH CAROLINA INLAND FISHING, HuNTING AND TRAPPING REGULATIONS DIGEST 38-43 (2007) (identifying the beginning and
end of various hunting seasons and the specific days on which muzzle loading rifles
can be used).
225. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-409.11(a)(3) (2007) (emphasis added).
THINKING
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suggests? 2 26 Indeed, the only explanation for the exception is buried
deep in the minutes book of the House Judiciary I Committee, which
adopted the exception as part of the version of the Technical Corrections Act it approved.2 2 7 The uninspiring purpose of the General
Assembly in adding the antique firearms exception, it seems, was "to
conform [North Carolina] law to federal law regarding antique firearms." 228 This it achieved. 22 9 The minutes do not reveal, however,
whose idea this was. Whatever its origin, this little exception will
prove to be quite important in our strict scrutiny analysis.

B. Looking for the Legislature's Purpose
Having described the Felony Firearms Act's legislative history in
considerable detail, we may now take another step towards the core of
our constitutional analysis. This next challenge is that of determining
in more precise terms what interests the State of North Carolina might
assert in defending the current Act against a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process challenge. In other words, before discussing
whether the Act is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, we
must take a shot at identifying that interest.
This task is made atypical by virtue of its revolving around the
Act's infringement of a "new" fundamental right-that of self-defense,
which no court has yet described as an individual fundamental right in
2 30
the Fourteenth Amendment sense, and at which Heller only hints.
Fortunately, we are not without some starting point. North Carolina's
courts have addressed the Act, and their opinions discussing the more
recent version of the Act tend to describe (in very vague terms) what
226. See Act of July 27, 2006, ch. 259, 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 1234 (bearing the
heading, "An Act to Make Technical Corrections and Conforming Changes to the General Statutes as Recommended by the General Statutes Commission, and to Make Various Other Changes to the General Statutes and Session Laws" (emphasis added)).
227. See MINUTES FOR H. JUDICIARY I COMM., July 25, 2006, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2005) (addressing Senate Bill 1523). See also 2005 Bill Tracking N.C. S.B.
1523 (LexisNexis) (reporting that the House Judiciary I Committee's substitute to Senate Bill 1523 was adopted on the House floor on July 25, 2006).
228. MINUTES FOR H. JUDICIARY I CoMM.,July 25, 2006, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.

(N.C. 2005) (bill analysis included with minutes as "Attachment V," prepared by Committee Co-Counsel Kory Goldsmith, summarizing the proposed committee substitute
to Senate Bill 1523, Second Edition).
229. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-408.11 (defining "antique firearm"), with 18
U.S.C. § 921(a)(16) (2006) (defining "antique firearm" in a substantially identical
fashion).
230. See supra discussion accompanying notes 24-27.
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ultimately must be considered the state's compelling interest: protection of the public.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a government's
"general concern with crime prevention" is a compelling interest for
substantive due process purposes. 2 3 ' Thus, we might reasonably conduct the remainder of our analysis of the Act against this public protection interest alone. However, because states are quite inventive in
asserting alternative interests arguably furthered by the challenged
law 23 2 (and since no case has weighed North Carolina's public safety

interest against the specific fundamental right at issue here), I have
endeavored to address some of these miscellaneous, potentially-assertable interests as well.
1.

North Carolina Courts and Minimum Scrutiny

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has given a short series of
pronouncements on the modern Felony Firearms Act's constitutionality. Criminal defendants convicted of violating the Act have leveled
pre-Heller attacks against it,2 3 3 but their arguments have fallen flat
under the application of what is essentially mere "rational basis" scrutiny.2 34 Because courts have only applied the least stringent level of
constitutional review to the Act, the state has never been required-as
it would be under an application of strict scrutiny-to identify with any
precision the compelling interest or interests which the Act furthers.
231. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987) (emphasis added).
232. See supra note 57.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) (approving

disentitlement where State demonstrated Act was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, such as the preservation of the health and welfare of its citizens); State v.
Tanner, 251 S.E.2d 705, 706 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting appellant's equal protection argument and holding "there is clearly a reasonable relation between the classifi-

cation, those convicted of a crime of violence, and the purpose of the statute,
protection of the people from violence"). No litigant in the North Carolina state courts
has raised a fundamental right-based substantive due process challenge to the Act
since the federal Supreme Court's decision in Heller in June of 2008.
234. Under rational basis review generally, a law is presumptively valid and will be

struck down only if the court believes it is not rationally related to any conceivable,
legitimate government interest. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs

540 (3d ed. 2006). The government is not even required to point out

"the" interest it claims the law to further; instead, it need only rely on the court to
imagine a legitimate interest, after which it will inevitably deem the law "reasonably
related." See id. Arguably, this amounts to little more than guessing at the law's potential effect, then assessing the legitimacy of that effect. In this fashion, the actual reasonableness of the means employed by the government is rendered utterly

inconsequential.
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The cases that follow relate North Carolina courts' various
descriptions of such interests. While these interests were not discussed in the context of substantive due process attacks and were
labeled as merely "legitimate," it is reasonable to assume that the state
would attempt to recharacterize these same interests as "compelling"
should the need arise in defending the Act's constitutionality.
a. The Legitimate Interest in Protecting the Public: State v. Johnson
Carlton Johnson was convicted in 1983 of possession and sale of
cocaine-a felony offense in North Carolina.2 35 In 2001, a police
officer found Johnson with a pistol in his vehicle during a routine traffic stop.2 36 He was subsequently convicted of violating the Felony
Firearms Act.

237

Johnson appealed his conviction, arguing, among other things,
that retrospective application of the 1995 repeal of the five-year disentitlement cap 238 had (1) violated the state and federal ex post facto
clauses 23 9 and (2) stripped him of a vested right to bear firearms in
violation of his right to due process.2 4 °
As to the first of these arguments, Johnson contended more specifically that
at the time of his previous felony conviction in 1983, [the Act] permitted him to possess a firearm five years after the date of discharge of the
conviction, and thus, his conviction under [the Act] as amended in
1995, violate[d] the ex post facto clauses of the United States and
North Carolina Constitutions. [The amendment in 1995, which
removed the disentitlement cap,] . . .punished him for conduct that
was not previously criminal.2 4 1
But the court rejected this claim, characterizing the Act not as "punitive," but as merely "a retroactive civil or regulatory law," which as
such did not violate the ex post facto clause.24 2 Incident to drawing
this conclusion, the court declared that the Act "remain[ed] rationally
connected to the state's legitimate interest in protecting the public. 2 4 3
235. State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739, 741 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The disentitlement cap is discussed in detail beginning supra in the text accompanying note 100.
239. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at 741-42.
240. Id. at 746.
241. Id. at 741-42.
242. Id. at 743.
243. Id. at 744 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115,
124 (4th Cir. 2004)).
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Johnson's second argument rested on due process grounds. He
claimed that his rights of citizenship were restored 2 44 in 1990 and had
become "vested. '2 45 These civil rights included his right to possess a

firearm. 2 46 Thus, he urged, application of the Felony Firearms Act as
amended in 1995 deprived him of a vested right without due process
of law.2 4 7 The court briefly considered this argument:
A statute cannot be applied retrospectively if it will interfere with
rights that have vested .... A vested right is a right which is otherwise

secured, established, and immune from further legal metamorphosis ....

However, our case law has consistently pointed out that the

right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation .... The only requirement is that the regulation must be reason-

able and8 be related to the achievement of preserving public peace and
24

safety.

Having stated the law in this fashion, the court then concluded
that the "regulation" of Johnson's right to possess a firearm-in the
form of disentitlement under the Act-was "reasonably related to further securing the public's safety. ' 2 49 "Furthermore," said the court,
"[the] defendant has not been completely divested of his right to bear
arms [because the Act] allows him to possess a firearm at his home or
place of business . 25 0 Thus, 1Johnson's argument on these grounds was
also held to be meritless.

25

With its responses to Johnson's arguments, the court invoked the
same sort of language we might expect to find in most "rational basis
scrutiny" cases. And while the facts and legal arguments of this case
involved theories other than the interplay between substantive due process and deprivation of a fundamental right, the court's description of
244. Unfortunately, the opinion does not make clear whether these rights were

restored to Johnson through a petition-based, statutory rights restoration procedure, or
rather, by virtue of the terms of the former disentitlement cap.
245. See id. at 746.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
249. Id. (emphasis added).

250. Id. (emphasis added). Recall that even though this appeal was decided in
2005-after the domestic violence bill in 2004 had eradicated the home and business
exceptions, see supra text accompanying notes 172-213-Johnson himself was charged

and convicted under the version of the Act in existence at the time of his arrest for the
firearms violation in 2001. That version, of course, was pre-2004. Thus, it still fea-

tured the home and business exceptions even though the Act as it stood at the time of
Johnson's appeal no longer included them.
251. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at 746.
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the state interest at stake is nonetheless useful for purposes of applying
strict scrutiny.
To summarize: the Johnson court maintained that the Act was reasonably related to advancing the state's "legitimate" interest in protecting the public, preserving public peace and safety, and (curiously)
"further" securing the public's safety.2 52 Indeed, in addressing Barney
Britt's claims in the following case, the court of appeals leaned heavily-too heavily, in fact-upon this rather broad enunciation of the
state's interest.
b.

New Statute, Hand-me-down Analysis: Britt v. State

Barney Britt was just twenty years old when he was convicted of a
felony drug offense in 1979.253 He served a sentence which ended in
1982.254 In 1987, he regained the right to possess a firearm pursuant
to the five-year disentitlement cap featured in the version of the Felony
Firearms Act on the books at the time. 25 5 With his rights of citizenship restored, Britt started a successful business in Raleigh and
resumed hunting deer in his free time.25 6 He even earned a record for
shooting the third-largest deer in North Carolina history.2 5 7
When he learned from a local sheriff that the General Assembly
had modified the Act in 2004 such that it would prohibit him, absolutely, from possessing any gun, Britt brought a civil suit against the

252. See id. at 744, 746. The court's ill-advised use of the adverb "further" here may
have the effect of suggesting the state's interest lies not in providing the public with a
first line of defense against lawbreakers, but in fabricating a rather nominal benefit in
the form of an incremental layer of prohibitions-a security blanket, in other words. If
such is deemed to be the case by a federal court, the state's interest is likely to appear
diminished in importance.
253. See Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); see also Press
Release, Barney Britt, Legislature Revokes Rights of NC Citizens (Sept. 20, 2005),
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?acct=104&story=/www/story/09-202005/0004111837 (describing Barney Britt's felony offense as "ignorant" and "youthful," and pointing out that he had "worked hard since making a mistake when [he] was
only 20 years old" to become a "valuable member of society").
254. Britt, 649 S.E.2d at 404.
255. Id. The disentitlement cap is explained supra in the text accompanying
note 100.
256. See Press Release, supra note 253.
257. WRAL.com: Garner Man Challenges Law Forbidding Convicted Felons From
Carrying Guns (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/120061
[hereinafter Britt Story].
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State, arguing (on numerous grounds) that the Act was unconstitu-

tional. 258 The trial court granted summary judgment for the State.
On appeal, Britt faced an uphill battle: his principal argument was
one of reasonableness, 259 and the court of appeals had already demon-

strated in Johnson that it would consider virtually anything reasonable
as relating to the Act under rational basis, minimum scrutiny. Nevertheless, Britt maintained that because the Act prohibited all firearms to
all convicted felons-even those whose crimes were nonviolent and
were committed decades earlier, and whose civil rights had been fully
restored 26 0 -the law "swept too broadly and [was] not reasonably
related to a legitimate government interest. '261' His challenge thus
called for the application of rational basis scrutiny.
The court's response, unfortunately, was neither surprising nor
original:
The General Assembly made a determination that individuals who
have been convicted of a felony offense shall not be able to possess
most firearms. This statutory scheme, which treats all felons the same,
serves to protect and preserve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of this State.2 6 2
In rejecting Britt's due process argument, the court recycled the
exact same analysis 26 3 which it used to reject an ex post facto chal-

lenge in Johnson, this time concluding that an entirely different version
of the Act was nonetheless "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.

26 4

258. Britt, 649 S.E.2d at 408 ("Sheriff Harrison told [Britt] that if he saw [him] with
a firearm on his own property, [Britt] would be charged under [the Felony Firearms
Act] as a felon in possession of a firearm.").
259. See id. at 405 ("Specifically, plaintiff contends [the Act] sweeps too broadly and
is not reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.").
260. Interestingly, several years prior to Britt, the Fourth Circuit had declined to
discuss "whether North Carolina would allow a change in its laws to strip a felon of
his previously restored right to possess firearms, and if so . . .whether that would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." United States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115,121 n.6 (4th
Cir. 1999). The Britt court, however, seems to have assumed such a change in North
Carolina law would have no effect on that constitutional issue.
261. Britt, 649 S.E.2d at 405.
262. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
263. Like the "analysis" found in a struggling law student's essay responses, the
court of appeals' discussion may be more accurately styled a conclusion in the absence
of analysis; a type of assertion which begs the reader to ask, "Why is the law reasonably related to the state's interest? How does it serve to protect citizens?"
264. Compare id. at 406, with State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739, 746 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005) ("[T]he regulation is reasonably related to further securing the public's safety.").
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But as the dissenting judge pointed out, there were "major differences between the 1995 and current versions of the statute." 265 Specifically, the Act was upheld in Johnson in large part because
disentitlement (1) did not apply to the felon's home or lawful place of
business and (2) was "limited to weapons that, because of their concealability, pose a unique risk to public safety. '2 66 But the home and
business exceptions as well as the statute's emphasis on restricting
possession of concealable weapons were gutted from the Act as part of
the broadening amendments passed in 2004.267 Thus, the holding in
Britt and the rationale supporting it (which came from Johnson) were
at odds with one another.2 68
Following the advent of the Heller decision, North Carolina's
supreme court reopened Barney Britt's case. 26 9 However, as explained
in the Introduction to this Comment, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals on very narrow state law grounds: as applied to Britt,
the Act was not a reasonable regulation of the right to bear arms under
North Carolina's constitution. 270 Rather, given that Britt had been
convicted of a relatively minor, nonviolent offense, and in light of his
subsequent decades of sterling behavior even after having had his firearm rights restored, the court concluded that "the State unreasonably
divested [him] of his right to own a firearm. "271 In so holding, the
majority opinion did not identify a state interest at all. 272 However,
Justice Timmons-Goodson's dissent announced that the Act was reasonably related to a "compelling interest in the public welfare and
safety.,

2 73

Note that because Britt was an "as applied" decision, the court's
holding did not alter the applicability of the Act to any other individual
disentitled by it. This means the Act is still vulnerable to wholesale
265. Britt, 649 S.E.2d at 410 (Elmore, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 409 (emphasis added) (quoting and distinguishing Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at
744).
267. See supra Part III.A.6 (discussing these amendments).
268. Even if one somehow managed to reconcile these two cases, they would be
rendered inapposite by recognition of an individual, fundamental right of self-defense,
and along with it, the need for strict scrutiny of the Act.
269. See Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322 (N.C. 2009) ("On 24 March 2009, this
Court retained [Britt's] notice of appeal based upon a substantial constitutional
question ... ").
270. See id. at 322-25.
271. Id. at 323.
272. The court did note that the trial court had described the Act as "rationally
related to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 322.
273. Id. at 324 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
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attack on other grounds; namely, substantive due process arguments
predicated on a fundamental right guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.2 7 4
In the event a court squarely addresses a challenge to the Felony
Firearms Act under the federal Constitution, it will not be able to characterize the Act as being narrowly tailored to that interest even if that
court declares North Carolina's legitimate public safety interest "compelling." However, the court might also investigate whether the statute
is narrowly tailored to different interests. For as Britt's attorney
observed, the statute "was denominated as an act to conform state law
to federal and to 'prevent domestic violence.' '' 275 The legislative history makes that clear.2 76 Thus, our discussion now turns to address
these and other legislative concerns to decide whether they might reasonably be cited by the State as alternative compelling interests.
2.

Considering Potential Alternative Interests

As just explained, it is important to find out whether the Felony
Firearms Act may reasonably be said to serve other interests-interests
potentially less deserving of constitutional respect. I have arrived at
four such alternatives. The first of these-namely, discouragement of
recidivism-would perhaps constitute a valuable legislative interest;
but recognizing this interest might render the Act an unconstitutional
ex post facto law. The second alternative interest-stewardship of
prison resources-is perhaps even more compelling than the first; but
this also appears to have been foreclosed by the Act's own history and
interpretation. Another alternative-prevention of domestic violenceis a worthy goal, but (as we will see later in the discussion) concerns
an interest to which the Act's proscriptions cannot be said to be narrowly tailored. The last of these alternatives-conformity with federal
law-is the most preposterous of the four, but is supported, oddly
enough, by the Act's legislative history. Ultimately, none of these can
help the Felony Firearms Act pass strict judicial scrutiny.

274. See supra discussion accompanying notes 6-14.
275. Posting of Dan Hardway to http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglawand_policy/2008/05/another-good-te.html (May 19, 2008, 16:41:51 EST). Mr.
Hardway has characterized the Act as "a retroactive ban of any possession of any firearm by anyone ever convicted of any felony anywhere[, with] no exceptions[, even] for
home defense." Id. "By the Court's reasoning," he says, "there are no rights for felons
in North Carolina-only privileges subject to the whim and good will of the General
Assembly." Id. (emphasis added).
276. See supra discussion accompanying notes 179-215.
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a. Deterring Violent Recidivists?
The primary purpose of a "recidivist statute" is to deter repeat
offenders.2 7 7 One of the actual interests at stake, then, might be that
of dissuading felons from using firearms in post-conviction crimes, or
from doing anything which would draw attention to them and the fact
that they may be keeping a firearm illegally. 7 8 The Act may be said to
serve this goal by promising felons they will meet with a stiffer sentence for wielding such dangerous weapons in another crime, or even
for being pulled over for speeding and being found with a gun. The
potential deterrent effect of longer jail time should militate towards a
reduction in the use of firearms by repeat offenders, and might make
all felons who insist on keeping firearms more careful in their conduct.
Practically speaking, then, this view paints the Act as operating to
impose only nominal "real" restrictions on felons' possession of firearms in their own homes, with its true effect instead being that of creating harsher punishment for those felons who use guns to commit
crimes or who simply get caught with a gun in their possession-a
27 9
recidivist statute masquerading as a substantive law, if you will.

277. State v. Wood, 647 S.E.2d 679, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
278. That the state might reasonably have anticipated felons' determined efforts to
continue carrying firearms for self-defense, notwithstanding their convictions, is supported by this ultimatum: "Die or go to jail? That's a hell of a decision." T.I., Ready for
Whatever, on PAPER TRAIL (2008 Atlantic Records). "If your life was in jeopardy everyday, [are] you telling me you wouldn't need weaponry-just because of your felonies?"
Id. While these lyrics are written from the perspective of a person already imprisoned
for felony gun possession, rapper T.I. actually recorded them "while under house
arrest for weapons possessions charges," awaiting his "year-long prison sentence
beginning in 2009." See Rolling Stone, Online Album Review (Oct. 16, 2008), http://
www.rollingstone.com/reviews/album/23094260/review/23306351.
Scolding those
who would misperceive him as "just another ignorant rapper who had a chance at
success and [did] nothing but horrible things with it," T.I. has emphasized that while
he accepted his federal gun possession conviction, his attempts to secure weapons for
self-defense purposes were justified and necessary: "[Do] you know how many
attempts have been made against my life?" CNN.com, Hip-Hop Star Discusses Firearms Conviction (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/showbiz/music/10/13/
qa.ti/index.html.
279. A similar sort of reasoning might have applied when Texas attempted to defend
its anti-sodomy law against substantive due process challenge in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Texas might have conceded that it would not often be able to
invade the bedrooms of sodomites to detect a violation of the anti-sodomy statute.
Since the Court appeared to reject "morality" as a legitimate basis for lawmaking,
Texas might have argued, for example, that the statute was really used to effectuate a
more robust sentence for adults who raped child victims of the same sex-crimes
which involve illegal acts of sodomy, albeit incidental. Similarly, North Carolina
might be forced to concede that it has little chance of enforcing the Felony Firearms
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But according to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, deterring
repeat offenders is not the purpose of the Felony Firearms Act. 2 80 In

State v. Wood, the appellant argued that the Act's requirement that the
state prove he had been convicted of a felony revealed that the predominating purpose of the statute was to deter and punish repeat offenders. 28 1 Proof of his prior felony, therefore, was merely a "recidivist
component. ' 28 2 Because of this, he argued, his violation of the Act
could only serve as a "sentencing enhancement" for a separate, substantive offense-one with which he had not been charged, of course.
While Wood does not make this clear, it seems the appellant's argument was that ratcheting up his jail sentence based on his mere possession of a firearm would be "punishing him for conduct that was not
28 3
previously criminal," in violation of the ex post facto clause.
Batting down Mr. Wood's argument, the court of appeals cited the
General Assembly's "inherent power to define and punish any act as a
crime,
concluding that while the Act "has characteristics of a recidivist statute, a plain reading of [it] shows that it ... creates a substantive offense . . . and not a sentencing requirement aimed at reducing

recidivism. ' 28 ' This conclusion, alas, involved no inquiry into the precise societal difficulty at which the legislature's creation of the substantive offense itself was aimed. Given the court's eagerness to
explain that "courts must ... construe [a criminal statute] with regard

to the evil which it is intended to suppress, 2 8 6 its refusal to follow its
own rule and conduct an investigation into the actual intentions of the
Act (or even detecting violations of it) other than by way of tips from informants who
peek around inside felons' homes looking for guns. From this position, the state

might maintain that the Act is not really implemented with respect to its "substantive"
character, but is instead applied to make a gun-crime by a convict more costly to him,
sentencing wise.
280. See Wood, 647 S.E.2d at 686 (stating that while the Felony Firearms Act "has
characteristics of a recidivist statute, a plain reading of the statute shows that it creates
a new substantive offense").
281. See id.

282. Id.
283. See State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739, 742 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). The Johnson

court pointed out that "only laws which retroactively increase punishment or impose a
penalty violate the ex post facto clause, but retroactive civil or regulatory ones generally
do not." Id. at 743 (referencing State v. White, 590 S.E.2d 448, 454 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004)) (emphasis added).
284. Wood, 647 S.E.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 687; cf. State v. Bowden, 630 S.E.2d 208, 213 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("The

mere fact that a statute is directed at recidivism does not prevent [it] from establishing
a substantive offense.").

286. Wood, 647 S.E.2d at 686 (emphasis added).
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legislature-an altogether different task than describing the bare effect
of the statute-is unsettling.
In any event, whether or not preventing or discouraging recidivism in such a fashion could be deemed a compelling interest, Mr.
Wood's interpretation of the Act would render it punitive in nature.
The courts have made it clear that the purpose of the Act is not punitive, but rather, regulatory.28 7 We must therefore reject this as a viable
alternative state interest.
b.

Lessening the Burden on State Prisons?

Stiffening up disentitlement-as did the broadening amendments
of 2004-would make a bit more sense if denying felons gun possession rights could be characterized as a more efficient correctional alternative to outright incarceration. Of course, such a notion runs
contrary to the courts' utterances on the subject, which have pointed
out that the Act's prohibitions are "regulatory" in nature and not "punitive."'2 8 While such reasoning proved useful to the courts in beating
down ex post facto challenges, 289 it is futile in the context of a substan-

tive due process challenge to a state's deprivation of the fundamental
right of self-defense.
But even assuming absolute, perpetual firearms disentitlement is
justified by the state's "compelling" interest in implementing substitute
forms of criminal correction to alleviate an overwhelmed prison system-and assuming acknowledging this interest would not render the
Act punitive and thus an ex post facto law-there is no evidence that
the General Assembly ever believed the 2004 changes to the Act would
address the corrections system's problem at all.
In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. According to the legislature's Fiscal Research Division, the domestic violence bill was simply
to make "conforming changes to state firearm laws to mirror existing
federal law" and was "expected to have no state level fiscal impact. "290
Surely a report like this, which highlighted in detail the mounting cost
of incarceration and the accompanying lack of prison space, would
287. The court had previously explained that "any law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was ... when committed is prohibited as an ex post facto law."
Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at 743 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks

omitted).
288. Id. at 742.
289. E.g., id.
290. See N.C. GEN. AsSEM. FiscAL RESEARCH Div., LEGisLATivE FIScAL NOTE, HOUSE
BILL 1354 (FiFTH EDITION) 7 (2004) available at http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/2003/
fiscalnotes/house/pdf/hfn1354v5.pdf (indicating report was produced July 9, 2004).
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have pointed out any relevant fiscal benefit reasonably deducible from
the proposed changes to the Act-if such benefit existed. Indeed, a
fiscal note prepared the previous year for an earlier, failed bill (predecessor to the changes to the Act which appeared in the domestic violence bill) indicated quite plainly that removal of the home and
business exception and expansion of the types of firearms prohibited
to felons would lead to "an increase in
defendants" and would likely
29 1
require more prison beds-not less.
In addition, the Fiscal Research Division explained that because
"[tihe [Sentencing and Policy Advisory] Commission assumes for each
bill that increasing criminal penalties does not have a deterrent or
incapacitative effect on crime . . . , the Fiscal Research Division . . .
does not assume savings due to deterrent effects for this bill .. ."292
The cost-sensitive nature of this report rebuts the notion that the legislature may have been shrewd enough to realize (1) that the Act's survival hinges in some part on its "regulatory" nature, and (2) that
highlighting any fiscal benefits to the correctional system would risk
prompting the courts to recharacterize the Act as punitive.
The legislature never seemed to think the Act would lessen the
burden on North Carolina's correctional system, and the Act cannot
rightfully be said to serve a compelling interest in reducing that strain.
c.

Combating Domestic Violence?

Crimes of domestic violence, and the betrayal of trust and intimacy they often embody, are unquestionably horrific and perverse.
Throughout the development of the Britt case in 2007, one of the most
vocal supporters of the 2004 amendments to the Felony Firearms Actwhich, among other things, stripped it of the home and business
exceptions-was the North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence.29 3 Recall that the Coalition was instrumental in persuading the
2 94
legislature to modify the Act.
291. N.C.

GEN.

ASSEM. FISCAL RESEARCH

Div.,

LEGISLATIVE FISCAL NOTE,

HOUSE

BILL 1058 (FIRST EDITION) 2, 3, 5 (2003), available at http://www.ncleg.net/sessions/

2003/fiscalnotes/house/pdf/hfnlO58.pdf (emphasis added) (indicating report was
produced on April 22, 2003).
292. Id. at 2.
293. See Britt Story, supra note 257.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 193-215. As one of its spokespersons
revealed, the Coalition's view seems to have been that any criminal law is acceptable as
long as it is passed in the talismanic name of preventing domestic violence. Reacting
to Barney Britt's litigation, the Coalition's public policy specialist Beth Froehling
announced a justification for upholding the drastically broadened Act: it would be "too
difficult [for the state] to pick and choose which convicted felons should carry a gun
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Surely it is important that the state seek to prevent acts of violence
by and against members of a common family or household. One
might even concede that this is a compelling goal, constitutionally
speaking. But an interest in protecting potential victims of domestic
violence is hard to distinguish as anything more than a cross-section of
the state's "general concern with crime prevention" 29 5 or its "legitimate
interest in protecting the public. '29 6 This means any arguments renand which should not." Britt Story, supra note 257. Continuing, she explained that
she considered this "a public safety issue." Id. She asked, "Do we want convicted
felons to be allowed to have firearms?" Id. The rhetorical question Froehling
neglected to ask, of course, is whether "we"want anyone having guns. The Coalition's
likely answer would reveal that it is not content to deprive only "convicted felons" (an
unquestionably evil group of persons, in the Coalition's estimation) of their right of
self-defense. Instead, it appears to have a predilection for disarmament; for instance,
the Coalition objected to the idea of giving mere information about obtaining a firearm
for self-defense to the survivors of domestic violence. See Lynn Bonner, Weapons Counseling Stays in Bill, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 1, 2005, at B5, available at
2005 WLNR 13735643 (discussing the Coalition's negative reaction to H.B. 1311,
2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005), which required the clerk of court, upon
issuing a protective order to certain domestic violence victims, to provide information
to the victim explaining, inter alia, her right to apply for an expedited concealed handgun permit, pursuant to section 14-415.15, as a person facing an "emergency situation"); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3(cl)(6) (2007).
295. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987). Another example of an
important function of the Act-which should be distinguished from the interests
underlying it-arises in regard to the Act's focus on the felon's "access to the firearm
[without any regard to] the firearm's operability at any given point in time." State v.
Jackson, 546 S.E.2d 570, 574 (N.C. 2001) (emphasis added). The North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to read the Act as requiring that the firearm in the felon's
possession be "operable." Id. at 574-75. The court justified this interpretation as an
extension of "the intuitively logical objective of the statute to prevent a show of force by
felons, either real or apparent." Id. (emphasis added). The idea was that it is dangerous and harmful for people to run about the countryside pointing guns (operable or
otherwise) at one another in the course of breaking other laws. Thus one might
attempt to argue, citing Jackson, that the state has an interest in preventing such
"show[ings] of force." Id. However, that opinion explained that the Act was created to
address the "heightened risk and public concern associated with convicted felons possessing firearms." Id. at 573-74 (emphasis added). The court understood the Act as
operating to protect the public from those who would use a gun (or something that
resembling one) to facilitate their bad acts, and thus as serving the state's interest in
protecting the public from crime. See id. This means the "logical objective" of preventing felons from making a show of force in committing other crimes is not a state
interest as such, but only a theoretical effect of the Act by which it serves the general
public protection interest. An interest in preventing the "stick up" scenario and an
interest in crime control are one and the same, and do not require separate narrow
tailoring analyses.
296. State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739, 744 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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dering the Act constitutionally defective under the state's interest in
public safety will apply to this more fact-specific variant as well. However, there may be some subtle differences in the contours of the constitutional analysis conducted in light of an asserted interest in
combating domestic violence, so it is recognized here for the sake of
discussion.
d.

Conforming to Federal Law?

Classifying "conformity with federal law" as a compelling state
interest should immediately strike us as outlandish. But this was a
prominent justification during the legislature's 2004 removal of the
home and business exceptions, which were labeled as "unacceptable
297
and ... not consistent with federal law."
If achieving conformity with federal law is ever deemed a compelling interest, there can be no such thing as a "less restrictive means" to
that end. Only complete conformity to the federal law can be rightly
said to be "narrowly tailored" toward furthering a state's interest in
conforming to such law. Because there can be only one means to that
end-revision of the text of state law-the means and the ends become
one and the same.
This cuts both ways; for if conformity were a compelling interest,
strict scrutiny analysis would be inapposite wherever states succeeded
in mimicking the substance of federal statutory schemes. In other
words, the applicable analytic process would no longer be a form of
judicial review, but a mere proofreading for differences in the federal
and state codes.
It is one thing for state law to mirror federal law incidentally as it
is modified in an attempt to achieve some other compelling interest. It
is quite another for both the state interest and the state's means of
furthering it to be indistinguishable from one another. Despite the
manifest problems with this interest, I will nevertheless refer to it periodically in analyzing the current provisions of the Act.
IV.

SCRUTINIZING NORTH CAROLINA'S SHOTGUN APPROACH: THE
CURRENT LANGUAGE OF THE FELONY FIREARMS ACT

This Comment's analysis of the Felony Firearms Act now shifts
from history to the heart of strict scrutiny: the narrow tailoring analysis. I will first describe the import or logical effect of certain provi-

sions of the Act, and then evaluate the particular effect in light of
arguably compelling North Carolina interests to determine to what
297. See CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES

FOR

OCT.

28, 2003, supra note 193.
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extent the provision in question is narrowly tailored towards furthering the state's interest. In making that determination, I give special
attention to the Act's over- and underinclusiveness. 298 I will then consider whether there are less-restrictive means by which North Carolina
may achieve its goals.
To a certain extent, the approach of this Comment draws from
Justice Scott's dissenting opinion in Posey v. Commonwealth, a case
decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. 2 99 Justice Scott's compelling
discussion was organized around Kentucky's constitutional history
and the various features of that state's version of the Act, 30 0 giving less

attention to the question of state interests.3 0 ' In any event, the inquiries just explained will reveal that the Act is not carefully tailored to
further any compelling state interest and thus impinges unconstitutionally upon the individual, fundamental right of self-defense.
A.

Persons Subject to the Act: Demons or the Demonized?

Who loses their right to firearm possession under the Felony Firearms Act? The current text of the Act answers quite simply, "any person who has been convicted of a felony. 30 2 It goes on to provide that
298. Recall the discussion of over- and underinclusiveness appearing supra at note
48 and accompanying text.
299. Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 183-205 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
300. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 527.040(1) (LexisNexis 2002), which is the Kentucky
analogue to the North Carolina Felony Firearms Act, provides that "[a] person is guilty
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when he possesses, manufactures, or
transports a firearm when he has been convicted of a felony, as defined by the laws of
the jurisdiction in which he was convicted, in any state or federal court .... Interestingly, the statute also provides that "with respect to handguns, [its proscriptions]
apply only to persons convicted after January 1, 1975, and with respect to other firearms, to persons convicted after July 15, 1994." Id. § 527.040(4). Furthermore,
felons in Kentucky are exempt from this statute if they have been granted a full pardon
by the state's governor or the President of the United States, or "granted relief by the
United States Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of
1968, as amended." Id. § 527.040(1)(a), (b).
301. Writing two years prior to the United States Supreme Court's Heller decision,
Justice Scott argued persuasively that section 527.040 violates the Kentucky constitution. See Posey, S.W.3d at 183-205 (Scott, J., concurring in part dissenting in part).
Kentucky's Bill of Rights provides that "[aill men are, by nature, free and equal, and
have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned . . .[t]he
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties .. .[and] [t]he right to bear
arms in defense of themselves and of the state, subject to the power of the General
Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons." Ky.
CONST. § 1 (emphasis added).
302. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(a) (2007).
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convictions which cause disentitlement .. .shall only include .. .
[flelony convictions in North Carolina that occur before, on, or after
December 1, 1995; and ...[v]iolations of criminal laws of other states
or of the United States that occur before, on, or after December 1,
1995, and that are substantially similar to [the North Carolina felony
convictions just described] which are punishable
where committed by
30 3
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
The Act also defines a "conviction" as "a final judgment in any case in
which felony punishment, or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, as the case may be, is permissible, without regard to the plea
30 4
entered or to the sentence imposed.
To summarize this language: North Carolinians are subject to disentitlement under the Act if they have ever committed (1) a crime
labeled as a felony in the North Carolina General Statutes and punishable by over one year in prison, (2) a violation of the laws of another
jurisdiction that is "substantially similar" to a crime from the previous
category, or (3) a violation of any law for which "felony punishment"
of any duration is permissible.30 5
As Justice Scott poignantly suggested, it is important that one
understands "the vast area of non-threatening human activity covered
by the term 'felony. ' ' 3 6 Indeed, the dreaded "convicted felon"-the
person the state has been so eager to disarm in the name of public
safety-may not be that frightening at all.
For example, in North Carolina, it is a felony for a person to act as
a notary public knowing her commission has expired. 30 7 By committing her wicked, un-commissioned notarial act, the renegade notary
will earn all of five dollars. 30 8 The state, meanwhile, may reward her
with up to eight months in prison. 30 9 And even if she is sentenced
only to community service, her conviction for this Class I felony
303. Id. § 14-415.1(b)(1), (2).
304. Id. § 14-415.1(b)(3) (emphasis added).
305. See id.; supra note 158 (explaining legislative history of relevant language).

306. Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 187 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., dissenting).
307. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10B-60(e) ("It is a Class I felony for any person to perform notarial acts in this State with the knowledge that the person is not commissioned under [the Notary Public Act].").
308. See id. § 1OB-31 ("The maximum fee[] that may be charged by a notary
for .. .acknowledgments, jurats, verifications or proofs, [is] five dollars ....").
309. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c) (indicating that a Class I felon with no prior record
may receive between three and eight months imprisonment, depending on whether her
offense has mitigating or aggravating factors).
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means she is forever deprived of her right to have a gun for self-defense
purposes.

310

Like the example just given, a host of acts made unlawful by the
state do not involve violence or any sort of threat to personal safety, yet
are labeled and punished as felonies. Disentitlement will befall anyone
who is convicted for making a bootleg video at the movie theater,3 1 1
selling a time share without designating a registrar, 31 running a "pyramid" scheme, 3 13 writing a bad check, 314 removing pine needles from

posted land,31 5 or even operating a bingo game without a license.3 16
Browsing through Chapter 14 of North Carolina's General Statutes will
reveal that these sorts of examples are numerous.
1. The Public Protection Interest
Nearly thirty years ago, North Carolina's court of appeals
expressed its belief that "the purpose of the [Felony Firearms Act is]
protection of the people from violence. 3 1 7 It has since reaffirmed this
conclusion, but only with increasingly imprecise remarks about the
Act's ability to "protect and preserve [public] health, safety and welfare."13 18 Yet the Fourth Circuit-writing before the drastic changes to
the Act in 2004-asserted that "[the] legislature's 'judgment that a convicted felon ...is among the class of persons who should be disabled
possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is
from ...
rational.' "319 North Carolina's courts have echoed this reasoning.3 20
Arguably, then, if the Act disentitles persons who are not characterized by this "potential dangerousness," its rationality score should
suffer. And that it does; for although it may at one time have been
"reasonably related" to an interest in public safety, 3 2 ' the Act in its
current form is by no means carefully or narrowly tailored to that
310. See id. § 14-415.1(b) (providing that felony convictions trigger disentitlement
under the Act "without regard to the plea entered or to the sentence imposed," so long
as "felony punishment ...

is permissible").

311. See id. §§ 14-440.1(b), (c)(1).
312. See id. § 93A-58(b).
313. See id. § 14-291.2.
314. See id. § 14-107.
315. See id. § 14-79.1.
316. See id. § 14-309.5.
317. State v. Tanner, 251 S.E.2d 705, 706 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis added).
318. Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
319. United States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980)) (emphasis added).
320. E.g., Britt, 649 S.E.2d at 407 (citing O'Neal, 180 F.3d at 124).
321. State v. Johnson, 610 S.E.2d 739, 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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interest, being both vastly overinclusive as well as tellingly
underinclusive.
So first, the Act is overbroad because many of the individuals the
Act disarms are not potentially dangerous, and cannot reasonably be
described in that way. Nevertheless, courts appear to have latched
onto a puzzling logic: "persons who have been convicted of a felony.., are thus 'unfit to be entrusted with... dangerous instrumentalities.' ''32 2 This is not right. While a person may be convicted of a
felony due to heinous actions which themselves indicate he is "unfit"
to have a gun, an indivdual is not dangerous just because he or she has
been convicted of a felony.
Recall for a moment our example of that incorrigible scalawag, the
notary public. 3 23 Suppose she is so sinister as to notarize a testamentary document for her terminally-ill friend one day after learning her
commission has expired. Suppose for a moment she forgot what she
learned in the handful of hours she spent attending the required training course, and mistakenly believed she could lawfully update her
commission over the phone the next morning. And suppose the document she sealed ends up being revoked anyway. Is she really "among
[a] class of persons who should be [disarmed] because of potential
dangerousness"?3 24 Unthinkable. But if she is convicted, the state's
answer is "yes." What the courts and the General Assembly appear to
have contented themselves in assuming, quite perniciously, is that her
violation of a technical rule functioning to enhance the authenticity
and uniformity of legal instruments 325 (hardly a public safety mechanism) amounts to a full-blown propensity not just for carelessness or
even lawlessness, but for gun violence.3 2 6 In actuality, we cannot rea322. United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting O'Neal,
180 F.3d at 124) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added); see Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at 744
(quoting Farrow approvingly for this proposition).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 307-08.

324. Cf. O'Neal, 180 F.3d at 124 (using this language to describe disentitled
persons).

325. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10B-2 (2007).
326. But see State v. Oaks, 594 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). In Oaks, the court

of appeals vacated a trial court order which, citing federal law, imposed a permanent
and unconditional prohibition on firearms possession by a man convicted of misdemeanor marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession. See id. at 793. The court of

appeals criticized the order for "apparently presum[ing] that [the person] will always
be an unlawful user of controlled substances, and therefore may never possess fire-

arms." Id. The court also took exception "to the trial court's conclusion of law that
defendant and [his wife] 'may not possess firearms or ammunition on their own premises even for their own personal protection.' Our concern is that the trial court's language is unconditional and without any time limits." Id. (emphasis added). This case
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sonably conclude that her "potential" for dangerousness is any greater
than that of most ordinary North Carolinians with no criminal history.
But perhaps they, too, should be statutorily disarmed.
Which brings us to underinclusiveness: what sorts of criminals
actually evade the Act's proscriptions? The irony of the answer should
come as no surprise: dangerous ones. The Felony Firearms Act
announces the judgment of the General Assembly that an individual
convicted dozens of years ago of a nonviolent felony 32 7 is more likely

to commit firearm violence than is the individual who has not been
convicted of a "felony," but who has been convicted of a violent or
destructive misdemeanor, such as erecting a burning cross in someone's yard, 3 28 "hazing" one's classmates, 3 29 pointing a gun at someone
as a "joke,I33 ° desecrating gravestones,3 3 willfully obstructing police
officers,3 3 2 or taking indecent liberties with students of a school where
one works as a janitor.3 3 3 Even the habitual,3 3 4 wanton blowing up of
dynamite or exploding of bombs is not enough to earn disentitlement
under the Act.3 3 5
One might ask, "What 'potential' for dangerousness does one violent misdemeanor show?" The answer is, "Certainly at least as much
potential as a single, nonviolent 'felony' which presents no safety risk
to anyone." Even if a person is convicted of committing five or six of
these dangerous misdemeanors, they remain categorized as a misdemeanant and are not punishable by imprisonment in excess of one
year.33 6 Thus, even where the person does have a propensity for engagsuggests North Carolina courts might be willing to concede that wrongdoing (even
where admitted by the accused) is no indicator of violent criminal propensity. Also

encouraging is the court's sensitivity to the harshness of "unconditional" firearms disentitlement "without any time limit" in light of individuals' need for "personal protection." See id. But where is this sensitivity in cases where the underlying, nonviolent
crime bears the "felony" label? E.g.,Johnson, 610 S.E.2d at 744. The Act thus may be

said to dull, inexplicably, the courts' otherwise keen sense of fairness.
327. Recall the nonviolent, yet "felonious" criminal acts discussed supra in the text
accompanying notes 307-16.
328. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12.

329. See id. § 14-35.
330. See id. § 14-34.
331. See id. § 14-148.
332. See id. § 14-223.
333. See id. § 14-202.4.
334. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
335. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-283.
336. See id. § 15A-1340.23(c) (providing that, even with five or six prior convictions
under his belt, a person convicted of committing even the most severe misdemeanor
offense-punished at the Al level-will not serve more than 150 days in prison).
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ing in harmful behavior, the Act does not take away their right to pos33 7
sess a firearm.
Assuming the Act's aim is to protect the public by disarming those
who are potentially dangerous, its failure to extend disentitlement to
these overtly malicious criminals is nothing short of amazing. But
more than that, these oversights are revealing. The legislature's willingness to deprive "convicted felons" of their right of self-defense is irreconcilable with its lack of interest in disarming evildoers who
demonstrate malicious or dangerous tendencies. This suggests that
the public safety interest the state will naturally trumpet as "compelling" is really not so compelling after all. In fact, it appears the state
did not feel "compelled" to disarm dangerous misdemeanants. Why,
then, should a conviction for a nonviolent, non-dangerous felonypotentially one that occurred decades ago-trigger disentitlement? It
should not. The statute is not carefully tailored to the state's public
safety interest.
2.

Other Interests

Let us consider now whether the Act's selection of criminals
deserving of disentitlement is narrowly tailored to the "alternative"
state interests introduced earlier in this Comment; namely, prevention
of domestic violence and conformity with federal law. I concede for
the sake of argument that both of these are "compelling" government
interests. The first, of course, is only a variation on the general "public
safety" interest already addressed, reduced to the context of the family
domicile. The second is kept in the game because it will highlight the
outrageousness of the legislature's indiscriminate use of the phrase
"conform to federal law" in justifying its policies.
With respect to the state's interest in combating domestic violence, the over- and underinclusiveness of the Act persists. By disarming even those persons convicted of a nonviolent, non-dangerous
felony,3 38 the Act goes further than the state's interest requires: why
should these folks be deemed more likely than the everyday jaywalker
to commit firearm violence against members of their own households-or against anyone, for that matter? But the statute also goes too
far for another reason. It is overbroad under a domestic violence prevention interest in a way that it is not under the general public safety
interest. This is because even convictions for extremely violent crimes
do not necessarily mean the felon has a propensity to harm his own
337. See id. § 14-415.1; supra text accompanying notes 302-04.
338. See supra notes 307-16 and accompanying text.
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family or household. In fact, a person may be convicted of a violent
and dangerous felony against a non-family member precisely because
he acted out of an impulse to avenge wrongs done to his own family,
household, or intimate partner. 33 9 Because even gruesome, indefensible crimes may originate from the offender's sense of loyalty to and
responsibility for his or her family and not from a propensity to compromise the harmony of the home, the Act's undistinguishing disentitlement of all felons is overinclusive as concerns an interest in
preventing domestic violence. Furthermore, since the Act ignores violent and even habitual misdemeanants 340 -even those which have actually engaged in hostile behavior towards their spouse for an extend
period 34 1 -its proscriptions are also underinclusive with respect to this

interest.
339. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 626 S.E.2d 271, 277 (N.C. 2006) (describing how the
defendant, after fatally shooting another man, assured his girlfriend that the victim
"would never call her a 'bitch' again"); State v. Robertson, 81 S.E. 689, 690-91 (N.C.
1914) (rejecting an argument that the defendant was "defending 'his castle"' when he
shot and killed a man who appeared to have been prevailing against a family guest in a
vicious hand-to-hand struggle in the defendant's home). In State v. Holloway, a man
named Worsley came by the home of John Holloway in search of a stolen wallet, firing
shots at the front door and making threats before leaving. 171 S.E.2d 475, 477 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1970). John feared Worsley would proceed to track down and harm his
youngest son, Phillip, who had not been home. Id. John and his eldest son, Larry,
armed themselves and set out to warn Phillip. Id. When they arrived at the place
where they thought Phillip would be, Worsley ambushed them and a struggle ensued
between him and John. Id. Larry spent his shots trying to break things up, and then
dove into the fracas to aid his father; but Worsley managed to wrestle John's gun away.
See id. At that moment, Phillip entered the building through the back door andseeing Worsley aiming to shoot his brother and father-fired a single shot, killing him.
Id. On these facts, the court of appeals ordered a new trial, holding that it was error
not to "instruct the jury that they could return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter" based on "the right to kill in defense of one's family." Id. at 478-79.
340. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
341. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (describing a variety of misdemeanor assaults,
none of which are punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year). Presumably, a
man could slap his wife across the face on a monthly basis for years on end and still
not become disentitled under the Felony Firearms Act, since he would remain a misdemeanant. See id.; id. § 14-415.1. Note however, that state law does permit domestic
violence protective orders to require a person to relinquish his firearms if he has used
them unlawfully, has seriously injured his spouse or a minor child, or has threatened
to do either of these things or to kill himself. See id. § 50B-3. 1(a). The person may file
a motion to recover the firearms after the protective order expires, but the court must
conduct an inquiry and deny the motion "if [it] finds that the defendant is precluded
from owning or possessing a firearm pursuant to State or federal law." Id. § 50B3.1(f). For an example of this system of disarmament at work, see Gainey v. Gainey,
669 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing trial court's grant of defendant's motion
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As for the question of whether the Act's reach is narrowly tailored
to a compelling interest in conforming state law to federal law, we see
rather quickly that it is not. The first problematic difference between
the Act and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), its federal analogue, is that North
Carolina disarms all felons,3 4 2 whereas Congress has seen fit to disentitle felons that were "convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."' 34 3 . The inclusion of this

"year and a day" prerequisite indicates Congress's awareness of the disparity among the definitions of "felony" throughout the various
states.3 4 4 Put simply, the Felony Firearms Act disarms persons who
would not be affected by § 9 2 2(g)(1), and thus overreaches any state
interest in mimicking that law. At the same time, the Act fails to reach
a variety of other individuals who would become disentitled under
other subsections of § 922, such as "fugitive[s] from justice," 34 5 per-

sons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces,3 4 6 anyone "adjudicated as a mental defective

institution,

'34 7

or

.

.

.

committed to a mental

and (lo and behold) any person "who has been con-

to recover firearms where judge failed to conduct the inquiry required by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50B-3.1(f) and where return of the firearms to defendant would appear to have
been unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(4) (2006) given defendant's commitment to a
mental institution, and thus also unlawful under the aforementioned North Carolina
provision).
342. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1; supra discussion accompanying notes 302-04.
343. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Moreover, the federal rule specifies that the actus reus
involves possessing the firearm "in or affecting commerce." Id. This latter element,
however, appears to have been reduced to a mere formality required of most federal
criminal law by the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See United States
v. Williams, 410 F.3d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a person's possession
of a weapon is "in or affecting commerce" if it crossed state lines at any point prior to
their possession). Even where certain prohibited weapons never cross state lines, such
as homemade machine guns, courts uphold federal bans on such weapons, explaining
that the restriction is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme and that the aggregate effect of homemade machine guns could substantially affect the market for them.
See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). However, if a person
actually does ship or receive a firearm across state lines, it is unlawful even if he is only
under indictment for a "year and a day" offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Thus, an
actual conviction is not necessary where the interstate shipment or receipt renders the
act within the very text of the Commerce Clause. See id.
344. Cf. United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hile
states may vary on what offenses are punishable by a term exceeding one year, it does
not alter Congress' intent to keep guns out of the hands of anyone that a given state
determines to be a felon.").
345. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)( 2 ).
346. Id. § 9 2 2 (g)( 6 ).
347. Id. § 922(g)(4).
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victed in any court of [even] a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 34 8 Clearly the notion that the current Act may be justified on
the grounds that it was at some point modified to conform to federal
law is an erroneous one, because this conformity still does not exist
where it reasonably could have been attempted.
3.

Narrow Tailoring: Learningfrom the Involuntary
Commitment Debate

If the state insists on disarming its citizens, there are more precise
ways for it to go about selecting its victims. The solution is simple:
amend the Act so that it really does impose disentitlement upon people
based on their "potential for dangerousness.

'34 9

The General Assem-

bly's narrow tailoring impulse in other lawmaking contexts supports
the conclusion that it would not be "too difficult [for the state] to pick
and choose which convicted felons should carry a gun and which
should not."3 5 0 A recent example makes this evident.
Following a rather dramatic series of exchanges on the Senate
floor in the summer of 2008, the General Assembly demonstrated a
bipartisan preference for making case-by-case determinations as to
who should be denied the right to have a firearm for self-defense purposes.3 5 Senate Majority Leader Tony Rand introduced a bill in May
of that year which would have required entry into the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 3 52 of any persons "invol-

untarily committed for either inpatient or outpatient mental health
348. Id. § 922(g)(9) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes
338-41.

349. Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting United States
v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also supra discussion accompanying

notes 317-24.
350. Cf. Britt Story, supra note 257 (reporting on statement by Beth Froehling made
on behalf of the North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence).

351. See Capital Beat, http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/archives/2008/
07/gunbill takes.shtml July 10, 2008, 21:55 EST) (reporting that the Senate's deliberations on Senate Bill 2081, infra note 353, proceeded so unpredictably that even the
bill sponsor and fellow-democrat Doug Berger were "going at it pretty good" by the

end of the debates).
352. This computerized background check system was first established as part of
the Brady Act. See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,
§ 103, 107 Stat. 1536, 1541-44 (1993) ("[Tlhe Attorney General shall establish a
national instant criminal background check system that any [licensed firearms dealer]
may contact, by telephone or by other electronic means in addition to the telephone,
for information, to be supplied immediately, on whether receipt of a firearm by a prospective transferee would violate [federal or state law]."); supra note 146.
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treatment. '3 53 The practical effect of this would have been to deny
these persons the ability to purchase any firearm under federal law,35 4
3 55
or a handgun under state law.
When this bill finally came before the Senate for consideration on
July 10, 2008, Senate Minority Leader Phil Berger (of Rockingham
County) introduced a floor amendment limiting the NICS reporting
requirement to those cases in which the involuntarily committed person had actually been found by the court "to be a danger to self or
others. '356 Senator Rand argued against the amendment, insisting that
the involuntariness of the commitments contemplated by the bill
would be enough to indicate the committed person's dangerousness.3

57

He continued:

[W]hat we're talking about here is whether or not you want to allow a
person who is mentally ill. .. to buy a firearm. I do not think that's in
society's best interest. I support the Second Amendment. I think the
right to bear arms, and the hunters, and all that-that's a part of
America. But when you're talking about mental illness and you're talking about the possibility that one will take the lives of others ... in a
significant way, I think society has a right ... to protect itself. And I
don't think anybody who is found to be mentally ill . . .should be

allowed to buy a gun.3 5 8
353. S.B. 2081, 1st Ed., 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2008) (emphasis added).
354. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2006) (making it unlawful to "sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause
to believe that such person ... has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been
committed to any mental institution"); id. § 922(t)(1), (4) (prohibiting dealers from
selling or otherwise transferring a firearm to any person before contacting the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System and being informed by that system that "the information available to the system does not demonstrate that the receipt
of a firearm by such other person would violate [federal] or State law").
355. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402(a) (2007) (making it illegal sell or transfer "any
pistol or crossbow" unless the purchaser or transferee presents a valid purchase permit issued to him by the sheriff in his county of residence); id. § 14-404(a)(1) (requiring local sheriff, prior to issuing such a permit, to conduct a criminal records check of
the applicant by inquiry to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System);
id.§ 14-404(c)(4) (prohibiting local sheriffs from issuing the purchase permit if the
applicant "has been adjudicated mentally incompetent or has been committed to any
mental institution").
356. S.Amend. 1, S.B. 2081, 3d Ed., 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2008).
357. See Capital Beat, supra note 351 ("Rand argued that court-ordered mental treatment is a pretty good indication that something is wrong enough with someone they
shouldn't be buying a weapon.").
358. Audio File: N.C. Gen. Assem., Senate Floor Debate of Senate Bill 2081 (July 10,
2008), available at http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/gun0701008c.mp3
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Senator Berger disapproved of Senator Rand's rhetoric:
[T]hrowing around the concept "mentally ill" in an effort to try to create an emotional fear with reference to what's going on here is a very
easy thing to do. But "mental illness" can be a very broad term, and it
with things that result in people acting in a
doesn't necessarily 3deal
59
dangerous manner.

His rejoinder also emphasized the value of individual rights and the
importance of exercising caution-not political exuberance-when
interfering with them through legislation:
We need to make sure that when we are dealing with people's constitutional rights-the Second Amendment is an individual constitutional
right-that what we are doing is we are carefully crafting the legislation
to meet the problem. The language in the bill that would have every
involuntary commitment, whether inpatient or outpatient, for those
individuals to automatically be reported and ineligible to acquire a firearm, reaches too far. The amendment cures that problem. And if you
want to make an argument that will sound good in a political commercial, and if you want to stir people up, just throw around [the term]
"mentally ill," and that will do [it]. But our job here is not to do that.
Our job here is to pass legislation that addresses problems that are
real. 36 0
Hearing this, Senator Rand responded with what was essentially a
variation on his first argument, using-and emphasizing-the words
"mental illness" or "mentally ill" at least five more times in his ninetysecond riposte.3 6
It was at this point that Senator Doug Berger (of Franklin
County),36 2 a Democrat, surprised everyone in the Chamber3 6 3 by siding with the Republicans on the issue. His opposition to the Majority
Leader's position was unequivocal:
"[M]ental illness" does not equate to being dangerous, and it does not
equate to even being in and of itself a defense in a capital case .... A
(statement of Sen. Tony Rand, Majority Leader). Note that all audio recordings cited to
herein are also available on file with the author.
359. Audio File: N.C. Gen. Assem., Senate Floor Debate of Senate Bill 2081 (July 10,
2008), available at http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/gun0701008d.mp3
(statement of Sen. Phil Berger, Minority Leader).
360. Id.
361. Audio File: N.C. Gen. Assem., Senate Floor Debate of Senate Bill 2081 (July 10,
2008), available at http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/gun0701008e.mp3
(statement of Sen. Tony Rand, Majority Leader).
362. Senator Doug Berger is no relation to Senator Phil Berger.
363. Incidentally, those physically present in the Senate Chamber that day included
the author of this Comment.
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"mentally ill" person can know the difference between right and
wrong.... I disagree again with Senator Rand, [who] suggest[s] that
depression is not a "mental illness." You could have a circumstance
where an elderly person . . . has lost their life partner: they're living
alone, they're extremely depressed, [and] they won't eat. And a family
member tries to get them to eat, [but] they won't eat. [So] they go
through a process of having them involuntarily committed so that
someone will make sure that they eat. But again, think about that.
That person may be a person who's alone; who will go back to a home
that's alone; who late at night, may have somebody try to break in[to]
their house. And it comes back to the core issue that we're talking
about a constitutional right-a constitutional right to have a gun to
36 4
protect yourself.

In addition, later in the debate, Senator Berger (of Franklin) commented that one of the serious problems afoot was that of "liberally
letting people be involuntarily committed on an outpatient basis. '"365
He argued that amending the bill, as proposed by Senator Berger (of
Rockingham), to require a judicial finding of the person's dangerousness prior to adding them to the NICS database would make mental
health care providers "think twice, in terms of being thorough, about
who they're putting back out here on the streets. 3 6 6 In other words, in
the event a mentally ill person ends up shooting someone, "he never
'3 6 7
should have been out on an outpatient basis in the first place.
"But let's just say he was," hypothesized Senator Rand. 3 68 The
embattled Majority Leader then described a fact pattern in which a
confessed murderer was subsequently involuntarily committed on an
outpatient basis after being found to be mentally incompetent. 36 9 In a
37
scolding tone, he then asked, "You'd let him go buy a gun then? 1
Senator Berger answered:
[H]e never should have been out in the first place. He can get a knife;
he can get all kinds of weapons. This comes back to-we're talking
about the right to bear arms, a constitutional right. You're not trying
to get rid of knives; you're not trying to get rid of cars. You're focusing
364. Audio File: N.C. Gen. Assem., Senate Floor Debate of Senate Bill 2081 (July 10,
2008), available at http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/gun0701008f.mp3
(statement of Sen. Doug Berger).
365. Audio File: N.C. Gen. Assem., Senate Floor Debate of Senate Bill 2081 (July 10,
2008), available at http://blog.news-record.com/staff/capblog/gun0701008g.mp3
(statement of Sen. Doug Berger).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. (statement of Sen. Tony Rand, Majority Leader).
369. Id.
370. Id.
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on guns, and you're doing a broad sweep where you're going to affect
law abiding citizens who need to be able to protect themselves.3 7 1
Senator Rand dismissed this reasoning as "fairly amazing," and
called for a vote on the amendment. 372 But the arguments of Senators
Phil Berger and Doug Berger appear to have won the day, as the
amendment passed by a vote of thirty in favor, ten against. 37 3 The
House subsequently concurred on the bill as amended, with almost no
discussion.3 7 4
What this episode demonstrates is that the General Assembly is
not incapable of putting together a narrowly tailored firearms law.
Senator Rand's attempt to bring about this law seemed based almost
entirely on his assumption that the classification "mentally ill" was
determinative concerning individuals' dangerousness and that "throwing around" this label would persuade the other legislators.3 75 But this
tactic earned him stiff criticism, even from members of his own political party. Moreover, his opponents rallied around the importance of
self-defense and the right and ability to exercise it, calling for a "carefully craft[ed]" approach rather than a "broad sweep. 3 76 Of particular
interest is that the Majority Leader's position drew fire for exploiting
the public's distrust of the mentally ill and its fear of gun violence,
conveniently focusing on regulating firearms but ignoring other dangerous instruments, such as knives or motor vehicles.37 7 In short, the
Senate appears to have agreed that the bill-and Senator Rand's strategy-was both overinclusive and underinclusive, as well as based on an
appeal to "emotional fear,"' 378 and that the proper course was to
require a specific finding of dangerousness prior to rendering the indi3 79
vidual in question unable to obtain a firearm.
371. Id. (statement of Sen. Doug Berger).
372. Id. (statement of Sen. Tony Rand, Majority Leader).
373. See N.C. S. Roll Call, S. Amend. 1, S.B. 2081, 3d. Ed., 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2008), available at http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/votehistory/rollcallvote
transcript.pl?ssession=2007&schamber=s&rcs= 1645.
374. See Capital Beat, supra note 351.

375. See supra text accompanying notes 359, 364.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 360, 364, 371.
377. See id.
378. Supra text accompanying note 359.
379. See supra note 373 and accompanying text; Act of July 18, 2008, ch. 210, sec. 1,
§ 122C-54(dl), 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws 896, 896 (showing that the ratified bill included
the insertion added by Senator Berger's amendment, which specified that "[rieporting
of an individual involuntarily committed to outpatient mental health treatment under
this subsection shall only be reported if the individual is found to be a danger to self or

others").

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol32/iss2/6

78

Cochran: A Fighting Chance for Outlaws: Strict Scrutiny of North Carolinas

20101

SCRUTINIZING THE FELONY FIREARMS ACT

The importance of this debate and its outcome for purposes of
scrutinizing the Felony Firearms Act cannot be overstated. If the legislature was so vehement in protecting the gun ownership and selfdefense rights of persons involuntarily deemed to be mentally ill, why
can it not do the same for people convicted of non-dangerous, nonviolent felonies? Senate members knew that the term "mental illness," as
referred to in the mental health field, encompassed not only such
innocuous quirks as nicotine addiction and insomnia, but also severe
and dangerous mental defects.3"' Yet in the face of these potentialities,
they voted to require a specific finding of dangerousness. After all, if
someone truly does present a danger to self or others, a judicial finding
to that effect ought not be too hard to come by.
Thus, one way to improve the Felony Firearms Act would be to
add a provision limiting its applicability to those who, when convicted
of the underlying crime, were deemed dangerous by the court. This
might be accomplished in a variety of ways. One approach might be to
amend the Act to specify that a felony does not trigger disentitlement
unless it was actually punished-as opposed to merely "punishable"by a sentence of more than one year in prison.3 8 1 Presumably, a sentencing judge will not allow a convicted person to live and work in free
society if she thinks that person poses a serious threat to the public.
As Senator Doug Berger might argue, if someone is truly dangerous, we
ought to "think twice" about giving them "outpatient" treatment with
respect to their correction and rehabilitation.3 8 2 And as Justice Scott
explained,
the only successful way to keep "hardened criminals" away from weapons and "hurting people"-is to put them in prison where they can't
hurt anybody else. We don't need to take away someone else's right to
38 3
defend themselves, or their family, to do that.

The arrangement just described might help tailor the Act to disarm only dangerous offenders; but its provisions could be narrower
still. For instance, this approach would not take into account the
380. See Audio File, supra note 359 (statement of Sen. Phil Berger, Minority Leader).
381. This would require striking certain phrases from a sentence in subsection (b)
of the Act so that, as amended, it would read as follows: "The term 'conviction' is
defined as a final judgment in any case in which imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year is imposed." Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(b) (2007) (currently defining
the term "conviction" as "a final judgment in any case in which felony punishment, or

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, as the case may be, is permissible, without regard to the plea entered or to the sentence imposed" (emphasis added)).
382. Audio File, supra note 365 (statement of Sen. Doug Berger).

383. Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.2d 170, 184-85 (Ky. 2006) (Scott, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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decades of good behavior shown by people who may have received
their sentences while Nixon was still the President.3 8 4 Nor would it
limit disentitlement to only those criminals who violently harmed life
or limb, since it includes persons sentenced to year-and-a-day imprisonment for other wrongs, such as counterfeiting.38 5 It would, however,
reach crimes against the habitation, such as arson.38 6
Another possible approach has its roots in the Act's own legislative history. Recall the amendment to the Act proposed by Senator
Vickery in 1975. 38 7 A solution harkening back to the Vickery amendment would involve listing, in the text of the Act, certain dangerous,
violent crimes-as defined in particular sections of the General Statutes-for which disentitlement ought to be imposed. While the
thought of poring over the criminal code in search of crimes indicative
of dangerousness may sound tedious or daunting, it is certainly not
impossible. 38 8
At this point, suffice it to say that the current Felony Firearms Act,
at least with respect to the persons on whom it imposes disentitlement,
is not narrowly tailored to further any compelling state interest. The
384. The problem of perpetual disentitlement is not addressed in this Section, which
focuses on the "who" element of the Act, but in Section B, infra text accompanying
notes 394-477, which analyzes the constitutionality of the "what" element (that is,
what disentitlement really means for the subject individual).
385. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-119(b) (describing a Class G felony, which may be
punished by up to sixteen months in prison if a first offense, according to section 15A1340.17(c)).
386. See id. § 14-58.
387. See supra discussion accompanying notes 111-25.
388. A more adventurous attempt at narrowing might be to add a provision making
the Act applicable only to those with convictions-both felony and misdemeanorwhich required a specific finding that the accused either (1) acted with malice and
with the purpose of causing another person immediate bodily harm or emotional distress, or (2) acted recklessly and unreasonably in creating a substantial and unjustified
risk of immediate and serious bodily harm to self and others. This language, of
course, is simply an example provided for purposes of discussion, and sustained
nitpicking might reveal its inapplicability to a miscellany of dangerous criminal convictions. Yet even in its current form, it would ensure that our notary public would not
find herself disarmed and defenseless after completing a sentence for her non-commissioned notarial act. See supra text accompanying notes 307-10. It would also ensure
that a person convicted of assaulting his own wife for cruelly and disgracefully striking her in the face could not avoid disentitlement purely because his act was a misdemeanor offense instead of a felony. See example supra note 341. In any event, the task
of the legislature would be to craft language which would select for disarmament only
those criminals whose crimes actually demonstrated their "potential for dangerousness." Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 407 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting United States
v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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statute is both overinclusive and underinclusive, and can be modified
so as to more carefully define the person it disarms. But let us now
shift our focus from the Act's victims to the particulars of its vices.

B. Disentitlement: The Unreasonable Imposition of Defenselessness
So what does disentitlement really entail? The conduct the Act
purports to prohibit is possession of any firearm. This prohibition is
not qualified in any way, which means it applies in all places and in all
situations-including those in which the disentitled person needs to
protect herself. 31 9 In addition, disentitlement lasts forever; that is, a
person convicted even forty years ago of any felony is no closer to
regaining his right to keep arms for self-defense than a person convicted yesterday of a far more brutal crime. Neither is there any statutory mechanism in place by which a person might petition to have his
rights restored.
Persons convicted of violating the Act are punished as Class G
felons.3 9 ° Under North Carolina's intricate structured sentencing
rubric, the "presumptive range" of the sentence for a person convicted
of any Class G felony, even assuming his antecedent conviction was for
the most minor of felony offenses, is between twelve and fifteen
months of active imprisonment.3 9 ' In comparison, an actual assault
on emergency room nurses-arguably a more harmful act than the
mere possession of an old shotgun-is only a Class I felony, 39 2 and is
presumptively punishable by no more than six months of jail time.3 9 3
Recall again the example of Joe Smith, the fellow introduced in the
Introduction. Imagine Joe somehow acquires a firearm notwithstanding the 1964 drug conviction that would render him disentitled under
the Felony Firearms Act. Faced with the prospect of being clubbed to
death in his own home by a gang of truants, he may very well deter389. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1.
390. See id. § 14-415.1(a).
391. See id. §§ 15A-1340.14, -1340.17(c). But see Act of Aug. 28, 2009, ch. 556,
2009 N.C. Sess. Laws, http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws/pdf/
2009-2010/s12009-556.pdf (reducing the upper limit of this presumptive range to fourteen months for violations committed after December 1, 2009).
392. See id. § 14-34.6(b).
393. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c). Ironically enough, Republican Senator Phil Berger
(quoted at length supra in the discussion accompanying notes 349-88) sponsored a
bill in February of 2007 which would have raised the penalty for a violation of the
Felony Firearms Act to the Class F level, which calls for between fifteen and nineteen
months imprisonment, presumptively, see id., but the bill died in a Senate Judiciary
Committee. See S.B. 311, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007); 2007 Bill Tracking N.C. S.B. 311 (LexisNexis).
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mine that the possibility of being prosecuted under the Act is not
enough to deter him from keeping his gun. If asked, Joe might explain
his fear that the state will not be able to do anything to stop his attackers until after it is too late. Indeed, until dusty old statute books can
somehow discourage evildoers (who have never read them) from doing
violence to life and limb, it seems unjust to expect someone like Joe to
be deterred by the Act from doing something he feels is essential to
preserving his life-something that in and of itself is patently harmless: keeping a gun.
Now granted: the casual observer might find this disentitlement
business appealing. After all, an armed "convicted felon" is surely
more dangerous than an unarmed one. Yet while naive citizens and
influence-peddling lawmakers might be content to conclude the Act
has the desired effect, such a conclusion requires mistaking the proscription of nonviolent conduct with actual prevention of violence.
This mistake is costly, for it wrongfully deprives many individuals of
the ability to exercise their fundamental right of self-defense. Indeed,
if preserving public safety is the state's compelling interest, the Act's
prohibitive provisions are not a good fit, being both overinclusive and
underinclusive with respect to that end.
1. What Conduct Violates the Act?
Under the Act today, a disentitled person is not allowed "to
purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any
firearm or any weapon of mass death and destruction.

'39 4

But the

actus reus of this crime is rather slippery. Indeed, if the statute means
what it actually says, its actus element is overinclusive for at least two
reasons: (1) it criminalizes ownership, which shares no factual relationship with the dangers it seeks to mitigate, and (2) it is too vague
with respect to the timing of the offense. These overinclusive features
create confusion and the potential for capricious enforcement of the
statute.

394. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(a). For convenience, this discussion will refer in
some instances to all of these prohibited acts collectively as "possession." Note that
the definition of "weapon of mass destruction" includes (1) "[a]ny explosive or incendiary;" (2) "[a]ny type of weapon [generally excluding shotguns] which will, or which
may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other
propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter;" (3) automatic weapons and short-scale shotguns and rifles; and (4) "[amny combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any
weapon described above." Id. § 14-288.8(c).
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So first, notice that "own[ership]" of a firearm is among the conditions which amount to illegal conduct under the Act. 3 95 While there

may be good reasons, practically speaking, to list ownership in the
statute, 396 ownership of firearms, standing alone, is not a condition or
action that is tied in any meaningful way to the problem of gun violence. Even the most hardened and scurrilous of ex-cons does not
endanger society by owning a gun, because ownership is altogether
different from possession; one can have an ownership interest in something without ever having possession of it. As a general matter, bans
on possession of firearms might be described as owing to society's fear
of the possibility that the possessor might actually use the gun in an
unlawful manner, taking advantage of the mere possession. But insofar as disentitlement prohibits mere ownership, it no longer functions
to keep harmless possessive conduct from becoming unlawful, dangerous misuse. In other words, it is not possible for a convicted felon to
take advantage of his mere ownership of a firearm in such a way that
he would cause the types of harms the Act seeks to prevent. To hurt
someone by way of his mere ownership, the felon must also engage in
an additional form of conduct listed in the statute, such as exercising
"control" of the firearm. 3 97 If Betty, for example, is the owner of a rifle
which is held in the care and custody of someone else in a far away
state, she is incapable of harming society through her ownership of
that gun unless she also has such "control" of it that she could direct
the weapon's custodian to use it to harm someone. It is not impossible
to imagine that a disentitled person might inherit a valuable firearm
and want to retain ownership of it without inviting criminal liability,
perhaps anticipating a later sale. Allowing mere ownership of a gun to
constitute a violation of the Act goes too far.
Next, consider the question of time. The Act appears on its face to
apply without regard to the timing or circumstances of the felon's violation.3 98 This presents problems. For instance, suppose Dave is convicted of a crime which triggers his disentitlement. His sentence is
suspended, and he receives probation. As the sentencing judge is
pounding the final gavel, police receive a tip saying Dave has an old
pistol under his bed at home. Can Dave be charged with "own[ing]"
his firearm five minutes after he walks out of the courtroom as a convicted man? What about five minutes after he enters his house? If not,
395. Id. § 14-415.1(a).
396. Such practical concerns include avoiding the raising of certain types of questions: "Is it okay if I just let my next door neighbor keep my guns for me?"
397. See id.
398. See id.
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why not? If something like "lack of opportunity to dispose of the firearm" is any excuse, Dave might also be excused if he had a friend keep
the gun for him, yet continued to "own" it while waiting for someone to
purchase it at a decent price-or if he had "sold" it to the friend with
the understanding that he would need it back. Or would either of
these arrangements still amount to "control" of the firearm? 3 99 Moreover, even assuming Dave managed to make it home and dispose of the
gun at some point during his first few days of life as a convicted felon,
what is to stop the state from saying he was nevertheless in possession
of a firearm at some point after having been convicted of a felony?
40 0
Under the language of the statute, the prosecution should prevail.
To hold otherwise would be to say that a felon being pursued by police
could escape liability under the Act by throwing his stolen handgun
out the car window and into the Cape Fear River, since the gun would
no longer be in his possession, care, or control when he is apprehended by authorities. It is clear that the Act must apply to violations
occurring in the past. The problem is that it looks (potentially) as far
back into the past as the date of the felony conviction which triggered
disentitlement. The vagueness of the Act regarding when someone
becomes criminally liable for the conduct it describes is thus
overbroad.
In short, the Act can be read as allowing almost anything gunrelated, done at any time by a person after receiving a felony conviction, to constitute a violation. The statute contains no requirement
that the prosecution even produce the weapon allegedly possessed (or
owned) by the felon. All that is necessary is for the state to show the
felon had been convicted of a felony and thereafter was in possession
(actual or constructive) of a firearm. This it can accomplish by the
testimony of a single, uncorroborated witness. A more narrowly tailored statute would, at the very least, delete the ownership prong of the
actus reus and would remedy the timing issues discussed.

399. The court of appeals has held that a person may be deemed to have "constructive possession" of an item even when it is not in his "physical custody, but he nonetheless has the power and intent to control its disposition." State v. Alston, 508 S.E.2d
315, 318 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
400. Whether practical factors would prevent these scenarios from ever arising can
have no bearing on an analysis of the plain meaning of the language appearing in the
statute. See In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (N.C. 1978) ("When the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the
courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to
interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.").
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What FirearmsAre Prohibited?

The range of instruments a disentitled individual is prohibited
from possessing is overinclusive, especially in light of the approving
interpretations given to prior, less inclusive versions of the Act. In
United States v. Farrow, for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Act was "regulatory" in nature instead of punitive
(and thus presented no ex post facto problem) because its prohibitions
were "limited to weapons that, because of their concealability, pose a
unique risk to public safety."4 1 At the time Farrow was decided, disentitlement was still based on overall gun length or barrel length.40 2
Accordingly, the court emphasized that "in prohibiting the possession
of handguns and other short firearms, [the Act was] narrowly tailored
to regulate 'only the sorts of firearm possession by felons that, because
of the concealability, power, or location of the firearm, are most likely
to endanger the general public.'

40 3

In contrast, the definition of "firearm" in the current Act-which
includes short guns, long guns, and even the lone frame or receiver of a
gun 4 04 -includes those that do not even "pose a unique risk to public
safety."4 05 Of the range of weapons now prohibited by the statute, perhaps concealable pistols and other small guns are most likely to present a threat-or unique risk-due to the difficulty law enforcement
might face in detecting them. This is something the legislature seemed
to recognize back in 1971.406 But the Act now bars possession even of
granddad's old double-barrel shotgun, which-even if it could be
stowed against the body in an ominous trench coat-could never be
401. United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
402. Recall that the original 1971 version of the Act applied only to a "hand gun or
pistol." See Act of July 19, 1971, ch. 954, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1538, 1538
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2007)). In 1974, the legislature
replaced the term "pistol" with the words "other firearms with a barrel length of less
than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches." Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch.
1196, sec. 1, § 14-415.1(a), 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 320, 320. But soon after Farrowwas

decided, the General Assembly expanded the Act to prohibit the possession of "any
firearm" by felons. Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, sec. 14.1, § 14-415.1(a), 2004 N.C.
Sess. Laws 716, 737-38 (emphasis added).
403. Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555 (quoting United States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 123
(4th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added).

404. The term "firearm" is defined as "any weapon, including a starter gun, which
will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of
an explosive, or its frame or receiver, or ... any firearm muffler or firearm silencer."

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 14-415.1(a).

405. Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555.
406. See supra discussion accompanying notes 70-81.
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tucked neatly inside a shirt pocket. Indeed, it makes owning that gun
illegal even if it has become completely inoperable by misuse, mechani40 7
cal failure, or perhaps rust.
Moreover, the current Act falls short of the Farrow court's expectations, as it is logically impossible for all firearms to be the "sorts of
firearm[s] .

.

. most likely to endanger the general public."40

Not all

members of a group can be described as being superlative to one
another as concerns a single defining characteristic.40 9
In addition, the inclusion of "weapons of mass death and destruction" in the Act's proscription is completely redundant in light of
another statute, which makes it unlawful "for any person [not just
felons] to manufacture, assemble, possess, store, transport, sell, offer
to sell, purchase, offer to purchase, deliver or give to another, or
410
acquire any weapon of mass death and destruction.
But the range of prohibited firearms listed in the statute is also
underinclusive given the exception made for "antique firearms. "411
The definition of antique firearms includes the muzzle loading pistolarguably a concealable weapon which at any time might be used in a
calculated, deadly fashion.4 1 2 Moreover, the exception includes any
gun "manufactured on or before 1898."413 Older weapons, of course,
may be just as lethal as newly manufactured guns. And even if they
have been rendered completely inoperable by the elements or their
own obsolescence, antique firearms are certainly at least as dangerous
as the mere "frame or receiver" of a modern firearm, which, although
useless for firing projectiles on their own, are also prohibited to disentitled persons.414
407. See State v. Jackson, 546 S.E.2d 570, 574 (N.C. 2001) (affirming the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that the firearm possessed by the defendant must be
"operable" in order to make his possession of it illegal).
408. United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1999)).
409. In other words, if Group Z consists of three unique members, A, B, and C, it
could be logical to argue that A is the most dangerous of the three members of Group
Z. It would never be logical, however, to insist that all of the members are at once the
most dangerous members of that group.
410. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.8(c) (2007) (emphasis added).
411. See id. § 14-415.1(a); supra text accompanying notes 217-29.
412. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-409.11(a) ("The term 'antique firearm' [includes
a] muzzle loading pistol ... designed to use black powder substitute, and which cannot use fixed ammunition.").
413. Id.
414. See id. § 14-415.1(a) (2007).
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With respect to a state interest in combating domestic violence,4 15

it is possible that the Act's current, broad definition of firearms is not
overinclusive, since a homicidal householder might murder someone
in the home with a non-concealable long gun just as easily as he might
with a concealable handgun. But the Act still only provides protection
here if all a home's inhabitants have prior felony records and thus
come under its disentitlement.4 1 6 Yet even ignoring that argument, the
range of weapons prohibited under the statute could easily be
described as underinclusive when evaluated under strict scrutiny. A
look at the homicide statistics compiled by the North Carolina Coalition of Domestic Violence shows that while guns are a popular tool for
these killers, their brutal acts are also carried out by more improvisational means.4 17 For many victims, death came at the edge of a knife,
or by strangulation.4 18 In one case, the murder weapon was a hammer.4 19 In another, it was the family car.4 2 ° One killer used arson.4 2 1
Additionally, a study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that
firearms are not the only threat to potential victims of domestic violence.4 2 2 To put it bluntly, if the Act were truly motivated by a compelling interest in preventing domestic violence, it would also prohibit the
convicted felon from having knives, carpentry tools, the car keys, and
even matches.4 2 3 Not to mention the old antique firearm sitting above
the mantle.4 2 4
415. See supra text accompanying notes 293-96.

416. Note that according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 67% of family assault
defendants nationwide did not have a prior felony conviction.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON
STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 47 (2005) [hereinafter FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS],

available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf.
417. See N.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence: 2008 Domestic Violence Homicides, http://www.nccadv.org/homicides-partners-2008.htm (last visited Nov. 22,

2009) (listing and describing the eighty-four domestic violence homicides occurring
in North Carolina from January 1 through December 29, 2008).

418. See id.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See id.

422. See FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 416, at 20 ("When an offender kills
the victim, the weapon is usually a firearm, knife, or blunt object such as a club. Less
frequent are murders that result from the offender's use of hands, fists, or feet.
Murders can also involve the use of ... poisons, narcotics, or incendiary devices.").
423. Cf. Audio File, supra note 365 (statement of Sen. Doug Berger) (criticizing a
legislative attempt to keep guns-but not knives, cars or other weapons-out of the
hands of persons involuntarily committed for mental treatment).
424. See supra text accompanying notes 411-14.
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Oddly enough, the current range of prohibited weapons fits more
squarely with any interest the state may have in conforming to federal
law, which also uses the all-inclusive "any firearm" language but
excepts antique firearms.425 The federal version, however, also prohibits the possession of ammunition.426
3.

Where Does Disentitlement Apply?

For almost thirty years, disentitlement under the Act could reach
no further than the front door of one's home or lawful place of business. This allowed disentitled persons to possess firearms for selfdefense purposes, while nevertheless prohibiting their carrying guns
around on the street, or in public. But the broadening amendments in
2004 quite literally gave the Act a "no-exceptions" character that is not
remotely tailored to achieving the protection of the public.
First of all, the living room of a convicted felon is not the stomping ground of the "public." Statistically speaking, the "public" has
nothing to fear from the ex-con who sits in his own bedroom cleaning
an old hunting rifle-it is his coming out of the home with the gun that
creates a problem. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
roughly 66.3% of all violent crimes committed against strangers
between 1998 and 2002 took place on public or commercial property-not in residences.427
But even if this were not the case, it would hardly justify depriving
the householder of his right to possess a firearm-arguably the most
potent means of defending himself against the froward molestations of
an armed and unwelcome houseguest.42 8 If a member of the public
happens to find himself within the home of a convicted felon who is
bent on causing violence to visitors, it is unreasonable to assume that
the guest is in any less danger of harm if the felon has no firearm.
What makes firearms dangerous is their ability to kill or inflict grave
wounds instantly from a removed position-not their mere presence in
a dresser drawer. Within the closer confines of a home, a gun may
425. See 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(1) (2006) (prohibiting felon from possessing "any firearm"); id. § 921(a)(3) (defining the term "firearm" so as to exclude antique firearms);
id. § 921(a)(16) (defining the term "antique firearm").
426. See id. § 922(g)(1).
427. See FAMILY VIOLENCE STArISTICS, supra note 416, at 9 (Table 2.2).
428. Justice Scalia might agree. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2817 (2008) (describing the home as the place where "the need for defense of self,
family, and property is most acute" and referring to firearms as the means of protection "overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful [self-defense]
purpose").
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become only a louder way to kill or inflict injury. It does not require
much imagination to realize that a homicidal villain's unsuspecting
houseguest could be maimed or slain just as horrifically with a knife, a
baseball bat, or a golf club.4 2 9
But lifting the home exception rendered the Act overinclusive for
another reason. Because a convicted felon cannot have a firearm "in
his custody, care or control,' 4 3' a felon's disentitlement within his own
home also operates to limit the self-defense capability of his spouse or
other cherished cohabitants. Disentitling the felon burdens the fundamental right of self-defense held by his family, whose lawful exercise
of that right becomes unmanageably complex. 43 1 Without convenient

access to a gun, how can a petite housewife resist an overwhelming
physical assault by her burly ex-con husband, who, in the apparent
estimation of the state, is certain to seek her injury at some point following his rehabilitation? Moreover, if a law-abiding woman married
to a felon owns a handgun but is continually required to keep it out of
her husband's "control" at the risk of sending him back to the big
house, it seems impossible that she will ever be able to store the firearm in such a way as to be able to access it quickly in the case of a
sudden threat. What's more, if a gun is not deemed to be within the
husband's possession or "control" by virtue of its being merely "accessible" to him, the state is powerless to prevent the wife from purchasing a gun herself and thereafter storing it at home such that it might be
purloined by her husband.4 3 2 Thus, lacking an exception for home
possession, the Act is either unconstitutionally overinclusive because
of its limiting effect on the spouse's fundamental right, or is so underinclusive that it is unenforceable against the convicted felon where his
spouse's or family member's right to possess firearms for self-defense
purposes continues to be honored.
Removal of the home exception doesn't seem to add anything to
the Act's effectiveness as a means of achieving the protection of the
general public. On the other hand, removing the business exception
429. Cf. supra text accompanying note 417-24.
430. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1(a) (2007).
431. In this instance, Professor Volokh's "burden analysis" has more applicability.
See Posting of Eugene Volokh, supra note 39.
432. For example, the police might search the couple's home following drug charges
against the husband. After finding a small handgun in the nightstand drawer beside
the couple's bed, police determine that it was purchased and is owned by the wife.
However, because the husband could have accessed it easily, the gun may be constructively deemed to be within the husband's "care or control." Arguably, the wife might
face criminal liability for being complicit in her husband's violation of the Felony Firearms Act.
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may bear the proper relationship to an interest in public safety. The
problem is that business owners and operators become easier targets
once statutorily disarmed. Consider the elderly jewelry store proprietor who was convicted of a non-dangerous, nonviolent felony some
twenty years ago. Surely he should have some effective means of
instant resistance when a trio of urbanites decides to invade his place
of business. It seems disingenuous to suppose the proprietor-who
has a natural incentive to earn (and keep) the trust and loyalty of those
who buy his merchandise-would suddenly yield to an aberrant
impulse to shoot up his own store. Certainly he is no more susceptible
to such an impulse than the ordinary non-felon. Market forces thus
militate against an abuse of the business exception.
Might the Act, bereft of the home and business exceptions, nevertheless be said to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest in
preventing domestic violence? Surely it seems to relate to some sort of
interest in making a felon's home a safe place in general, as opposed to
making the public safe. Perhaps this is why the removal of the exception can be found lying in the swath of a very broad "domestic violence" measure.4 3 3 But even as concerns preventing domestic violence,
the unlimited, unqualified disentitlement imposed by the Act is a poor
fit. When the home and business exceptions were stripped away, the
sole explanation of the relationship between these changes and an
interest in preventing domestic violence was that "[f]elons having guns
within their own homes or lawful place[s] of business is not acceptable
especially in a domestic violence situation"4 34 and is "very dangerous
in [the] context of domestic violence.

'43

1

But why was it "not acceptable" for a felon to have a firearm in his
home or business? Fueling such an assumption must be the notion
that "felons" are necessarily unfit to keep arms for self-defense simply
by virtue of their classification as felons. This notion I have assailed at
length already.4 36 Moreover, if the home and business exceptions were
"not acceptable," how exactly did they become "especially" unaccept437
able "in a domestic violence situation"?

First, the suggestion that the Act's business exception posed special dangers for potential victims of domestic violence is obviously
433. See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 182, at 24.
434. CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR OCT. 28, 2003, supra note 193 (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
435. CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR JAN. 7, 2004, supra note 202.
436. Recall the discussion supra accompanying notes 306-37 (examining the
strained relationship between the Act and the prevention or punishment of violence).
437. CRIM. L. SUBCOMM. MINUTES FOR JAN. 7, 2004, supra note 202.
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wrong, as even the violent use of a gun by a felon in his lawful place of
business is, by definition, not a "domestic violence situation." One
might ask, "But what if a person shows up at her spouse's lawful place
of business and is fired upon by the gun-wielding spouse?" This is not
domestic violence as such, but rather, violence against a spouse
outside the domicile and inside the workplace-in other words, it is
workplace violence committed incidentally against a spouse. Thus, not
even a compelling interest in combating domestic violence justifies
expanding disentitlement to the felon's place of business.
Second, this domestic violence justification seems to assume that
a family or household of which a felon is a member is in constant
danger of being set upon by the felon, and therefore it is dangerous for
the felon to have a firearm. But if this is true, the Act is actually underinclusive; for, as already discussed, in order to mitigate the ongoing
domestic threat posed by any convicted felon, the statute ought to
place every sharp object and every blunt instrument out his reach-not
just guns.
Perhaps the no-exceptions Act, as such, fits tightly with our "arguendo interest" in conforming state law to federal law,4 31 since it is true
that the Act's federal analogue does not provide any home or business
exception. Yet the federal law provides for the possibility of other
exceptions-such as through a process in which a disentitled person
may apply to the Attorney General for relief from his or her firearms
disability. 4 39 Thus the Act may still be overinclusive with respect to a
438. Recall the discussion of this interest beginning supra with the text accompanying note 297.
439. Indeed, unlike North Carolina law, the federal code regulating firearms provides that
[a] person who is prohibited from possessing . . . firearms or ammunition
may make application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities
imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer,
shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regardingthe disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are
such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest.
18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2006) (emphasis added). The question of whether relief is ever
actually granted under this provision, however, is an altogether different inquiry.
Since 1992, Congress has refused to fund the processing of these relief applications.
See United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74-75 (2002). Thus, no relief from a federal
firearms disability has been granted-or even formally denied-by the Attorney General in many years. See id. But this is inapposite as concerns the point being made in
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conformity-to-federal-law interest. This brings us to the next problem
with the statute: the perpetuity of its application.
4.

How Long Will Disentitlement Last?

If a person has been convicted of a disentitling felony, the Act
disarms her forever. As the North Carolina Court of Appeals
explained, the statute's language "contains no time bar. ' 440 As we have
learned, this was not always the case. 4 41' But it is now clear, even to the
federal courts, that the Act's disentitlement continues "regardless of
how much time has passed since conviction, release, or termination of
44 2
the sentence.
But even though the Act does not itself allow for relief from disentitlement, it appears a person might recover her rights to possess a
firearm by receiving an "unconditional pardon" of her underlying felony from the Governor.4 4 3 Such pardons appear to be granted only to
those "who have maintained a good reputation in their community,
following the completion of their sentence. '4 44 In addition, the person
applying for pardon ordinarily "must wait to apply until at least five
445
years have elapsed since [she] was released from State supervision.
While the possibility of receiving an unconditional pardon after
five years of one's felony might seem to mitigate against the Act's proscriptive perpetuity, the reality here is more grim. By the end of his
final year as North Carolina's highest executive official, former twothe text accompanying this footnote, since Congress may at any time decide to fund
the § 925(c) process anew.
440. State v. Gaither, 587 S.E.2d 505, 510 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (describing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2003)).
441. See Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, sec. 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1273, 1273
(creating a five-year limit to disentitlement); supra discussion accompanying
notes 149-56 (describing the demise of the disentitlement cap in 1995).
442. United States v. Clark, 324 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D. Me. 2004).
443. N.C. Office of Executive Clemency: Glossary of Terms, http://www.doc.state.
nc.us/clemency/glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (describing an "unconditional pardon" as one that is "granted primarily to restore an individual's right to own
or possess a firearm," and which "is granted without any conditions or restrictions");
see also N.C. CONST. art. Il, § 5, cl. 6 ("The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses (except in cases of impeachment),
upon such conditions as he may think proper, subject to regulations prescribed by law
relative to the manner of applying for pardons."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1(2) (2007)
("Any person convicted of a crime, whereby the rights of citizenship are forfeited, shall
have such rights automatically restored upon the . . . unconditional pardon of the
offender.").
444. See N.C. Office of Executive Clemency, supra note 443.
445. Id.
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term Governor Mike Easley had granted only five of the 756 requests

for pardons he received.4 4 6 There is no indication that Easley's successor, Governor Bev Perdue, will operate any differently.44 7 These sobering facts mean disentitlement under the Felony Firearms Act, once
earned, is virtually everlasting.
This arrangement allows a person's constitutional rights to be
defined by the subjective decision of a single official who cannot be
held accountable for his or her decision. As such, the possibility of a
pardon does not remedy the Act's overinclusiveness. Consider the case
of the young woman who is convicted of a non-dangerous, nonviolent
felony. She serves her prison sentence and is then permitted to reintegrate into society. In light of the Act's tenuous logical connection with
any compelling interest, it seems peculiarly senseless and unnecessary
to disarm this person for the rest of her life-especially since she
remains just as vulnerable to the acts of violent criminals as the rest of
us, if not more so.4 48 If she lives the life of a model citizen for the next
forty years, she may find herself an elderly woman with no way to stop
an armed intruder.4 4 9 Instead of inviting this scenario, a fair statute
would allow this woman to demonstrate her willingness to obey the
law to some adjudicative body, which could then restore her rights.
But even if we generously assume for the moment that the Act is
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in all other respects (that is,
assuming the state is entitled to disarm all felons in all places regardless of their potential dangerousness to society in those places), it does
not necessarily follow that such a deprivation of rights must last forever to further the state's interests. If the General Assembly wishes to
legislate with a public safety interest in mind, it can create an effective
mechanism that might nevertheless respect the self-defense needs of
446. See MarkJohnson et al.,
Easley Unlikely to Hand Out Pardons Like Candy, NEws
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 14, 2008, at B3, available at 2008 WLNR 23960207

(reporting on pardons as of the date of publication and noting that Easley's last day in
office would be January 10, 2009); cf. Capital Beat, http://blog.news-record.com/
staff/capblog/archives/2009/01/easley-on the w.shtml Uan. 10, 2009, 8:47 EST)
(reporting that Easley issued no pardons on the way out of office, though he did
reduce the sentences of two convicts).
447. See A Priori Concepts, http://jeffreysykes.wordpress.com/2009/01/10/pardon-me (Jan. 10, 2009, 18:43 EST) ("[W]ith Easley declining to give me a pardon ...[,]
I'm not going to wait around for Bev Perdue to consider my request.").
448. Perhaps the stigma of her former offense would make it difficult for her to
reunite with a family or to form a new support group that otherwise might help shield
her from some of the hazards of post-confinement life as a convicted felon.
449. Compare Audio File, supra note 365 (statement of Sen. Doug Berger) (providing
an analogous example).
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felons who have served their sentence and lived blamelessly in free
society for a number of years. Indeed, as the following example shows,
the state has made these sorts of compromises before.
5. Narrow Tailoring: Learning from Driving Laws
North Carolina has demonstrated its willingness and ability to
adopt very precise and elaborate statutory schemes in the interest of
keeping certain privileges out of the hands of those persons who have
proven themselves to be dangerous. The way in which the General
Assembly has responded to the serious problem of intoxicated driving
provides a template, more or less, for improving the Felony Firearms
Act so as to make disentitlement more narrowly tailored to compelling
interests.
While the state has been criticized by some as having inadequate
firearms regulations,4 5 ° it has at times been praised for being "tough
on drunk drivers."' 45 1 But the word "tough" may be misleading. It
seems, rather, that in comparison to the Felony Firearms Act, the statutory scheme addressing intoxicated drivers is reasonable and fair.
Under current law, if a person is convicted of an offense which
calls for mandatory revocation of her driving privileges (a revocation
offense),4 5 2 the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) is required to suspend or revoke her license for a period of time.49 3 Each revocation
offense calls for punishment of a slightly different type and duration,
depending on the severity and dangerousness of the particular offense
450. See, e.g., Thomasi McDonald, North Carolina Group Wants Lawmakers to Close
"Gun-Show" Loophole, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 12, 2003 (reporting Lisa
Price, Executive Director of North Carolinians Against Gun Violence, as suggesting
that the legislature should be "embarrassed" about loopholes allegedly contained in
the state's gun laws).
451. WRAL.com: Governor's Commission Looking to Make Tough Drunk Driving
Laws Tougher (Dec. 2, 1998), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/131481 (saying
also that "North Carolina is leading the country in the fight against drunk driving").
But see About.com: 60 Year Sentence!, http://alcoholism.about.com/library/weekly/a
a000116a.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) ("It's good to see that North Carolina is
finally beginning to take responsibility for maintaining the safety of its highways by
putting Melissa Marvin behind bars for 60 years, but it's a bit too late for [the teenagers she killed while driving with a blood alcohol content of .21]." (discussing State v.
Marvin, No. 99-CRS-2022-26, 2002 WL 416560 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2002)).
452. These offenses are listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-17 (2007) ("The Division shall
forthwith revoke the license of any driver upon receiving a record of the driver's conviction for any of the following offenses ....").Our discussion will focus on the
offense of "impaired driving," which is made a revocation offense by section 2017(a)(2).

453. Id. § 20-19.
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as well as the likelihood of a repeat offense.4" 4 Moreover, the law
spells out how-and whether-the DMV is to go about restoring the
driving privileges of these offenders prior to expiration of the revocation period.45 5 Restoration is accompanied by various mandatory
restrictions or conditions, as well as other conditions which might be
imposed according the discretion of the DMV. 45 6 Impaired driving is a
revocation offense.4 57
For example, if a person is convicted of impaired driving for the
first time, the law requires the DMV to revoke her driver's license for a
one-year period. 4 58 Assuming she behaves herself and does not drive
during this period, her license will be restored at its conclusion. When
the DMV restores her license, it is required to do so on the condition
that she not drive with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.04%
or more for the next three years.45 9 If she is caught driving either
before her privilege has been restored or after it is restored but with a
BAC of 0.04% in violation of the DMV's restriction, she will earn
another one-year revocation.4 6 °
If she continues her drinking and driving after this and is convicted of yet another impaired driving offense within three years of her
first one, her license will be mandatorily revoked again-this time for
four years. 4 6 ' If her license is restored after this, it will be on condition
454. See id.
455. See id.
456. See id.
457. Impaired driving means operating a vehicle either "[w]hile under the influence
of an impairing substance" or after having consumed enough alcohol to achieve, "at
any relevant time after the driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08[%] or more." Id.
§ 20-138.1(a). Being "under the influence of an impairing substance" is defined as
"having [one's] physical or mental faculties, or both, appreciably impaired by an
impairing substance." Id. § 20-4.01(48b).
458. See id. § 20-19(cl) ("When a license is revoked [pursuant to a conviction for
impaired driving] .

. . ,

the period of revocation is one year.").

459. See id. § 20-19(c3)(1) ("When the Division restores a person's drivers license
which was revoked [for impaired driving], it shall place the [following] restriction on
the person's drivers license . . .: For the first restoration of a drivers license for a
person convicted of driving while impaired .

. . , that

the person not operate a vehicle

with an alcohol concentration of 0.04[%] or more at any relevant time after the driving."); id. § 20-19(c3) ("The restrictions placed on a license under this subsection shall
be in effect (i) seven years from the date of restoration if the person's license was
permanently revoked, (ii) until the person's twenty-first birthday if the revocation was
for [impaired driving], and (iii) three years in all other cases.").
460. See id. ("A violation of a restriction imposed under this subsection or the willful refusal to submit to a chemical analysis shall result in a one year revocation.").
461. See id. § 20-19(d).
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that she not drive with a BAC of more than 0.00%.462 If even a sip of
beer at a party shows up on the breathalyzer test, she will have again
violated the condition of her restored privilege, and will be in even
more hot water.
But interestingly, the law also provides that after at least two years
of the revocation period have elapsed, theDMV is allowed to restore
the person's driving privilege if she can prove to the DMV that:
(1) [She] has not in the period of revocation been convicted in North
Carolina or any other state or federal jurisdiction of a motor vehicle offense, an alcoholic beverage control law offense, a drug law
offense, or any other criminal offense involving the possession or
consumption of alcohol or drugs; and
(2) [She] is not currently an excessive user of alcohol, drugs, or pre4 63
scription drugs, or unlawfully using any controlled substance.
These standards become even higher, the revocation period even
longer, and the restrictions and conditions more severe if the person
4 64
makes the mistake of committing a third impaired driving offense.
But even after license revocation becomes "permanent" due to this
third offense, the statutes provide for restoration after three years if the
person proves both of the elements above, or after two years if she also
shows that she "has not consumed any alcohol for the [twelve] months
preceding the restoration while being monitored by a continuous alcohol monitoring device of a type approved by the Department of Correction. ' 4 65 However, everything changes if the person commits a fourth
impaired driving offense.4 6 6 If convicted, she will lose not only her
4 67
right to drive a car, but also her freedom.
Note carefully what these impaired driving laws do not do. They
do not make it illegal for the unlicensed individual to "purchase, own,
[or] possess" a motor vehicle, or to have one in her "custody, care, or
control. '4 68 Rather, the statutes make it illegal for her to do a certain
thing with that vehicle in certain places; namely, to drive it on the
highway. 46 9 Thus, for example, they do not prohibit her from driving
462. See id. § 20-19(c3)(2).
463. Id. § 20-19(d).
464. See id. § 20-19(e)-(e3).

465. Id. § 20-19(e2)(1).
466. See id. § 20-138.5.
467. See id. § 20-138.5(b) ("A person convicted of violating this section shall be
punished as a Class F felon and shall be sentenced to a minimum active term of not
less than 12 months of imprisonment, which shall not be suspended.").
468. Id. § 14-415.1(a).
469. See id. § 20-7(a) ("To drive a motor vehicle on a highway, a person must be
licensed.., to drive the vehicle and must carry the license while driving the vehicle.");
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around in an old pickup truck on her family's farmland to help with
the crops. She may even take the farm tractor itself out on the roads
with no penalty, presumably because a slow-moving piece of farm
machinery is not as dangerous a weapon as a minivan hurtling along
at ninety miles per hour. 470 Nor do these laws keep her from riding a
moped, as this lightweight transport cannot reasonably be said to
endanger the highway drivers of sport utility vehicles or other standard
cars. 7 ' The penalty imposed on impaired driving offenders is directly
related to the state's objective of preventing the likely misuse-not possession-of dangerous instrumentalities.
The Felony Firearms Act should be amended to follow suit. Just
as license laws do not keep the DUI offender from driving on her own
land, firearms disentitlement need not extend into the home of the
convicted felon. Nor should it reach his private lands, on which he
might very well need to carry a firearm to protect himself from wild
beasts as he harvests timber from his wooded acreage. And just as
license laws do not apply to less-dangerous vehicles like tractors and
mopeds, the Act's disentitlement should not apply to weapons like
shotguns, whose spread patterns have a fairly short effective range and
thus do not create the same degree of risk as bullets fired from, say, a
high-powered rifle that is poorly aimed or accidentally discharged.472
Consider also that these impaired driving provisions do not treat
all impaired drivers alike in every instance. For instead of kowtowing
to media hysteria and public outrage whenever a tragic drunk driving
accident has claimed innocent lives, the legislature has recognized that
the better approach is to administer "different strokes for different
folks." A first-time offender has not necessarily proven herself to be
road hazard to the same extent as the person who has just been conid. § 20-4.01(13) (defining the term "highway" as "[tihe entire width between property
or right-of-way lines of every way or place of whatever nature, when any part thereof is
open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular traffic,"
and stating that "[t]he terms 'highway' and 'street' and their cognates are
synonymous").
470. See id. § 20-8(2).
471. See id.§ 20-8(7).
472. See DuckHuntingChat.com: Shotgun Shell Ballistics & Penetration (Dec. 17,
2008), http://www.duckhuntingchat.com/shotgun-shell-ballistics.php (describing, for
example, how even if fired at a velocity of 600 feet per second from a distance as close
as 37 yards, a No. 7 shotgun pellet only penetrates ballistic gel to a depth of 0.79
inches). A person firing a blast of shotgun pellets at an intruder inside his home is
unlikely to injure the next door neighbor. On the other hand, a round fired off indoors
by a hunting rifle might travel straight through the wall of the home and injure those

nearby.
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victed of his third DUI in as many months. An automobile can surely
be a deadly weapon in the wrong hands, and it only takes one accident
to ruin many lives forever-and many have been ruined.4 7 3 Yet the
General Assembly has been careful to distinguish between habitual,
recalcitrant offenders who ought to be kept off the road permanently,
and those who should instead regain their privileges after having
proven themselves capable of behaving soberly, safely, and responsibly. The Felony Firearms Act could be amended to provide for a similar system, involving perhaps the conditional restoration of firearms
rights, or a disentitlement of shorter duration for persons convicted of
their first offense or minor, nonviolent crimes.
It is also important to recognize that unlike many of the felonies
which trigger disentitlement under the Act, impaired driving is an
offense that actually shows the offender to pose a risk of harm-a risk
stemming directly from an abuse of the same privilege the law revokes.
Disentitling events under the Felony Firearms Act, on the other hand,
include even those acts which may have nothing at all to do with a
person's abuse of the right the Act operates to infringe. The Act
declares, "The state has labeled you a 'felon,' so I must take away your
fundamental right to keep and bear arms even though you might not
have done anything to abuse that right." Meanwhile, North Carolina's
impaired driving laws say to the offender, "You have used your driving
privilege improperly and unsafely, so we must withhold that privilege
from you."
The careful tailoring of the laws relating to impaired driving
offenses becomes all the more remarkable when we realize the "right"
at issue when a driver's license is revoked is a privilege inferior, constitutionally speaking, to the fundamental right of self-defense. If the
state is willing to treat the privilege to drive a car on the highway with
such reverence, surely it can fashion an improved version of the Felony
Firearms Act which pays proper respect to the importance of an individual right to keep arms for lawful self-defense purposes. And if there
is any confusion as to how to go about fixing the Act, the General
Assembly need look no further than the statute's own legislative history for examples of measures which kept disentitlement tailored to the
state's interest, to wit: prohibiting only short-scale or concealable
473. See N.C. GOvERNOR's HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM, HIGHWAY SAFETY: ANNUAL
(2007), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/nhtsa/whatsup/safeteaweb/fy
07/fyO7annrpts/ncarolina_2007annrpt.pdf (Table: Crash Data/Trends) (reporting that
in North Carolina, every year from 1997 through 2006, between 1483 and 1596 people died in car crashes, and that between 354 and 469 of these driving fatalities each
year were alcohol related).
REPORT
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guns,
excepting home and business possession,4 75 and limiting disentitlement to a certain number of years 4 76 or at least providing for a
rights-restoration process.477
To summarize this Section briefly, the actual contours of disentitlement under the Act are far too broad to render the statute narrowly
tailored to any of the state interests addressed. First, while there may
be significant reasons for denying concealable weapons to persons convicted of violent felonies, the Act goes too far in dispossessing persons
of all types of firearms-particularly when it clumsily allows "antique"
firearms to remain in circulation among felons, together with other
dangerous implements such as automobiles or garden tools. Second,
for no reason should the Act continue to operate without the home
exception, which has been missing since 2004. Extending disentitlement past the threshold of the convicted felon's home was a mistake.
If a person truly cannot be trusted with a gun in his own home, he
should not be released from prison to start with. Moreover, imposing
disentitlement on the felon in his home leaves his family members disarmed as well, or at least incalculably complicates their lawful exercise
of the right of self-defense. Finally, there is simply no support for the
notion that a person-even one convicted of something like felonious
assault-should continue to suffer disentitlement four or five decades
after he has served his sentence. The General Assembly has been able
to fashion a sensible and flexible system allowing restoration of driving privileges for convicted impaired motorists who meet certain
requirements; surely it should be just as eager to restore the powers of
self-defense to trustworthy persons whenever it is reasonable to do so.
C.

Hunting for Results-based Proof of Narrow Tailoring

In the nearly four decades that have transpired since the Felony
Firearms Act became law, not once has the North Carolina legislature
conducted a study to determine whether it has had the desired
effect. 4 78 Perhaps the Act (like other gun restrictions) may have served
474. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 126-36 (describing the home and business
exceptions).
476. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09 (describing the disentitlement cap).
477. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90 (describing the restoration

exemption).
478. Indeed, former Senator Ed Knox, who introduced the original Act, reports that
when he ran for governor in 1984, he received criticism for having once proposed a
reexamination of North Carolina's gun possession laws. Telephone Interview, supra
note 65. Knox says his opponents distorted that proposal, insinuating that he

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

99

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6

432

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:333

the political interests of legislators, who congratulated themselves in
the public eye for having supported such a noble, protective statute;
who convinced themselves that even the appearance of fighting crime
would be reason enough for keeping the law around. But has the Act
ever done any good? Is there any evidence that would suggest its provisions-which appear so vastly overinclusive and so anemically
underinclusive-are nevertheless accomplishing the purposes of the
state?
First of all, the number of firearm-related deaths annually in
North Carolina has remained fairly constant over the entire course of
the Act's development.4 7 9 Further, North Carolina's violent crime
figures have tracked the national average with remarkable consistency
throughout this period.48 ° And interestingly, the largest percentage
drops in the state's violent crime rate and firearm homicide figures
appear to coincide with the narrowing amendments enacted in 1975
and with the advent of the Brady Act. 4 8 ' Similarly, domestic violence
homicides in North Carolina have actually increased slightly since the
broadening amendments of 2004.482 This suggests that the Act has
very little to do with how many individuals in the state are put in danger by firearms.
One reason for the Act's statistical lack of effectiveness is that it is
only logically capable of preventing opportunistic or impulsive gun
violence, which is nonetheless intentional conduct. The sensibleness
of disentitlement depends on assuming that a person convicted of any
significant "intent crime" (one requiring proof of intent to satisfy its
mens rea element) will commit intentional wrongdoing again. But
another assumption is necessary if the Act is to marry with its objecintended to put guns into the hands of dangerous criminals. Id. Ironically, this tactic
ignored Knox's role in disarming felons.
479. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Homicide: State Level, http://
bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/search/homicide/state/statehomicide.cfm (follow
"One Year of Data" hyperlink) (select "Weapons Type" variable for North Carolina and
produce data table for each year beginning with 1976 and ending with 2005).
480. See Data Chart: N.C. Violent Crime Rate Compared to Neighboring States and
National Average (2009) (on file with author) (using Bureau of justice Statistics data to
track relevant violent crime rates between 1960 and 2006 in relation to the amendments to the Felony Firearm Act enacted during that period).
481. See id.
482. See North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Homicides, http://
www.nccadv.org/homicides.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (follow hyperlinks to
domestic violence homicide figures for years 2002 through 2008) (reporting 79
domestic violence murders in 2002, 46 of which were committed with guns; 72 in
2003, 34 with guns; 81 in 2004, 46 with guns; 71 in 2005, 39 with guns; 79 in 2006,
41 with guns; 86 in 2007, 40 with guns; and 87 in 2008, 45 with guns).
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tive: we must assume that the convicted felon, possessed once again of

evil intent, will lust for-rather than any other weapon-a firearm with
which he might inflict dread casualty upon an innocent. We must also
assume that this violent man will be substantially deterred from his
quest if the law has instructed him not to keep a gun handy, and that
he will not content himself with an alternative weapon equivalently
suited for the task.
Simply put, violent people are given no reason to stop being violent simply because they are told they cannot have a firearm. When
the state elects not to keep such a criminal imprisoned, but instead to
turn him out into free society, his capacity for violence suffers no real
limitation other than that imposed by the borders of his own creativity.
While this Comment does not pretend to make an exhaustive
inquiry into the relevant statistics, available data nevertheless indicates that the answer to the above question-that is, whether the Act
has been effective in reducing overall violent crime, firearm injuries or
deaths, or domestic violence-is simply "no."
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has assumed that all persons have an individual,
fundamental right to self-defense protected by the Constitution's Due
Process Clause. In its current form, North Carolina's Felony Firearms
Act infringes on that right by denying an impermissibly broad classification of individuals the ability to acquire, own, control, or otherwise
possess a firearm-even in their own home, faced with a life-threatening situation. Even when the person whose rights have been deprived
has shown a flawless respect for the law for the past forty years. Even
when that person's original "felony" was nothing more than an innocuous violation of a technical rule. Even when other, comparatively more
violent criminals get to keep their firearm. While the Britt v. State
decision ultimately turned out well for Barney Britt, individuals in his
situation should be able to preserve their fundamental right to selfdefense without being forced to spend nearly half a decade locked in
litigation.
The Act's objectives, however, can be substantially realized
through a more narrowly-tailored legislative approach. The General
Assembly is indeed capable of more careful statutory craftsmanship,
as it has demonstrated in addressing the rights of involuntarily committed persons and the privileges of intoxicated drivers. There seems
to be no reason that the state's lawmakers should not step up to the
task once again. Of course, it will be difficult for elected representatives and senators to muster the courage to vote in a way that will be
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construed by the press as putting guns into the hands of "convicted
felons." North Carolina may indeed choose to continue disarming
some of its most productive and loyal citizens, blissful in its false confidence that the Britt decision represents the high-water mark of postHeller challenges to firearms restrictions. But if she has any sense, the
Old North State will take new aim at the Felony Firearms Act, will pin
this unjust, ineffective statute under the crosshairs of the Second
Amendment and the fundamental right of self-defense, and will pull
the trigger.
It's worth a shot.
Matthew Jordan Cochran
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